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I. Introduction 
Among the Rehnquist Court's more shiking accomplishments are the 
invigorated takings and state sovereign immunity doctrines. At first glance, 
these developments might be characterized as conservative jurisprudence in 
line with other recent decisions. Expanded takings doctrine, after all, 
champions property rights and restrains government from burdening 
landowners with the cost of regulation. Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity,' like the Court's other federalism decisions, protects the states' 
dignity and curtails the federal government's power. From a broad level of 
generality, these doctrines seem part of a common judicial project. 
And yet, though they are products of the same Court, there is reason to 
think that takings and state sovereign immunity cases are fundamentally 
incompatible with each other. On the one hand, the Court's recent takings 
cases often expand the instances in which a property owner can sue the 
government to recover just compensation for a taking of property. On the other 
hand, the state sovereign immunity cases make it easier for state governments to 
rely on sovereign immunity to shield them from suit. Of course, this rough 
characterization misses terrific doctrinal complexities but, at their core, these 
two doctrines do not mesh easily. 
Curiously, despite the Court's recent attention to these areas, little has 
been made of the seeming incompatibility of such robust takings and sovereign 
immunity precedents. In recent memory, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
the paradox rarely, most famously in 1987, in a footnote in First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of LQS ~ n ~ e l e s ?  in which 
the Court offhandedly asserted that the Just Compensation Clause trumps 
1. My references to "Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity" refer generally to state 
sovereign immunity. However, as discussed in Parts III, V, and VI, the Court's recent decisions 
in Seminole Tribe and Alden seem to root state sovereign immunity in pre-constitutional 
common law grounded in the structure of the Constitution, thus expanding the doctrine far 
beyond the Eleventh Amendment's textual confines. 
2. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304 (1987). 
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sovereign i~nrnunity.~ This First English footnote might, in fact, have it right, 
but the issue requires greater exploration. First, the footnote is dictum, because 
the plaintiffs in First English sued the county, not the state. Second, state and 
lower federal courts are split on the question, and many decisions have 
neglected to cite, let alone follow, the footnotes4 Third, both areas of law have 
-- - 
3. Footnote nine reads: 
The Solicitor General urges that the prohibitory nature of the Fifth Amendment, 
combined with principles of sovereign immunity, establishes that the Amendment 
itself is only a limitation on the power of the Government to act, not a remedial 
provision. The cases cited in the text, we think, refute the argument of the United 
States that "the Constitution does not, of its own force, furnish a basis for a court to 
award money damages against the government." Though arising in various factual 
and jurisdictional settings, these cases make clear that it is the Constitution that 
dictates the remedy for interference with property rights amounting to a taking. 
Id. at 316 n.9 (internal citations omitted). 
4. The most thorough state judicial treatment of this problem is the Oregon Court of 
Appeals's decision in Boise Cascade COT. v. Oregon, 991 P.2d 563 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). The 
court there concluded that "Alden should not be read so broadly as to dictate that states may not 
be sued in state courts on federal takings claims unless they have specifically waived their 
sovereign immunity." Id. at 569; see also Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 90 P.3d 506, 
509 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (declining to follow Boise Cascade and finding sovereign immunity 
to bar takings claim), cerr. granted, Manning v. N.M. Energy & Minerals, 92 P.3d 11 (N.M. 
2004); SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 650 N.W.2d 1,9 (S.D. 2002) (following Boise Cascade). 
Federal appellate courts have generally ruled that the Eleventh Amendment does bar 
takings suits, but they have not engaged with the issue carefully. Indeed, most fail to even cite 
First English. See, e.g., Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277-79 (1 1th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars takings claims in federal court, in part because state 
courts provide means for redress, but failing to cite First English); John G. & Marie Stella 
Kenedy Mem'l Found. v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667,674 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars Fifth Amendment inverse condemnation suits brought in federal district court, 
but failing to cite First English); Robinson v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 966 F.2d 637, 640 (1 lth 
Cir. 1992) (same); Broughton Lumber Co. v. Columbia River Gorge Comrn'n, 975 F.2d 616, 
618-20 (9th Cir. 1992) (deciding that inverse condemnation suits are barred in federal district 
court, without citing First English); Citadel Corp. v. P.R. Highway Auth., 695 F.2d 31,33-34 
n.4 (1st Cir. 1982) (finding the same before the Supreme Court had decided First English); 
Garrett v. Illinois, 612 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding a takings claim against the 
state barred by the Eleventh Amendment); see also Esposito v. S.C. Coastal Comrn'n, 939 F.2d 
165,173 n.3 (4th Cir. 1991) (Hall, J., dissenting) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment must yield 
to takings claim, even though majority notes that plaintiffs did not challenge on appeal district 
court's ruling that Eleventh Amendment barred damages). The only federal appellate case to 
deal with these issues in any depth is the Sixth Circuit's recent decision, DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 
381 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2004), cerr. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1733 (2005), which rules that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars takings suits against the state in federal court, but would not do so in 
state court. Id. at 526-28. Unlike most other federal appellate decisions in this area, DLXdoes 
cite First English, id. at 527, but nevertheless finds that state sovereign immunity bars takings 
actions for damages against the state in federal court. Id. at 528. It is noteworthy that state and 
federal courts have tended to go in opposite directions on this issue, especially in light ofAlden 
v. Maine, which arguably might require symmetrical immunity rules between the state and 
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changed significantly since 1987. Fourth, even if correct, the footnote is terse 
and does not wrestle with the issue's real complexities. Indeed, the conflict 
exposes deep tensions in our constitutional framework worthy of sustained 
analysis. Fifth, the doctrinal collision raises important, if more abstract, 
methodological questions about how to arbitrate between competing 
constitutional provisions. 
It is interesting that the problem has received so little attention. The Court 
itself might have addressed it as recently as 2001 in Palauolo v. Rhode ~sland: 
but it declined to answer an amicus briefs argument that Rhode Island was a 
sovereign state immune from suit even in takings cases.6 Admittedly, the Court 
is understandably reluctant to address newly presented arguments appearing 
only in amicus briefs. But quite possibly, the Court also recognized that 
squaring the two doctrines would be no small task, so it chose not to expose a 
snag in its case law. After all, addressing the doctrinal train wreck might have 
encouraged the Court to scale back one area to make room for the other, an 
outcome that, though perhaps logically more sound, was not required, given 
that both doctrinal lines had consistently commanded five votes.' Whatever the 
reason, the current Court has avoided the issue to date.8 
federal judicial systems. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing Alden and the implication that state 
sovereign immunity applies equally in state and federal courts). 
5. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
6. Brief for the Board of County Commissioners of the County of La Plata, Colorado et 
al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Respondents State of Rhode Island, Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047), 2001 WL 15620, at 20-21. The Court opted not to 
address the collision, proceeding as though it accepted First English's assumption that the 
Takings Clause does trump sovereign immunity. SeePalauolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18 (addressing 
petitioner's takings claim against the state and stating that "the two threshold considerations" 
were ripeness and that the deprivation preceded petitioner's ownership). 
7. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas quite 
consistently supported the expansion of both takings and state sovereign immunity law. These 
five again comprised the majority in Palauolo. Palauolo, 533 U.S. at 610. 
8. Scholars have given slightly more attention to the problem, noting the paradox on 
occasion, though usually just in a short paragraph or in a footnote. See, e.g., RICHARD H .  
FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 379,100243 
(4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (discussing the role of sovereign immunity with 
respect to the Takings Clause); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: 2002 SUPPLEMENT 181-82 (2002) [hereinafter HART & 
WECHSLER, 2002 SUPPLEMENT] (discussing cases that preceded Alden v. Maine and their 
implications for state sovereign immunity in cases involving constitutional rights); LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1273 n. 18 (3d ed. 2000) (noting the Court's stance in 
regards to the Takings Clause); Jack M. Beennann, Government Oficial Torts and the Takings 
Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 328 (1988) 
(discussing federalization of state ton law in context of Takings Clause prior to recent Eleventh 
Amendment decisions); Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial 
Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 138 
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This Article explores the paradoxes arising from the collision of the 
Court's recent takings and state sovereign immunity doctrines. More 
n.344 (1999) (referencing First English footnote nine); Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who's 
Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment?: The Limited Impact of the Court's Sovereign Immunity 
Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 24344 (2006) (noting the collision and arguing that 
Congress could override sovereign immunity when a state takes property); Richard H. Fallon, 
The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U .  CHI. L. REV. 
429,485 (2002) (noting the apparent First English exception to state sovereign immunity and 
suggesting that it is not coincidental that it protects "old property rights generally looked on 
with more solicitude by conservatives than by liberals"); Vicki C. Jackson, 7?ze Supreme Court, 
the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1,115 nn.453-54 (1988) 
(noting the First English footnote and discussing "self-executing nature" of Takings Clause); 
Thomas W. Memll, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U .  L. REV. 1561, 
1564 (1986) (reviewing RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)); Robert V. Percival, "Greening" the Constitution-Harmonizing 
Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809, 861-64 (2002) (noting the 
collision course between takings and state sovereign immunity); Thomas E. Roberts, Facial 
Takings Claims Under Agins-Nectow: A Procedural Loose End, 24 U .  HAW. L. REV. 623,623 
n.2 (2002) (remarking on the disparity between takings clause doctrine and state sovereign 
immunity); Catherine T. Struve, TurfStruggles: Land, Sovereignty, and Sovereign ItnmuniQ, 
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 571,574 (2003) (citing First English and noting that Just Compensation 
Clause appears to be an exception to state sovereign immunity bar on damages claims against 
states); Howard S. Master, Note, Revisiting the Takings-Based Argumentfor Compensating the 
Wrongfully Convicted, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 97,14546 (2004) (noting the collision in 
context of compensating the wrongfully convicted). However, though these critics' recognition 
of the issue has been thoughtful, it has not been thorough, for those articles do not focus on the 
tension I identify. Moreover, the recent expansion of both doctrines have highlighted the 
tension and presented yet more doctrinal knots. 
The one article that has focused on these two issues together is Richard H. Seamon, The 
Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1067 (2001). Professor Seamon 
argues that although states are immune from just compensation suits brought in federal court, 
due process concerns can subject nonconsenting states to just-compensation suits in state court 
(hence, the asymmetry). Id. at 1068-70. Thus, if a state fails to create an adequate remedy, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires state courts to hear just 
compensation suits notwithstanding state sovereign immunity. Id. at 1069. 
Seamon's discussion is very intelligent, but ultimately I disagree both with his conclusion 
and his methodology, particularly his reliance on century-old cases to support his argument that 
states are immune from just compensation suits in federal court. Because those cases mostly 
assert a vigorous state sovereign immunity (some before the Takings Clause even applied to the 
states), their holdings add less to the analysis of this constitutional conflict than one might 
initially think. Indeed, his decision to make one doctrine "fit" with the other one obstructs a 
more thorough analysis weighing the relative merits of the competing doctrines. Moreover, in 
light of Alden, it seems strange to assume, as he does, that the rules between federal and state 
court would be so different. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing Alden and the symmetry of state 
sovereign immunity in state and federal courts). This Article not only arrives at a different 
conclusion, but seeks to wrestle more with the Court's recent case law, to consider more 
carefully the structural relationship between the two provisions, and, more abstractly, to explore 
methodological approaches for arbitrating between conflicting constitutional doctrines. This 
Article also relies more on the nature of constitutional remedies and the force of the Takings 
Clause, whereas Professor Seamon roots his argument in due process requirements. 
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specifically, it examines whether the Takings Clause is self-executing9 and 
therefore can, by its own force, abrogate--or strip-the state of the sovereign 
immunity it would otherwise enjoy in actions for damages. If not, states 
would retain their sovereign immunity in takings cases unIess Congress 
abrogated that immunity pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 
power.'0 Either outcome jars current case law. If the Takings Clause only 
applies to the states when Congress abrogates the states' sovereign immunity 
(or, alternatively, if a state itself waives its sovereign immunity), then takings 
cases applied against the states rest on an illegitimate assumption." To be 
sure, as sovereign immunity does not extend to state subdivisions or officers, 
the takings suits brought against counties, municipalities, or officers are not 
implicated, but there remain takings cases, like Palazzolo and Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal ~ o u n c i l , ' ~  in which the defendants were the state or a state 
agency. Similarly, concluding that the Takings Clause, through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, abrogates state sovereign immunity by its own force, 
effectively ignores the Court's recent vigorous defense of state sovereign 
immunity principles. 
Ultimately, this Article argues that the Takings Clause does trump state 
sovereign immunity by automatically abrogating--or stripping-the 
immunity that states usually enjoy in actions at law. An action to recover 
damages for a temporary taking therefore arises directly out of the 
Constitution and requires no statutory authorization, either to provide a cause 
of action or to abrogate state sovereign imrnunity.13 The arguments on both 
9. This Article uses the term "self-executing" to mean that the Takings Clause abrogates 
state sovereign immunity by its own force and thereby provides a cause of action for damages 
against the state without further legislation. It is worth noting that the concept of a "self- 
executing" provision is somewhat woolly. In some contexts, for instance, it might mean merely 
that the provision has force without statutory authorization (so that, for instance, a plaintiff 
could sue a state official for an injunction to force him to return his taken property). Unless 
indicated otherwise, this Article uses it to refer more broadly to a provision that automatically 
abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
10. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Congress can 
abrogate state sovereign immunity when enforcing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); see 
also Ha. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,64546 
(1999) (indicating that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity for deprivations of 
propeny without due process provided that constitutional violation is manifest). 
11. Because the Tucker Act waived the federal government's sovereign immunity for, 
inter alia, takings claims, such suits are permitted against the federal government. See infra 
notes 409-20 and accompanying text (discussing the Tucker Act and waiver of federal 
sovereign immunity). 
12. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
13. A direct constitutional action against the state is not only theoretically sound but also 
practically necessary, as no such statutory action exists. The statute that most frequently is the 
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sides of this debate, however, are complex and, in places, persuasive.I4 The 
competing goals of individual rights and a workable structure of government 
reflect a constitutional system that, quite appropriately, seeks multiple 
objectives. Accordingly, the tension between the notion that rights deserve 
adequate protections and remedies, on the one hand, and the competing idea 
that the judiciary should be reluctant to control the legislature's budget, on 
the other, runs throughout this Article. 
The judiciary plays but one part in the grand constitutional enterprise, 
and one danger with this Article's thesis is that it grants too much power to 
courts. This Article's theory of automatic abrogation must therefore be 
justified not merely with narrow legal arguments, but with broader arguments 
regarding judges' roles in our government structure. In particular, this 
Article focuses on the issue of constitutional remedies because, though 
money damages are seemingly the most appropriate remedy for a temporary 
taking, clearly our system does not provide the full ambit of remedies for 
every cognizable injury. The curious and fascinating interplay between 
remedy and injury-combined with the unique text of the Takings Clause- 
weaves through all the different arguments presented here. 
In addition to the doctrinal details, a study like this must also consider 
the appropriate methodology for resolving incompatible lines of 
constitutional case law. How should the constitutional jurist address a 
basis for suits in federal court against local governments and state officials who have allegedly 
violated a party's federal rights, 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, does not override state sovereign immunity. 
See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979) (finding no basis to conclude that Congress 
intended to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity). Section 1983's use of the word "person" 
has been found to apply to state officers sued in an individual capacity, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 
21,31(1991), and state subdivisions, see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 628,688-89 
(1978) (finding that "person" includes "local government bodies"), but not states themselves. 
See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58.65 (1989) (finding that "a State is not a 
'person' within the meaning of 8 1983"). Accordingly, 5 1983 creates no remedy against the 
state itself. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,69 (1997) (finding that 
"8 1983 actions do not lie against a State"); see also infra note 11 1 (discussing further this line 
of cases). 
14. Upon first glance, some might view this collision as easily resolved. One school of 
thought might argue that the Takings Clause promises a damages remedy and that as 
incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, it necessarily trumps any 
immunity emanating from the Eleventh Amendment. An opposing school would view state 
sovereign immunity as a bedrock principle that nothing in the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments 
would purport to ovemde. As the Court stated in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), "a 
suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the 
state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 663. Indeed, in the nineteenth 
century, just compensation clauses did not give rise to a damages remedy but instead invalidated 
legislation effecting takings without just compensation. This spectrum of reactions makes clear 
that this is not only an unanswered question but also a difficult one. 
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conflict between doctrines that rest on large bodies of precedent? It has been 
common in recent decades for American courts to make one doctrine fit with 
the other, to find exceptions within a body of law, and to claim that the 
apparent collision does not exist. Sometimes this approach is not only 
acceptable but correct; it nicely averts a messy collision and recognizes that 
only one doctrine is at the heart of the matter. But this approach has also 
gone too far, for real doctrinal conflicts sometimes do exist and in such cases 
the judge should address those conflicts directly. This is such a case. 
Though there may be ways of reconciling state sovereign immunity and 
temporary takings, it is healthier and more honest to acknowledge the 
paradox. Indeed, many other judicial systems around the world-for 
instance, in Europe, in Canada, and in South Africa-are far more 
comfortable recognizing conflicts within their own bodies of law, and have 
far less difficulty balancing the relative interests of both in determining 
which body should prevail in a given context.15 Such weighing is not without 
its problems, but it does provide the opportunity for rigorous and honest 
assessment of a doctrine's place in a particular situation. 
Part ll of this Article frames the problem, providing a hypothetical suit 
in which this question would be central to the outcome. Given the doctrinal 
complexities of these areas, only a suit with certain characteristics would 
actually pose the collision this Article addresses. However, this collision is 
by no means hypothetical; suits like this do arise and, in fact, have been made 
more likely by recent decisions. Part I11 surveys the doctrinal train wreck and 
summarizes the Court's takings and tax refund due process cases, on the one 
hand, and state sovereign immunity cases, on the other. It also reviews 
quickly the Court's brief-and vague-statements about the instant conflict. 
Parts IV, V, and VI argue that the Takings Clause automatically 
abrogates state sovereign immunity, focusing respectively on textual, 
structural, and historical arguments.I6 Though no single argument is 
necessarily dispositive, collectively these factors point strongly towards 
automatic abrogation. The Article concludes by considering what 
implications these findings might have for the courts' role in our democracy, 
for the judicial vindication of other constitutional rights, and for 
methodological approaches to the collision of constitutional doctrines. 
15. See infra note 532 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrinal balancing that 
sometimes occurs in foreign courts). 
16. Because these categories are not rigid, each section borrows from others' reasoning, 
though this Article cabins some arguments in given sections for ease of presentation. 
COLLISION OF TAKINGS & STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
II. Framing the Problem 
Given the variety of ways in which takings claims arise, it is easy to 
imagine a takings case in which it would be impossible to raise an Eleventh 
Amendment defense. Only particular circumstances invite the potential "train 
wreck" between takings and sovereign immunity doctrines. Similarly, many 
scenarios pose procedural complications that, while significant to many takings 
litigants, are complicated enough to merit entire articles themselves. This 
Article briefly introduces the procedural complexities facing takings litigants; it 
focuses, however, on the potential conflict between immunity and just 
compensation issues. 
Assume that a state government or agency enact. a regulation that deprives 
a landowner of the use of her land and that the owner sues the state government 
in state court to recover just compensation for this regulatory taking.'' After 
appealing to the state or filing a lawsuit, the plaintiff successfully forces the 
state to stop the regulation, thus eliminating the condition that deprived her of 
the use of her property. Although her land has been effectively "returned," the 
landowner lost the use of her land for the duration of the regulatory taking. The 
state has ended the regulatory scheme that took her land in the first place but 
has refused to compensate her for the period she was deprived of her land. She 
sues the state to recover for the temporary taking, and the state raises an 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense. 
The details of this hypothetical are important to set up the collision 
because slight variations would avoid it. For instance, it must be the state's 
regulation that effects the temporary taking; municipalities and counties are 
never entitled to raise a sovereign immunity defense.'* The suit must also be 
one to collect damages, such as for an interim taking, for which injunctive relief 
17. A variety of regulations might deprive a landowner use of her land. Many 
environmental regulations, for instance, might accomplish such deprivation, especially under the 
Court's current robust takings doctrine. In Palauolo, for instance, the Rhode Island Coastal 
Commission denied plaintiffs application to construct a beach club on eighteen acres of coastal 
wetlands. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611-16 (2001). 
18. See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (holding that the 
Eleventh Amendment does not bar an individual's suit in federal court against a county for 
nonpayment of debt). One wonders, though, given the current Supreme Court's willingness to 
extend state sovereign immunity far beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment, whether the 
Court might also choose to extend that immunity to state subdivisions as well. But see 
generally Melvyn R. Durchslag, Should Political Subdivisions Be Accorded Eleventh 
Amendment Immunity?, 43 DEPAULL. REV. 577 (1994) (arguing that Lincoln County distinction 
between states and counties for immunities purposes is not anomalous on either historical or 
functional grounds). 
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is effectively unavailab~e.'~ If the contested state behavior were, by contrast, a 
physical taking that had not yet ceased, then the plaintiff might sue a state 
officer for injunctive relief to force the state to return the property. Because Ex 
parte youngZ0 permits suits against state officers for injunctive re~ief,~' a state 
sovereign immunity defense could not arise. However, in the above 
hypothetical, a Young injunction does the plaintiff no good; the state has 
already returned her property, and so the only relief she seeks is money to 
compensate her for the loss of use of her land.22 Given that the damages sought 
could be large, this hypothetical illustrates well why the officer suit alternative 
is not always adequate.23 
The forum is also important. Though it is not clear that state and federal 
coun lawsuits would necessarily require different results, a plaintiff can sue in 
state court to try to avoid substantial procedural obstacles. Most notably, 
takings plaintiffs in federal court must avoid the notorious "Williamson trap."24 
Under Williamson County v. Hamilton ~ a n k , ~ '  a plaintiff may need to seek 
compensation on federal takings claims in state court to meet Supreme Court 
ripeness requirements.26 The combination of these fairly rigorous ripeness 
requirements often forces litigants to bring state inverse condemnation 
19. Temporary takings are not necessarily the only scenario in which this can arise, but 
they pose the collision most succinctly. 
20. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
21. See id. at 159 (reasoning that a state official who attempts to enforce an 
unconstitutional law may be subjected to a suit for injunctive relief because the official is 
"stripped of his official or representative character"). 
22. Under the Court's decision in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes. 526 U.S. 687 
(1999), a 5 1983 suit to recover for a taking constitutes a suit for damages. Id. at 710. Whether 
one characterizes this relief as damages, restitution, just compensation, or something else, 
however, is not significant for sovereign immunity purposes, given Edelman's rule that Exparte 
Young relief applies only to prospective, not retrospective, remedies. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
U.S. 651, 664 (1974). Because money compensating a plaintiff for an already terminated 
regulatory taking is certainly retrospective, even if it is characterized as equitable restitution, 
Edelman applies and an Exparte Young remedy is unavailable. See id. at 666-67 (finding that 
Ex parte Young may be unavailable even though plaintiff characterized the relief sought as 
equitable restitution). But see infra Part III.A.2 (noting that due process tax cases might avoid 
sovereign immunity in part because the remedy resembles restitution). 
23. But see Ann Woolhandler, Old Property, New Property, and Sovereign Immunity, 75 
NOTREDAME L.REV. 919,920 (2000) (placing herself "squarely among the no-bigdeal camp"). 
24. See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 264 (2002) 
(discussing the "Williamson trap"). 
25. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm. v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 
U.S. I72 (1985). 
26. See id. at 186 (finding the respondent's taking claim to be "premature, whether it is 
analyzed as deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or as 
a taking under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment"). 
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proceedings before they can even get into federal court. The "trap," though, is 
that once they get into federal court, those same plaintiffs might be unable to 
raise the same claim they did in state court due to preclusion rules.27 
Interestingly, these ripeness requirements sometimes make interim takings 
more likely to happen, thus, in the long run, increasing the number of possible 
takings claims. Because ripeness requirements tend to be strict, plaintiffs are 
likely to spend significant time seeking remedies outside the federal court 
system. If the plaintiff is complaining about an interim taking, the duration of 
that taking will increase as she works her way through the state agency's 
dispute procedures. Petitioning a state agency takes time, and, even if she 
ultimately succeeds in forcing the agency to return the property, either by 
physically returning it or halting the regulation diminishing its value, she has 
lost use of the land for the added time it took her to exhaust the state's 
administrative remedies. Even if the state ultimately returns her property, either 
as a result of the administrative procedures or because the state loses takings 
litigation in court, the landowner will have lost the use of her land for a longer 
period of time. Under First English, the property owner can recover for this 
interim violation whether it arises out of a physical or regulatory taking.28 
Ripeness requirements, therefore, make it more likely that the interim taking 
will have been for long enough to merit litigation.29 The great irony, then, is 
27. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 24, at 264 (discussing the "Williamson trap"). The 
unfathomable brilliance of this trap calls to mind Yossarian's respectful whistle upon first 
hearing about "catch-22." JOSEPH WR, CATCH-22, at 52 (1961). 
In a case ostensibly challenging the procedural pitfalls resulting from Williamson. the 
Supreme Court recently held that even though federal claims are not ripe until after state court 
proceedings, the full faith and credit statute. 28 U.S.C. 8 1738, precludes plaintiffs from 
relitigating in federal court 8 1983 claims that state courts adjudicated. See San Remo Hotel, 
L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491,2507 (2005) (affirming the Court of Appeals' 
decision that found no exception to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 8 1738). In a short 
concurrence, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by three other justices, expressed 
skepticism about the Williamson doctrine. See id. at 2507 (Rehnquist, C.J., concuning) (writing 
that Williamson "may have been mistaken" in part). Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote 
that he was not sure "why federal takings claims in particular should be singled out to be 
confined to state court, in the absence of any asserted justification or congressional directive." 
Id. at 2509 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). It is unclear, of course, whether the remaining justices 
opted not to join the Chiefs concurrence because they disagreed with him or because the 
wisdom of Williamson was not squarely presented in Sun Remo. Either way, for the time being 
Williamson remains good law and might have been further entrenched by the Court's suggestion 
that "it is entirely unclear why. . . [a] preference for a federal forum should matter for 
constitutional or statutory purposes." Id. at 2505. 
28. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304, 3 19 (1987) (noting that converting a taking "into a 'temporary' one, is not a sufficient 
remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation Clause"). 
29. Of course, in many takings suits, a key issue is what constitutes "just compensation." 
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that just as ripeness requirements make it harder for property owners to litigate 
takings claims, they also make the damages component of such claims more 
significant. And, given the Supreme Court's increasingly robust sovereign 
immunity doctrine, they also increase the instances in which a state might raise 
an Eleventh Amendment defense to protect itself from a suit seeking to recover 
damages for a protracted interim taking. 
III. The Doctrinal Collision Course 
To understand how and why takings and sovereign immunity doctrines 
collide, it is important first to understand the two areas independently. They 
are both complex bodies of jurisprudence, and the paradoxes this Article seeks 
to explore arise out of those complexities. Because others have explored each 
doctrine at length elsewhere, this Part will summarize each area very briefly, 
focusing on the Court's recent cases that most directly affect the "collision." 
The last section of this Part addresses the Court's brief attention to the 
collision. 
A. Takings Doctrine and Tax Refind Cases 
1. Takings Cases 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads, "[Nlor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."30 Initially, the 
clause applied only to the federal government, although the Court later . 
incorporated it through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to 
apply to the states as well.31 Much of the case law has focused on exactly what 
constitutes a taking: Precisely how must government regulation interfere with 
the private property owner's rights for that regulation to constitute a taking, 
thereby requiring the state to offer the property owner just compensation? 
In the case of physical takings, the Court has articulated a bright line 
rule.32 The problem of defining a taking, however, becomes more complicated 
Though obviously significant, this issue is beyond the focus of this Article. 
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
31. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,241 
(1897) (finding that a taking by a state violates Fourteenth Amendment due process rights). 
32. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,441 (1982) (requiring 
compensation for a physical occupation). When the "'character of the governmental action' . . . 
[is] permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the 
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in the area of regulatory takings, when the regulation does not cause private 
property to be physically occupied, but rather deprives the owner of the full 
value of her property in some other way. When these restrictions deprive 
the owner of all "economically beneficial use of land,"33 the Court will find 
a taking.34 But when the restriction merely deprives a landowner of some 
economic value, the Court engages in an ad hoc, fact-specific inquiry to 
determine whether it constitutes a taking.35 In recent years, the Court has 
tended to favor property owners in ad hoc inquiries, as in the exaction 
cases.36 This trend in favor of property rights is perhaps most apparent in 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, itself a regulatory takings case, in which the 
Court held that a landowner can assert that a particular exercise of the 
State's regulatory power is onerous enough to compel compensation, even 
if that regulation went into effect prior to the owner's purchase of the 
land.37 The Court found that "a regulation that otherwise would be 
unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background 
principle of the State's law by mere virtue of the passage of title."38 
Collectively, these cases from the past fifteen years have expanded the 
range of regulatory activity and conditions that constitute a taking. Though 
this phenomenon is certainly important by itself, First English renders them 
extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public 
benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner." Id. at 434-35 (quoting Pem Cent. 
Transp. CO. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
33. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992). 
34. See, e.g., id. at 1030 (finding that a taking occurs when a property owner is deprived 
of all economically viable use). Lucas's rule might be complicated somewhat by Tahoe-Sierra 
Pres. Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). which suggested that 
Lucas might apply only to regulations effecting complete deprivations of all market value, as 
opposed to regulation that prohibits all building. See id. at 343 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(dissenting because in Lucas the Court found that under circumstances such as those presented 
in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the government must pay just compensation). 
35. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (stating that "while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if the regulation goes too far it will be recognized 
as a taking"); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978) 
(describing the factors the Court considers when engaging in "essentially ad hoc factual 
inquiries"). 
36. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring "rough 
proportionality" between the exaction imposed and the harm created by the requested 
construction); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comrn., 483 U.S. 825,837 (1987) (requiring an "essential 
nexus" between the condition imposed and the government interest furthered by the condition). 
37. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,616 (2001) (rejecting the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court's finding that the petitioner could not seek compensation based on a regulation 
enacted before he came into possession of the disputed property). 
38. Id. at 629-30. 
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particularly significant for our purposes. First English establishes that the 
government must provide compensation for the period during which the 
government deprived the property owner of the use of his land for not only 
physical but also regulatory takings.39 In this way, First English extended 
the line of precedent that already held that property owners suffering 
temporary physical takings were entitled to just compensation.40 Stopping 
the regulation and returning the property to the owner is not enough; the 
government must also pay money damages to compensate for the owner's 
"lost time."41 A property owner then may have already resumed complete 
use of his land but can still sue for "just compensation."42 
The doctrinal collision occurs when the State raises a sovereign 
immunity defense to the plaintiff's takings claim for damages. It is 
important to note that doctrinal developments since First English do not 
themselves create this "collision"; the apparent incompatibility of takings 
and state sovereign immunity doctrine already existed, notwithstanding 
First English's attempt to brush aside those complexities in a footnote.43 
However, while First English did not create the tension, it did heighten the 
paradox by holding that property owners subjected to a temporary taking 
are entitled to compensation beyond the invalidation of the ordinance 
effecting the taking.44 Because injunctive relief-invalidating the law and 
forcing the government to return the taken property-is therefore 
inadequate to make such a property owner whole, the owner can sue under 
First English to recover damages for the period during which she was 
denied use of the land. However, when the defendant is a state, it 
theoretically can raise sovereign immunity as a defense against suits for 
money damages. 
39. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 
319 (1987). 
40. See id. at 318 (describing prior cases in which the Court had required just 
compensation for temporary physical occupations); see also Kimball Laundry Co. v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 1, 14 (1949) (requiring just compensation for a temporary physical 
occupation); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372,381 (1946) (same); United States 
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,384 (1945) (same). 
41. First English, 482 U.S. at 3 19. 
42. Id. 
43. See id. at 3 16 n.9 (discussing briefly the "prohibitory nature of the Fifth Amendment . . . 
combined with principles of sovereign immunity"). 
44. See id. at 321 ("We merely hold that where the government's activities have already 
worked a taking of all use of property. no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of 
the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective."). 
COLLISION OF TAKINGS & STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 507 
2. Due Process Tax Refind Cases 
The tax refund cases are roughly analogous to takings cases; both involve 
plaintiffs suing a government for the return of property unjustly taken from 
them. Like regulatory takings cases, in particular, these are instances in which 
the plaintiff seeks monetary relief and in which the state presumably could raise 
an Eleventh Amendment defense.45 In Ward v. Love the Supreme 
Court reversed an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision that found that a state law 
barring recovery of voluntarily paid taxes precluded the Choctaw Indian Tribe's 
claim to recover taxes, which the Tribe alleged were coercively ~ollected.~' 
Contrary to the Oklahoma court's findings, the Supreme Court found that the 
taxes had been "obtained by coercive means-by compulsion," and held that 
"money got through imposition may be recovered back."48 Because the suit 
here was against the county and not the state itself:9 sovereign immunity issues 
would not have come up, but Ward nevertheless laid the foundation for a due 
process right to recover from government unfairly coerced taxes. 
The Court has returned to this line more recently in McKesson 
Corporation v. Division of ABFO and Reich v. ~ o l l i n s . ~ '  In McKesson, the 
plaintiffs demanded a refund of Florida state taxes paid under a discriminatory 
tax that had been held unc~nstitutional.~~ Although it struck down the tax 
under the Dormant Commerce clause, the state court did not refund the taxes 
plaintiffs had already paid.53 The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
unanimously that when a state requires a taxpayer to pay a tax before 
challenging its legality, the Due Process Clause requires the state to afford a 
meaningful opportunity to secure postpayment relief.s4 Thus, McKesson 
45. One could argue that tax refunds do not constitute damages, because an injunction is 
theoretically all that is needed to force a government to return taxes to an individual. The Court 
in Edelman v. Jordan, however, did not see the issue that way. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
U.S. 65 1,668-69 (1974) (ruling that Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 
(1945). compelled the decision that the Eleventh Amendment barred an action to recover unpaid 
welfare benefits, notwithstanding plaintiffs effort to characterize relief sought as "equitable 
restitution"). 
46. Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920). 
47. See id. at 25 (noting the Oklahoma Supreme Court's position that "if the payment was 
voluntary, the moneys could not be recovered back in the absence of a permissive statute"). 
48. Id. at 23-24 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
49. Id. at 17. 
50. McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990). 
5 1. Reich v. Collins, 5 13 U.S. 106 (1994). 
52. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 22. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 22; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8,85 1-52 (discussing McKesson). 
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suggests that state and local governments might have certain constitutional due 
process obligations to their citizens, even though no applicable statute enforces 
the obligation and traditional immunities might otherwise bar a suit against the 
state.55 
What is most striking about McKesson is not that the Court required a 
post-deprivation remedy, but that it determined that in some instances only a 
monetary refund would suffice.56 This is particularly significant for our 
purposes because sovereign immunity usually does not bar suits entirely but 
rather bars suits against the state for money damages. As Professors Fallon and 
Meltzer note, McKesson therefore "poses something of a puzzle when 
compared with doctrines applicable to other suits seeking monetary relief 
against the government. In the vast majority of cases, sovereign immunity and 
related doctrines bar uncontested suits for payment of funds directly out of state 
and federal t reas~r ies ."~~ So the question remains: "why does the Constitution 
mandate a damages remedy against the government for unlawful exactions of 
taxes (and for takings) but not for other constitutional  violation^?"^^ 
Reich addressed the implications of this due process right, confronting the 
issue of sovereign immunity more directly and stating the constitutional 
obligation more forcefully. While again unanimously affirming that due 
process requires a state to provide "clear and certain" remedy for taxes collected 
in violation of federal law, the Court also emphasized that the obligation exists 
55. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 26-31 (finding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar 
appellate review by the Supreme Court). One should not, however, overstate McKesson's 
implications on state sovereign immunity doctrine. The Court did place some emphasis on 
Florida's willingness to open its courts to refund actions, in essence waiving any sovereign 
immunity defense they might have had. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 852; see also 
McKesson, 496 U.S. at 30-3 1 (noting that when a state court takes "cognizance of a case, the 
state assents to appellate review" by the Supreme Court). 
56. See McKesson. 496 U.S. at 31-35 (requiring a monetary refund in certain 
circumstances). 
57. Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 173 1, 1825 (1991) (footnotes omitted); see also 
Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1993) (requiring the state to 
provide a remedy for a tax that vioIated federal law). 
58. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1826 n.537 (citing First English in footnote to 
support the proposition that the Constitution mandates damages remedies for takings). One 
possible answer, of course, is that the tax refund cases are straight due process cases. See id. at 
1826-29 (suggesting various answers to the question). Note that, whatever the answer, 
Professors Fallon and Meltzer's question assumes that First English's footnote nine is binding. 
They might be correct, but not necessarily, particularly given the Court's most recent sovereign 
immunity cases, all of which were decided after their excellent article was published. See infra 
notes 92-109 (discussing the recent sovereign immunity cases). 
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notwithstanding "the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own 
Though significant, cases like McKesson and Reich must be read in light 
of other doctrinal limitations. Perhaps most importantly, these decisions, both 
handed down prior to Alden v. ~ a i n e , ~ '  arose out of state court  case^.^' In 
other words, these cases were decided before Alden extended state sovereign 
immunity to state SO the Court's due process requirements did not 
trump active sovereign immunity barriers. Moreover, in federal court actions 
for due process tax refunds, the Supreme Court has upheld state sovereign 
But while it is important not to require too much of McKesson and 
Reich, these cases, like takings cases, do seem to collide with sovereign 
immunity  decision^.^^ 
B. State Sovereign Immunity Doctrine 
State sovereign immunity doctrine may have expanded even more than 
takings doctrine during the past decade. It was not always such an important 
part of American constitutional landscape. In 1793, the Court in Chisholm v. 
~ e o r ~ i a ~ ~  rejected Georgia's claim that an unconsenting state was immune 
59. Reich v. Collins. 5 13 U.S. 106, 110 (1994); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 
8, at 852 (quoting Reich). 
60. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
61. See McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 22 (arising out of a Florida state court); Reich, 5 13 
U.S. at 106 (arising out of a Georgia state court). 
62. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 760 (affirming the dismissal of the suit against Maine on 
grounds of state sovereign immunity). 
63. See, e.g., Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 55 (1944) (finding that the 
"legislature of Oklahoma was consenting to suit in its own courts only"). 
64. There are, of course, significant differences between takings and tax refund cases. 
One potential difference is that because the tax cases provide a "refund" equal to the tax unjustly 
exacted, the remedy in such cases resembles "restitution" more than money damages in a 
regulatory takings case, where the initial h m  was not cash actually taken from the property 
owner, but a regulation impairing that owner from reaping the full benefit of her land's value. 
As restitution at common law usually fell under equity and not law, Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 
508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993), one can view Reich and McKesson as providing injunctive relief 
more in line with Ex parte Young's and Edelman's requirements. See infra Part II1.B 
(discussing Exparte Young and Edelman). But see supra note 45 (noting that the Court rejected 
this argument in Edelman v. Jordan). Another potential difference between tax refund and 
takings cases is that tax cases are more likely to affect large classes, making it potentially 
difficult for the government to provide full remediation. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, 
at 1828-29 (noting that "tax cases, unlike constitutional tort suits and just compensation claims, 
typically affect large classes"). 
65. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
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from suit by a citizen of another state.66 Article III, Section 2, after all, extends 
the federal judicial power to "Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of 
another However, in a famous lone dissent, Justice Iredell argued that 
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should be interpreted with reference 
to common law principles and assumed that the Court could exercise only 
jurisdiction that Congress had ~onferred.~' ~e asserted that English common 
law would only have permitted a suit for damages against the government with 
the king's consent, and that, therefore, in the absence of sovereign consent, 
Congress had to affirmatively waive state immunity for such a suit to proceed.69 
Justice Iredell might have lost the battle, but he won the war. According 
to some, the Chisholm decision "fell upon the country with a profound 
shock. "I0  Just five years later, in 1798, the Eleventh Amendment was ratified, 
ovemling ~hisholrn.~' The Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign Some have 
argued that the quick passage of the Eleventh Amendment demonstrates the 
"shock of surprise" Chishom created,73 though many scholars dispute that 
interpretation.74 
66. See id. at 480 (finding that the suit could be brought against the state of Georgia). 
67. U.S. CONST. art. I. 5 2. 
68. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 432-35 ("[A]11 the Courts of the United States must 
receive . . . all their authority . . . from the legislature only."); see also HART& WECHSLER, supra 
note 8, at 1047 (discussing Chisholm). 
69. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 44547 (analogizing the instant case to the common law of 
England). 
70. 1 C. WARREN, THESUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96 (rev. ed. 1926). 
71. See Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473 (1987) 
(stating that the passage of the Eleventh Amendment "was undeniably designed to repudiate the 
majority analysis in Chisholm and ovemle its holding"). 
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
73. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1 890). 
74. See, e.g., JOHN ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OFTHE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH 
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27 (1987) (stating that "speedy adoption [of the Eleventh 
Amendment] is not significant"); Amar, supra note 71, at 1481-84 (arguing that, given its 
current interpretation, the Eleventh Amendment's passage did not necessarily vindicate Justice 
Iredell's views); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immuniry: A 
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1926 (1983) (arguing that "Congress's initial 
reaction to the Chisholm decision hardly demonstrates the son of outrage so central to the 
profound shock thesis"); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 1048 (summarizing 
literature on "shock of surprise" theory). 
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Hans v. in 1890 marks the crucial turn in Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence. While the express language of the amendment 
applies only to suits against one state "by Citizens of another ~ ta te , " '~  Justice 
Bradley's Hans opinion reads the Amendment more broadly to prohibit suits 
against a state by citizens of the same state.77 Although Justice Iredell's 
primary objection in Chisholm was statutory-the jurisdiction granted by the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, he argued, did not extend to unheard-of remedies like a 
suit against a ~tate~~-~ustice Bradley emphasized Justice Iredell's doubts that 
Congress could constitutionally enact a statute subjecting the states to federal 
court Phrasing his originalist argument in a series of rhetorical 
questions, Justice Bradley asks: 
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was 
understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in 
the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of 
foreign states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when 
proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that 
nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by its 
own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United 
States: can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the 
Justice Bradley, with little historical evidence, scoffs at the notion, 
dismissing it as "almost an absurdity on its f a ~ e , " ~ '  and Hans's interpretation, 
which found the state immune from suit on a claim for damages arising under 
the Constitution's Contracts Clause, remains controlling over a century later.82 
75. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1 890). 
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
77. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15. 
78. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,436-37 (1793) (concluding that the 
Court "[could] exercise no authority . . . consistently with the clear intention of the act, but such 
as a proper State Court would have been at least [competent] to exercise at the time the act was 
passed"). 
79. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 
SUP. CT. REV. 1,9 (discussing Justice Bradley's treatment of Justice Iredell's Chisholm dissent). 
80. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15. 
81. Id. 
82. In a fascinating article, Professor Nelson argues that sovereign immunity originally 
applied as a doctrine of personal jurisdiction, which could be waived, but that the Eleventh 
Amendment created a second type of immunity sounding in subject matter jurisdiction, which 
therefore could not be waived. Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1566 (2002). Out of this two-track system of 
jurisdictional immunities, however, the Court created a single doctrine of sovereign immunity 
reflecting an odd cross between the two tracks. Id. 
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The most important exception to Eleventh Amendment doctrine is Ex 
parte which recognized suits against state officers for injunctive 
relief.M However, the Young exception hardly renders state sovereign 
immunity meaningless. First, plaintiffs must allege that the officer is acting in 
violation of federal law.85 Second, Ex parte Young actions are limited to 
injunctive relief; a plaintiff cannot access the state treasury via a state official.86 
Moreover, Edelman v. ~ o r d a n ' ~  halted any possibility that money remedies 
could be attained by characterizing the money sought as restitution, and 
therefore equitable, rather than legal, damagesg8 In an opinion that 
foreshadows his later victories in this area, then-Justice Rehnquist reminds us 
that "the relief awarded in Ex Parte Young was prospective only."89 By way of 
contrast, the "retroactive" relief sought in Edelman "stands on quite a different 
footing. 
Edelman is generally significant because it restricted courts' ability to 
offer plaintiffs money from the state treasury by characterizing the remedy as 
"equitable restitution." For our purposes, it is especially important because, as 
applied to takings cases, it requires that takings plaintiffs suing a state should 
only receive a prospective injunction, rather than retrospective damages. In 
other words, if a state regulation has burdened private property, Edelman 
pennits injunctive relief but seems to bar any suit for retrospective damages 
compensating the landowner for the duration of the taking. Under this 
reasoning, a property owner whose land was once burdened by a state 
regulation could not receive money compensating him for this temporary 
regulatory taking. But, as we have already seen, First English holds that 
property owners are entitled to money damages for these exact cases.91 
Notwithstanding cases like Hans and Edelman, Eleventh Amendment 
immunity has its limits. States are free to consent to suit by waiving their 
83. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
84. See id. at 155 ("The State has no power to impart to [its officer] any immunity from 
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."). 
85. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderrnan, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (concluding 
that Exparte Young is inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law). 
86. See Edelman v. Jordan. 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (stating that "a suit by private 
parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment"). 
87. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 65 1 (1974). 
88. See id. at 665-69 (rejecting the petitioner's "equitable restitution" argument). 
89. Id. at 664. 
90. Id. 
9 1. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing possible claims arising from a 
temporary taking). 
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sovereign immunity, and Congress in some circumstances may also abrogate 
states' sovereign immunity, thereby subjecting unconsenting states to certain 
kinds of lawsuits. Although it is not always clear what constitutes a valid 
waiver, waiver is conceptually relatively straightforward. Congressional 
abrogation-the process by which Congress legislates to remove state sovereign 
immunity for certain types of cases-however, is more complicated and has 
changed significantly in recent years. 
Under Fitzpatrick v. ~i tzer :~ Congress can abrogate state sovereign 
immunity pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 powers.93 The 
Court recognized that "the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state 
sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement 
provisions of Section 5 of the Fourteenth ~mendment."" Although 
Fitzpatrick's holding is still not controversial, the Court has subsequently cut 
back on Congress's ability to abrogate pursuant to its other powers. Indeed, as 
it stands today, it seems that Congress may not abrogate pursuant to any of its 
Article I powers. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. ~ l o r i d a , ~ ~  the Court, 
overruling its 1989 decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas C O . , ~ ~  held that 
Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Indian 
Commerce  lau use.^' In so doing, the Court limited congressional power to 
abrogate state immunity, so that Congress could do so only pursuant to its 
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the other 
Reconstruction arnendrnent~.~~ And, under City of Boerne v. ~ l o r e s , ~ ~  the 
Court, not Congress, defines the scope of those Fourteenth Amendment 
92. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
93. Id. at 456. 
94. Id. (citation omitted). 
95. Seminole Tribe of Ha. v. Florida, 5 17 U.S. 44 (1996). 
96. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
97. Id. at 72. 
98. Though abrogation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is more 
common, precedent suggests that Congress can also abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant 
to the other Reconstruction amendments. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 
179-80 (1980) (upholding Voting Rights Act as proper exercise of Fifteenth Amendment power 
and explaining that "Fitzpatrick stands for the proposition that principles of federalism that 
might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the 
power to enforce the Civil War Amendments 'by appropriate legislation"'); United States v. 
Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 181 n.17 (2d Cir. 2002) (reasoning that Congress's Thirteenth 
Amendment Section 2 powers seemingly do not fall under the scope of Seminole Tribe and its 
progeny); see also Struve, supra note 8, at 573 n.8 (collecting cases indicating that Congress 
can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendment powers). 
99. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1999). 
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powers.100 Finally, merely suggesting abrogation is not enough; Congress must 
provide a "clear statement" of its intent to abrogate immunity or the Court will 
not view the abrogation as valid.lO' 
Seminole Tribe and Boerne collectively scale back Congress's power to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity,'02 but Alden v. Maine is in some ways more 
remarkable because it prevents Congress from subjecting states to suit in state 
courts. By rooting state sovereign immunity in principles outside the Eleventh 
Amendment itself, Alden reconceptualizes the entire doctrine.lo3 By its own 
terms, the Eleventh Amendment applies to "[tlhe Judicial power of the United 
states."lw In holding that state sovereign immunity applies also in state 
court-more specifically, by holding that Congress cannot abrogate in state 
court where it cannot abrogate in federal c o ~ r t ~ ~ ~ - t h e  Court significantly 
100. See id. at 527-29 (finding that Congress cannot decide the scope of its own power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment). Boeme requires that there be "a congruence or 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that 
end." Id. at 520. Following Boeme's lead, the Court has further narrowed Congress's power to 
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under its Section 5 powers. See Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373-74 (2001) (holding unconstitutional Congress's attempt to use 
Section 5 to abrogate state sovereign immunity for damages actions brought to enforce the 
Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63-64 (2000) 
(holding that Section 5 could not furnish a basis for overcoming a state's immunity from private 
suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (holding unconstitutional 
provisions in Patent Remedy Act that abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity so that 
"[alny State" and "any instrumentality of a State" could be sued for patent infringement). But 
see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,533-34 (2004) (holding that Title I1 of Americans with 
Disabilities Act constitutes a valid exercise of Congress's authority under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce that Amendment's substantive guarantees); Nev. Dep't of 
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,737-40 (2003) (holding that state employees may recover 
money damages in federal court in the event of the state's failure to comply with the family-care 
provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act because protection of equal employment 
opportunity for women falls under the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
101. See Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533,541-42 (2002) (requiring 
a "clear statement of an intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity"); Atascadero State Hosp. v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (noting the requirement that "Congress unequivocally 
express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits against the States in 
Federal court"). 
102. See, e.g., Marcia L. McCormick, Federalism Re-Constructed: The Eleventh 
Amendment's Illogical Impact on Congress' Power, 37 IND. L. REV. 345,357 (2004) (arguing 
that the new test in Boerne restricted Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers by essentially 
removing Congress's power to deter potential constitutional violations). 
103. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999) (noting that "sovereign immunity 
derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution 
itself '). 
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
105. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 748 (finding that "the States retain an analogous constitutional 
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expanded the immunity's scope and called into question previous assumptions 
about the relatively limited scope of Eleventh Amendment doctrine.'" Indeed, 
there is no reason to think that the current Court is finished in this area. In 
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority 
(FMC),"~ for instance, it held that state sovereign immunity also applies in 
administrative agency adjudicatory hearings.lo8 First English's footnote may 
once have qualified as the final word on this issue, but, in light of these 
developments, Eleventh Amendment bars might not falter against a takings 
claim.lW Of course, Seminole Tribe and the other cases do not create a new 
immunity from private suits in their own courts"). 
106. See James E. Pfander, Once More unto the Breach: Eleventh Amendment Scholarship 
and the Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817,820 (2002) (noting that before Alden "a variety of 
ways around the Eleventh Amendment were available"). 
107. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
108. Id. at 769 (concluding that applying sovereign immunity in administrative hearings is 
likely consistent with the framers' intent). 
109. Although state sovereign immunity has certainly become more robust in recent years, 
the story of its growth is not without exceptions. The Court, for instance, recently suggested 
that sovereign immunity's scope in some instances can be quite narrow. In Tennessee Student 
Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004). the Court held that an undue hardship 
determination sought by respondent in Bankruptcy Court did not constitute a suit against the 
state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 451. However, while this does 
suggest that litigation affecting state interests will not necessarily trigger the Eleventh 
Amendment, the opinion is too specific to glean just how narrowly the Court views sovereign 
immunity. Thus, while certain in rem actions enjoy an exception to usual state sovereign 
immunity bars, this is not reason to think that such an exception extends more generally to all 
suits involving property. Indeed, the Court in Tennessee Student Assistance carefully 
circumscribed the scope of its holding. It stated that it was not claiming that "a bankruptcy 
court's in rem jurisdiction ovenides sovereign immunity but rather that the court's exercise of 
its in rern jurisdiction to discharge a student loan debt is not an affront to the sovereignty of the 
State." Id. at 451 n.5 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court subsequently took the additional step 
of resolving what Tennessee Student Assistance had left unresolved. Specifically, the Court 
held that the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution does not contravene state sovereignty. 
Central Va. Comrn. Coll. v. Katz, No. 04-885, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 917 (2006). Accordingly, 
under the Bankruptcy Clause, "Congress may, at is option, either treat States in the same way as 
other creditors insofar as concerns 'Laws on the subject of the Bankruptcies' or exempt them 
from operation of such laws." Id. at *39. As Tennessee Student Assistance had already 
suggested, this is in part because of bankruptcy courts' in rem, rather than in personam, 
jurisdiction. See id, at *23-29 (noting bankrutpcy's in rem jurisdiction). This distinction, of 
course, is worthy of note, but it likely will have little impact on the takings context, since 
inverse condemnation suits are generally regarded as not falling under courts' in rem 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hage v. United States, 5 1 Fed. C1. 570, 574-75 (2002) (finding that 
plaintiffs' claim for just compensation does not constitute a suit for in rern relief). Indeed, given 
the Court's careful analysis of the unique features of bankruptcy jurisdiction, Central Virginia is 
probably best read as narrowly confined to the bankruptcy context. 
Central Virginia's primary significance to the larger narrative of Eleventh Amendment 
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conflict, but the new vigor of state sovereign immunity does raise questions 
about First English's quick resolution of an old one. 
C. The Unanswered Questions 
As should now be clear, because the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated 
the Takings Clause against the states, Congress could abrogate state sovereign 
immunity over takings claims pursuant to its Section 5 powers."0 To this point, 
however, it has not chosen to do so.'" We must therefore ask if Congress must 
abrogate that immunity or if the Takings Clause automatically abrogates any 
immunity the state might have in other kinds of cases. 
To the extent that past Courts have addressed this issue, the answers have 
been terse and contradictory. In his well-known decision in Lynch v. United 
states,'12 Justice Brandeis asserted that the government must always consent to 
suit; sovereign immunity, then, is never automatically abrogated. He argued 
that: 
[Clonsent to sue the United States is a privilege accorded; not the grant of a 
property right protected by the Fifth Amendment. . . . The sovereign's 
jurisprudence may be that the newly confirmed Chief Justice Roberts voted with the dissent 
(written by Justice Thomas, and also joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy). Although it is 
misleading to read too much into any single vote, Chief Justice Roberts's vote indicates that he, 
like Chief Justice Rehnquist before him, will likely support a vigorous state sovereign immunity 
doctrine. As a curious aside, Justice O'Connor, in one of her last actions on the Court, voted 
with the majority (written by Justice Stevens, and joined also by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer). While this vote is somewhat explicable in light of the Court's attention to the unique 
history and policy behind the Bankruptcy Clause, it is also surprising in light of her previous 
votes in state sovereign immunity cases. 
110. Because the Takings Clause applies to the states by incorporation through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity to enforce that clause 
under Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976), which held that Congress can abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity when enforcing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
11 1. The statute most frequently invoked by plaintiffs seeking a private right of action 
against state officials for the deprivation of constitutional rights, 42 U.S.C. 8 1983, does not 
abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332.345 (1979) (finding that 
9 1983 does not abrogate the states' sovereign immunity). The Court later held in Will v. 
Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). that state governments are not 
persons under 9 1983. Id. at 6 M 7 ;  see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378-79 
(1951) (holding that state legislators sued in their personal capacity under § 1983 may use 
immunity doctrines to shield themselves from damages liability if "acting in a field where 
legislators traditionally have power to act"). Section 1983, therefore, creates no remedy against 
the State. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,69 (1997) ("We have 
held . . . that 5 1983 actions do not lie against a State."). 
112. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). 
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immunity from suit exists whatever the character of the proceeding or the 
source of the right sought to be enforced. It applies alike to causes of 
action arising under acts of Congress . . . and to those arising from some 
violation of rights conferred upon the citizen by the ~onstitution.'" 
Lynch's treatment of the issue is straightforward, but dictum. In that case, 
Justice Brandeis found Congress's repeal of all laws pertaining to war 
insurance policies unconstitutional and thus determined that Congress could not 
take away the previously promised right and remedy (that is, the previous 
consent to suit).'14 
The most authoritative recent Supreme Court statement on the matter is in 
the First English footnote where the Court takes a very different approach, 
refuting the United States' argument that "the prohibitory nature of the Fifth 
Amendment . . . combined with principles of sovereign immunity, establishes 
that the Amendment itself is only a limitation on the power of the Government 
to act, not a remedial provision."1 l5 There the Court asserted that "[tlhough 
arising in various factual and jurisdictional settings, [takings] cases make clear 
that it is the Constitution that dictates the remedy for interference with property 
rights amounting to a taking.""6 Some years later, the Court seemed to 
backtrack when it noted in City of Monterey v. Del Monte ~ u n e s ' ' ~  that " [elven 
if the sovereign immunity rationale retains its vitality in cases where [the Fifth] 
Amendment is applicable. . . it is neither limited to nor coextensive with 
takings claims."118 Del Monte then suggests the possibility that, given the 
113. Id. at 581-82 (citing Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166-68 (1894)) 
(suggesting that sovereign immunity applies as strongly when suit arises under Constitution as 
when it arises under statutory law) (other citations omitted). 
114. Id. at 581-88. Also, it is worth noting that the defendant in Lynch was the federal 
govemment, not a state govemment. Although there might be reason to think that the sovereign 
immunity laws are analogous-that if one must waive its immunity, then so too must the other, 
e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 612-13 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissentingbthat is not 
necessarily the case. But see Seamon, supra note 8, at 1090-94 (arguing that there is symmetry 
between federal and state sovereign immunity). 
1 15. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles. 482 
U.S. 304,316 n.9 (1987). 
116. Id. 
117. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
118. Id. at 714. The issue in Del Monte was whether the plaintiffs 5 1983 takings claim 
was properly submitted to the jury. Id. at 694. The Court determined that it had been properly 
submitted, reasoning in part that just compensation is a monetary, compensatory remedy and 
that the denial ofjust compensation amounted to a constitutional tort. Id. at 709-1 1. This kind 
of action, therefore, falls squarely within the Seventh Amendment's promise of a jury trial for 
actions at law. Id. As part of this discussion, the Court noted that sovereign immunity would 
not have barred the suit in Del Monte because acity was the defendant, not the state. Id. at 714. 
This analysis vaguely suggests that sovereign immunity might have barred the suit were the 
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opportunity, the Court might revisit the First English footnote, but it offers 
little guidance. 
We, therefore, have nothing concrete to go on; indeed, neither First 
English nor Del Monte presented the instant question directly. The government 
in First English was the County of Los Angeles and thus was not entitled to a 
straight sovereign immunity defense.lL9 In Del Monte, the question was 
whether the plaintiff had a right to jury trial in a federal court inverse 
condemnation claim against a city under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983;120 the sovereign 
immunity issue arose in response to the dissent's argument that government 
power to shield itself from suit must include the lesser power to permit such 
suits without providing a jury trial.'*' Given this sparse and inconclusive 
precedent, we must explore the nature of the competing constitutional doctrines 
more deeply. Indeed, the Court's cursory references to this problem highlight 
its reluctance to arbitrate between competing constitutional provisions. Of 
course, none of these cases presented directly the question at issue here, but the 
Court's willingness to brush aside the problem quickly speaks to an 
unwillingness to wrestle with paradoxes created by separate lines of precedent. 
This Article, therefore, attempts both to address in detail the doctrinal conflict 
and to identify a more thorough approach to such conflicts than the cryptic 
statements offered by the Court. 
IV. The Textual Argument 
The simplest and most straightforward argument in favor of automatic 
abrogation is textual. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is that rare 
constitutional clause that dictates a particular remedy,122 stipulating that private 
property shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation." '23 
defendant the state, but the discussion is too brief to discern much about the Court's views on 
the First English footnote. 
119. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Sems., 436 U.S. 658,690 n.54 (1978) (noting that 
there is no basis for concluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a bar to municipal liability). 
120. Del Monte, 526 U.S. at 721-22. 
121. See id. at 742 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that some courts have rested on 
sovereign immunity to allow legislatures to qualify and condition the right to brings suits 
against the sovereign). 
122. The Constitution refers explicitly to remedies only in the Fifth Amendment's Just 
Compensation Clause and in safeguarding the remedy of habeas corpus against "Suspension" by 
Congress. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 849; see also infra Part V.A (discussing the 
unique nature of the remedially oriented Takings Clause and Suspension Clause). 
123. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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Unlike many rights for which the Constitution merely curtails government 
power to act, this provision expressly dictates a particular remedy. 
"Just compensation" traditionally has been thought to amount to money 
damages equal to the fair market value of the property taken by the condemning 
government.'24 Presumably, in eminent domain cases, the state could choose to 
return the property rather than pay the fair market value. Unless the 
government mis-estimated the court's determination of "fair value," however, 
this seems unlikely-the condemning authority has taken the property knowing, 
most likely, that it will have to pay fair market value for it.12' Extending this 
principle to regulatory takings cases, once the regulation has ceased, under 
First English, the government must pay actual money to compensate the 
landowner for the period of the taking. There is, of course, the possibility that 
the Court could overrule First English, but that chance seems extremely 
remote, especially given the robust nature of contemporary takings 
jurisprudence. 
Given that the Constitution requires "ust compensation," the straight 
textual argument seems to require the government to provide money damages, 
notwithstanding otherwise applicable sovereign immunity bars.'26 This is so 
not just because the Fifth Amendment commands it, but also because there is 
no Eleventh Amendment language that would require a different outcome. The 
term "just compensation" must mean money damages; there is no other remedy 
that could possibly constitute *'just compensation" in a temporary takings 
case. 127 
Of course, there is a potential state sovereign immunity bar to recovering 
this money from the state. The doctrines limiting the available relief might be 
wise, but, as a strict textual matter, the Constitution itself does not require this 
immunity in any federal question case, let alone talungs cases brought under the 
Fifth Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of 
124. DANA & MERWL, supra note 24, at 169. 
125. Of course, a state that knowingly takes property can initiate condemnation 
proceedings for a determination of how much compensation is due. Such proceedings derive 
from the same Fifth Amendment right to money damages, but concede the landowner's right to 
receive just compensation. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 
526 U.S. 687.71 1-12 (1999) (distinguishing condemnation proceedings from 5 1983 actions). 
126. See, e.g., SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 650 N.W.2d 1.8-9 (S.D. 2002) (finding that 
sovereign immunity is not a bar to money damages and that "the remedy does not depend on 
statutory facilitation"). 
127. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 710-.11 ("[Jlust compensation is, like ordinary 
money damages, a compensatory remedy . . . [and therefore] legal relief." so that a suit alleging 
a taking seeks "not just compensation per se but rather damages for the unconstitutional denial 
of such compensation"). 
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the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign state."12* Nothing in 
this language would seem to extend state sovereign immunity to cases in which 
a state citizen sues his own state to recover ')just compensation" for property 
that the state has taken.129 
Indeed, state sovereign immunity doctrine strays far from the 
Constitution's text.l3' Hans marked the most significant departure from the 
Eleventh Amendment's text, extending the states' immunity to suits in which a 
citizen sues her own state,13' even though Article III authorizes such suits and 
the language of the Eleventh Amendment includes only suits by citizens of one 
state against the government of a different state. As Professor Nelson explains, 
the Court since Hans "has been holding that federal courts cannot entertain 
suits against states in a variety of contexts that apparently are covered by 
Article I117s grants of subject matter jurisdiction and are not covered by any 
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
129. Indeed, nothing in the Eleventh Amendment's language would support much of 
today's sovereign immunity doctrine, even though Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Court's two 
most ardent textualists, are both strong proponents of vigorous state sovereign immunity. 
Professor Ernest Young emphasized how unmoored state sovereign immunity has become from 
the Eleventh Amendment text when he titled a section in his article "A Tough Day for 
Textualists, or, Did Justice Scalia Really Sign This Thing?" Ernest Young, Alden v. Maine and 
the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 W M .  &MARY L. REV. 1601, 1617 (2000); see also John F.  
Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 11 3 YALE 
L.J. 1663,1667 (2004) (noting that the text of the Eleventh Amendment cannot bearthe Court's 
interpretations). 
130. See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 74, at 1895 ("[Flrom a textual standpoint, the 
suggestion that states were immune from suit in federal court seems preposterous on its face."); 
Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 WV. L. REV. 
1342, 135 1-7 1 (1989) (arguing that there is no rational justification for departing from the plain 
meaning of the text); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendments, 56 U .  CHI. L. REV. 61, 97-142 (1989) (providing the historical development of 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and reasons why the Court departed from the text). 
131. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890) (invoking historical practices and 
precedent to support the statement that a state may not be sued without its consent). See 
generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An 
Essay on Law, Race, History, and "Federal Courts," 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927 (2003) (arguing that 
Hans gave voice not to the intent of the 1790s but to the compromise of the 1890s in which 
white Americans, driven in part by racism, allowed the South limited independence in imposing 
white rule and repudiating its state debts in exchange for national reconciliation and unity); 
Mark Strasser, Hans, Ayers, and Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence: On Justification, 
Rationalization, and Sovereign Immunity, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 251 (2001) (arguing that 
Hans makes sense in light of precedent precluding federal courts from taking control of state 
treasuries and in light of the fact that any other decision would have been unenforceable). 
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plausible reading of the Eleventh ~mendmen t . " '~~  This detextualization of the 
Eleventh Amendment, itself central to more than a century of state sovereign 
immunity doctrine, has become even more pronounced in the Court's recent 
decisions, especially Alden, where the Court announced that "the scope of the 
States' immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment 
alone but by fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design."133 
Of course, relying on history is not necessarily contrary to a textualist 
reading. Originalist-textualists seek to reconcile their approaches to 
constitutional interpretation by searching for the commonly understood 
meaning of the text at the time of ratifi~ati0n.I~~ But in this instance, the Alden 
majority's controversial view of original understanding of the Eleventh 
~mendrnen t '~~  is so at odds with the plain meaning of the text, that the Court's 
approach, faithfully characterized, simply abandons textualism. Indeed, the 
Court's opinion does not even attempt to determine what the words of the 
Eleventh Amendment would have meant in the 1790s, '~~ focusing instead on 
the Founders' "intent to preserve the States' immunity from suit in their own 
The Court even admits that the phrase "Eleventh Amendment 
immunity" is: 
[Clonvenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign 
immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of 
the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the Constitution's structure, its 
history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the 
States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which 
the States enjoyed before ratification of the Constitution, and which they 
retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union 
upon an equal footing with the other States) . . . . 138 
However persuasive the historical and structural arguments might be, they are 
decidedly unmoored from the Constitution's text. 
132. Nelson, supra note 82, at 1563 (emphasis in original). 
133. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,729 (1999). 
134. See Michael W .  McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1132 (1998) (describing the rationale behind originalist interpretation); 
see also Young, supra note 129, at 1620 (discussing potential overlaps between textualist and 
originalist arguments). 
135. See infra Part V1.B (discussing the original understanding of state sovereign 
immunity). 
136. See Young, supra note 129, at 1622 ("There is no effort . . . to use historical evidence 
to determine what the words of the Eleventh Amendment would have been understood to mean 
at the time that the Amendment was adopted. "). 
137. Alden, 527 U . S .  at 741. 
138. Id.at713. 
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Although doctrines of statutory interpretation are rarely applied to the 
Constitution, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio a l t e r i ~ s ' ~ ~  is helpful here. 
In fact, it is probably even more appropriate than in the statutory context. One 
drawback to expressio unius in statutory interpretation is that the doctrine 
assumes a kind of legislative omniscience; it is unfair and unrealistic to expect 
a legislature to include statutory language dealing with every scenario that it 
might intend to fall under a law's ambit.I4' By way of contrast, Chisholm 
brought the issue of state immunity to the forefront of the nation's 
constitutional consciousness. In amending the Constitution, the framers of the 
Eleventh Amendment must have been aware that states might try to raise 
sovereign immunity defenses in other kinds of cases. Indeed, the Pennsylvania 
ratification debates make clear that some Founders did not expect immunity to 
necessarily extend to federal question cases.I4' And though one need not 
assume that the Eleventh Amendment's framers considered every possible 
variation (for example, whether sovereign immunity should not extend to 
constitutional claims or to all federal claims), one can assume they understood 
the basic divide between federal question and diversity suits well enough (and 
implicit enough in the federalist system) that it is unrealistic to think that they 
would not have considered those distinctions. 
That the response to Chisholm was to codify state sovereign immunity 
only for suits brought by citizens of another state or foreign citizens cuts 
strongly against the current Court. Of course, Chisholm was a diversity case, so 
one could argue that the Eleventh Amendment addressed only the mischief 
caused by that case and left undisturbed sovereign immunity in federal question 
cases, upon which Chisholm had not intruded. But this response is a weak one 
because the fiamers of the Eleventh Amendment surely anticipated that 
sovereign immunity issues would have arisen in contexts other than diversity 
cases and recognized that the Eleventh Amendment would figure significantly 
in future generations' views of that immunity. 
Professor Manning similarly contends that the specificity canon, itself a 
close relation of expressio unius, has at least as much force for precise 
constitutional provisions as for precise statutory ones.I4* The rigorous 
processes of constitutional amendment set forth in Article V of the Constitution 
139. The Latin translates into "inclusion of one thing indicates exclusion of the other." 
WIW N. ESKRDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE 
CWON OF P ~ L I C  POLICY 824 (3d ed. 2001). 
140. See id. (describing inherent flaws in the maxim). 
141. See infra note 430 and accompanying text (discussing the Pennsylvania debate in 
further detail); see also infra Parts V.B. 1 & V1.B (providing additional historical perspective). 
142. Manning, supra note 129, at 1671. 
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require judges to carefully respect any amendment's lines of 
The fact that Article V's requirements are more stringent than those 
necessary to enact mere legislation should militate towards an especially 
close reading of the relevant text; a broader reading might permit an 
interpretation that the necessary super-majorities could not have ratified.'44 
Confronted with a specific, rule-like amendment, courts thus can reasonably 
infer a negative implication from the text's specificity.'45 Applied to the 
Eleventh Amendment, this interpretive approach would read the text to mean 
what it says and only what it says: states enjoy sovereign immunity in suits 
brought by citizens of another state or a foreign state. Because the text 
reflects the compromise necessary to ratify the amendment, it should not 
apply to other kinds of suits, such as federal question actions brought by 
citizens of the same state. States, therefore, would not be protected against 
taking suits, except, arguably, those brought by citizens of another state.'46 
Of course, even though the textual hook for the Eleventh Amendment is 
especially weak, the takings textual argument has its weaknesses as well. 
While the Just Compensation Clause does provide for an explicit remedy, its 
language does not promise compensation for temporary (or, for that matter, 
regulatory) takings. Nor does it, by its own terms, apply against the states.I4' 
To be sure, the extension to temporary and regulatory takings seems to be a 
logical outgrowth of the Just Compensation Clause in the sense that the 
purpose inherent in the Clause's language cannot be satisfied without 
extending it to such takings. And because the Takings Clause 
incontrovertibly applies against the states through the Fourteenth 
143. See id. at 1672, 1692-1720 (arguing that the text of amendments is entitled to great 
deference because of the nature of the amendment process). 
144. Id. at 1702, 1719-20 (arguing that, given the constitutional protections Article V 
gives to political minorities, a strict reading of the amendments is necessary to ensure that 
judges do not enforce a provision that was not properly ratified); see also Henry P .  Monaghan. 
We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constiturional Amendment, 96 C O L ~ .  L. REV. 
121,125-26 (1996) (discussing Article V's design, which permits a very small number of states 
to prevent constitutional amendment and requires super-majorities of both houses of Congress). 
145. See Manning, supra note 129, at 1671, 1702 (noting that, in regard to rule-like 
amendments such as the Eleventh Amendment, "textual precision should be understood to 
reflect the adopters' willingness or ability to go so far and no farther in pursuit of the desired 
constitutional objective"). 
146. If the narrower reading of the Eleventh Amendment were to ever win the day, an 
interesting question would be whether it would extend only to diversity suits against a state or 
also to federal question suits that happened to be brought by out-of-state individuals. 
147. Of course, in many areas of constitutional law settled doctrine does not rest on 
constitutional text. See infra Part VII (arguing that many constimtiond principles are products 
of judicial interpretation due, in large part, to the brevity of the Constitution). 
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~ m e n d m e n t , ' ~ ~  this extension satisfies the Just Compensation Clause's 
purpose within the context of the new post-Civil War federa1i~m.l~~ But one 
must concede that both of these significant developments are judge-made. 
The difference, however, is that while First English purports to interpret 
the Takings Clause, Alden does not claim to interpret the Eleventh 
Amendment at a11.150 The requirement that the government compensate 
property owners for temporary takings closes a potential loophole in the 
Takings Clause and effectuates its purpose more fully; without it, the 
government could repeatedly take property temporarily and then return it 
without having to compensate the owners. By way of contrast, it is 
impossible to see how the extension of Eleventh Amendment immunity to 
suits by states' own citizens furthers the achievement of the Amendment's 
language, which gives the states' protection against suits brought by citizens 
of other states. From a textualist perspective then, it would be very strange 
for the essentially common law sovereign immunity to prevent damages 
actions for violations of the Takings Clause. 
V. The Structural Arguments 
Of course, although it is wise to begin with the text, the inquiry cannot 
end there. Indeed, were it to end there, the vast majority of our sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence would not exist, for the Court has found its roots in 
structural and originalist arguments. We should not forget the Constitution's 
text-and it is in fact perhaps worth emphasizing to demonstrate that our 
absurdly complicated Eleventh Amendment doctrine was far from 
ine~itablel~~-but we must place it aside both because there are other 
arguments to be made and because we must address the arguments in favor of 
sovereign immunity on the Court's own terms. 
148. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,239 (1897) 
(finding that Fourteenth Amendment due process requires just compensation when a state 
government takes private land for public use). 
149. Admittedly, as the Fourteenth Amendment does not explicitly incorporate the Bill of 
Rights, the force of the textualist argument is somewhat diminished. 
150. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999); see also supra note 133 and 
accompanying text (discussing Alden). 
15 1. See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME 
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 41-85 (2002) (critiquing the elaborate complexities of Eleventh 
Amendment doctine). 
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A. Which Reading Does Less Damage? 
Any resolution will damage one line of case law or the other. The Court 
could keep silent and ignore the incompatibility, but even that approach would 
probably prioritize takings over sovereign immunity because refusing to 
address the issue in a case would side step immunity altogether. This is 
essentially what happened in ~a l azzo lo .~ '~  Judicial politics might encourage 
this result, but it leaves in place significant doctrinal contradictions. 
One way to resolve the collision is to ask which outcome damages an 
existing doctrine least. Although unorthodox, this approach admits that one 
constitutional doctrine will necessarily be pruned back, so it seeks to amve at 
the solution that requires the least pruning. Of course, there are other factors 
one might use to decide what to "prune,"153 but an advantage of this approach is 
that it seeks neutrality. 
From this perspective, the Takings Clause should be automatically 
abrogating. The main point of the Takings Clause is to limit the government's 
power of eminent domain,154 frequently by forcing the government to pay for 
private property it takes, even when it would prefer not to. If the government 
could bar suits for just compensation, the Takings Clause would be stripped of 
much meaning. State governments could take property whenever it wanted to 
without providing any compensation to landowners. The state could, of course, 
choose to waive its immunity, but the whole purpose of the Takings Clause is 
to require just compensation and give the government no decision in the 
matter.'55 Requiring formal congressional abrogation would give the legislature 
the very power that the Constitution seeks to deny it. One could argue that it 
looks bad for a government to take private property and then block itself from 
suit by invoking sovereign immunity (and that, therefore, it would have 
incentives to abrogate its immunity). But because takings affect potentially 
only a small minority, it is unrealistic to think that political safeguards would 
necessarily lead to abrogation or ~a iver . ' '~  
152. See generally Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (failing to discuss 
sovereign immunity in finding a taking); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text 
(discussing Palauolo). 
153. Of course, normatively some might prefer an outcome that does the most damage to 
one or both doctrines. 
154. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 24, at 2-3. 
155. But see Brauneis, supra note 8, at 60 (arguing that takings clauses in state 
constitutions did not always require just con -?nsation but rather nullified legislation that 
effected a taking); infra Part V1.A (discussing the development of the "Just Compensation" 
requirement). 
156. One must not overstate the potential failures of the political marketplace for property 
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This, of course, is a rather extreme reading, depicting sovereign immunity 
as necessarily draining the Takings Clause of all its content. A more charitable 
reading is that sovereign immunity really only kills First English's judicially 
imposed requirement that the government compensate landowners for 
temporary takings. Even if a state uses state sovereign immunity to shield itself 
from suit in a physical takings case, a plaintiff can still sue a state official for 
injunctive relief forcing the return of her property. Such a plaintiff cannot 
recover money for the duration of the taking, whether regulatory or physical, 
but if the state refuses to compensate her, she can still get her property back. 
Given the availability of Ex parte Young injunctive relief and suits against 
officers in their personal capacities, sovereign immunity's interference is 
minimal, affecting mostly temporary takings. 
This rejoinder is significant, but it underestimates how central First 
English is to just compensation doctrine and values. First English itself 
recognizes this, stating "that 'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a 
landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent 
takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires ~om~ensation."'~' Just 
compensation principles thus rest not on the duration or permanence of a 
taking, but rather on the idea that the Takings Clause is "designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in 
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."158 Because 
the value of using land for a fixed period of time "can be great indeed,"'59 it 
owners. As a class, they surely have more political clout than many groups seeking protection 
under the Constitution, such as criminal defendants. See, e-g., Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice 
and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279,282 (1992) (stating that a citizen with voting 
rights has less reason than a nonconstituent to fear uncompensated takings). But because 
takings can affect property owners scattered over a large area, affected property owners will 
frequently be unable to act as a political unit. Government failure is, then, a distinct possibility, 
potentially resulting in a compensation system that is neither efficient nor just. See, e.g., 
Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An EconomicAnalysis, 72 
CAL. L. REV. 569,62&23 (1984) (discussing political fiscal illusion, which occurs when the 
governmental body discounts the cost of its action because it does not explicitly appear as a 
budgetary expense); William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More 
Eficient Regulation a Taking of Property?, 67 CHI-KENT L. REV. 865, 887-88 (1991) 
(discussing the Takings Clause as a means of protecting individuals from bearing burdens that 
should be borne by the public as a whole); Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 
22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 306 (1990) (noting that the legal system regards organized interest 
groups differently than it does an individual citizen or a collection of citizens, who but once in 
lifetime face a common burden). 
157. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304,318 (1987). 
158. Id. at 318-19 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960)). 
159. Id. at 319. 
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would not make sense for the Takings Clause to cover permanent takings but 
not temporary ones that could last years and deprive a property owner of 
millions of dollars. Indeed, even Justice Stevens, who dissented in First 
English, admits that "[tlhere may be some situations in which even the 
temporary existence of a regulation has such severe consequences that 
invalidation or repeal will not mitigate the damage enough to remove the 
'taking' label."160 
Permitting sovereign immunity doctrine to trump the Takings Clause 
would accomplish just this, effectively overruling First English, at least as 
applied to the states.161 Without the obligations created by First English, a state 
could render private property unusable indefinitely and return it without 
compensating the landowner at all for the period of its use. Because the state 
would have no incentive to minimize the duration of a taking, government 
possession could last for the duration of the plaintiffs lawsuit; the state would 
thus have incentives to draw out the case, filing motions and appeals to make 
sure the process takes as long as possible.162 This scenario, of course, assumes 
the worst behavior and might not accurately reflect the way most states would 
behave most of the time. But to the extent that the very existence of the 
Takings Clause presupposes a distrust of government, it would be odd to design 
a jurisprudence that left so much to the good will of the state and did not force 
government to internalize the costs of its takings.'63 This result might tempt 
160. Id. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
161. First English does not actually find that a regulatory taking had occurred; rather, it 
holds that the government must pay just compensation to a landowner if a regulatory taking 
occurs. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1176 (4th ed. 1998). 
162. That Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to a state but not its subdivisions poses 
not only doctrinal complications but also curious policy incentives. To the extent that the 
Constitution, particularly as interpreted by the Rehnquist Court, represents a laissez-faire model 
of governance (though, granted, not nearly as emphatically capitalist as during the Lochner 
Court), this constitutional baseline discouraging regulation makes sense, even if it is 
normatively controversial. To the extent, though, that it encourages state regulation and 
discourages equivalent locality regulation, the result seems odd. For an originalist who opposes 
big government, our original federal structure existed not merely to protect sovereign states, but 
also to localize decisionmaking, preserving a kind of small town, Jeffersonian democracy. This 
might be a controversial--or idealized, or ndive-conception of our constitutional heritage, but 
it is an important part of the anti-federalist tradition. (By "anti-federalist," I refer not so much to 
the Anti-Federalists who opposed the Constitution, but rather to the supporters of the 
Constitution who nevertheless wanted to protect local rule from a large centralized 
government.). Sovereign immunity doctrine theoretically encourages state rather than local 
regulation, a policy trend that is not necessarily desirable (though, admittedly, the politicians 
creating policy might not be thinking at all about the Eleventh Amendment when drafting their 
policies). But see Roberts, supra note 8, at 623 n.2 (noting that many takings claims are filed 
against local governments). 
163. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFLAW 64 (5th ed. 1998) (providing 
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policy makers to believe the "fiscal illusion" that the resources they take have 
no opportunity cost, thus leading to overzealous regulators with no concern for 
the misallocation of resources.L64 
Allowing state sovereign immunity to bar recovery in First English suits 
would thus undermine the very principles upon which just compensation rests. 
By way of contrast, the opposite outcome, privileging Fifth Amendment takings 
over Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, leaves most of current 
sovereign immunity doctrine intact. Were the Court to hold that a state cannot 
raise a sovereign immunity defense against a takings claim, the rest of 
sovereign immunity doctrine could still stand. A takings exception to sovereign 
immunity doctrine could rest on various theories, such as the Fifth 
Amendment's remedial command. Under this reading, current state sovereign 
immunity case law would only be disturbed with regards to interim takings; 
Seminole Tribe, Alden, and FMC would remain unaffected. Sovereign 
immunity would still have bite against other constitutional rights, statutory 
rights, and state law. A narrow exception for takings therefore would not 
defang sovereign immunity nearly as much as the alternative approach would 
nullify the Takings Clause. 
B. The Marbury Principle and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies 
1. Just Compensation and the Remedial Promise 
As suggested at the end of the last section, one can also make a broader 
argument that, as a structural matter, it does not make sense to bar suits against 
a state for federal constitutional violations because removing the remedy often 
constrains the right. Under this theory, state sovereign immunity should apply 
to federal statutes and state laws, but not to the federal Constitution, because 
the very purpose of enshrining these rights in the Constitution is to protect them 
regardless of the political whims of the state. The Takings Clause would then 
provide a kind of ~ i v e n s ' ~ ~  action against the states, creating a cause of action 
for damages out of a constitutional vi01ation.l~~ Of course, Bivens itself applies 
examples of the perverse economic decisions the government might make were it able to obtain 
land freely). 
164. See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of 
Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997,999-1001 (1999) (discussing the deterrence function served 
by the just compensation requirement). 
165. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
166. See id. at 397 (holding that when a federal agent acting under color of his authority 
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to federal officials, not state governments, so it provides no direct doctrinal 
support for this position.'67 Instead, it suggests that the violation of 
constitutional rights can itself give rise to an action for damages; a crucial role 
of the judiciary in this model, therefore, is to protect individuals against 
government incursions on their constitutional rights. Though one could make 
the broader argument that any federal constitutional right should always 
automatically abrogate a state's immunity, this section seeks more modestly to 
apply such arguments only to just compensation cases. 
Underlying this argument is the famous aphorism, traced back to 
Blackstone, that for every right there must be a remedy.'68 Chief Justice 
Marshall articulated this principle in Marbury v.  adi is on,'^^ stating that "[tlhe 
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to 
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."170 Thus, 
"where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon 
the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who 
considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a 
remedy.""' As the Court later stated, "Adjudication is of no value as a remedy 
unless enforcement fo I l~ws . " '~~  Given this reasoning and the tremendous 
importance assigned to Chief Justice Marshall's Marbury opinion, it would 
follow that the Takings Clause assigns a specific duty by law, so that its 
violation-if the government takes property without providing just 
compensation-gives the injured property owner the right to seek that 
compensation in the judicial system. 
Marbury's principle is fundamental and persuasive, but, as might be 
expected, the matter is not so simple. Although an injured property owner 
clearly has a constitutional right, that right alone does not entitle her to the 
remedy of her choice. Our judiciary considers distinct such concepts as cause 
of action, jurisdiction (both personal and subject matter), justiciability, remedy, 
and sovereign immunity, and satisfying judicial requirements in one category 
violates the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff has a cause of action for damages if he can show a 
resulting injury). 
167. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (finding that the Eleventh 
Amendment precludes Bivens-type actions against state governments in federal court unless the 
states consent to such suits). 
168. See, e.g., Daniel Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 2537,2554 (1998) (discussing Blackstone and constitutional remedies). 
169. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
170. Id. at 163. 
171. Id. at 166. 
172. R.R. Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337,339 (1879). 
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often will have no effect on another.'73 Merely having a cause of action, 
therefore, is not enough to guarantee judicial review on its own, nor is it 
sufficient to guarantee an appropriate remedy,'74 even if there is review.17' As 
Professors Meltzer and Fallon point out, "Marbury's apparent promise of 
effective redress for all constitutional violations reflects a principle, not an 
ironclad rule, and its ideal is not always attained."'76 Indeed, claims against the 
government implicate two competing interests: the individual's interest in 
receiving compensation for a meritorious claim and society's interest in 
maintaining democratic control over the allocation of limited public f ~ n d s . " ~  
Keeping in mind these traditional bars on Marbury's principle that every 
right deserves a remedy, it becomes much easier to see why sovereign 
immunity is an obstacle at all. And yet, there is good reason to think that 
sovereign immunity doctrine should not apply to the Takings Clause. There is 
something deeply contradictory about including a right in the Constitution and 
then constructing a sovereign immunity bamer to prevent injured parties from 
enforcing it. For some constitutional rights, this phenomenon is troubling but 
explicable. In a First Amendment setting, for instance, a state might pass a law 
banning a particular protest. Sovereign immunity will bar the protesters from 
suing for damages, but if they file their action early enough, the plaintiffs can 
receive injunctive relief forcing the state officer to permit the protest. Eleventh 
Amendment immunity here limits the range of possible remedies, but in many 
instances an equitable remedy will in fact be what the protesters want.'78 By 
173. Even though these categories are usually thought of as analytically distinct, judicial 
analysis sometimes blurs them together. As I shall demonstrate, the issues of remedy and 
sovereign immunity are especially intertwined in the context of takings. 
174. Traditional remedies for constitutional violations include "damages, restitution, 
injunctions, mandamus, ejectment, declaratory judgments, exclusion of evidence, remand for 
retrial or reconsideration untainted by constitutional error, and writs of habeas corpus." Fallon 
& Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1778. 
175. But see Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-hecuring Constitution, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 289,292 (1995) (arguing that the Constitution should be self-executing and that 
"enforcement of the Constitution is not dependent on the assent of the political branches or of 
the states"). 
176. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1778. 
177. Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of C l a i m  Against the United States: The 
Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625,626 
(1985). 
178. Of course, the scenario becomes more complicated if, for instance, the protesters do 
not have time to file an action in time to strike down the law before the protest. Presumably, the 
state could play its cards so that the law prevents a protest, and then sovereign immunity would 
block plaintiffs' ability to receive money damages. If the protest were a one-time event (so that 
a future protest on the same issue would be worthless), then the injunctive relief afforded to 
plaintiffs through an Ex parte Young suit would do the protesters no good. In this instance, 
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way of contrast, in temporary takings cases, damages are the only remedy that 
will protect the plaintiffs rights. A sovereign immunity bar thus eviscerates the 
property right. Congressional abrogation, of course, can restore the right and 
the remedy, but requiring abrogation essentially demotes the Takings Clause as 
applied to the states to the status of a statute. 
While this argument could apply to other constitutional rights, it is 
strongest for takings cases. The Takings Clause is not merely "another 
protection of the few against the many,""9 but one of only two constitutional 
provisions that are remedially oriented. The other is the Suspension Clause, 
which provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it."'" The original Constitution and Bill of Rights thus offered its 
most vigorous protections for liberty and property. Indeed, the Constitution 
emerged partially out of a recognition that the Articles of Confederation had 
failed to protect these two rights. At the beginning of the American 
Revolution, Americans did not think that democracy could threaten such 
property and liberty rights."' The experience of the 1780s under the Articles of 
Confederation, however, taught them otherwise; America, as it turned out, was 
not that different from other societies, and these rights needed special 
protection.'82 After all, liberty was central to the American project and, as 
Madison pointed out, only a minority (those with property) would be interested 
in protecting property rights.'83 
Takings, like habeas, then would seem to be an area where the Eleventh 
Amendment has little traction. As the nineteenth century Court explained in 
United States v. L.ee:ls4 
If this constitutional provision [protecting the writ of habeas corpus] is a 
sufficient authority for the court to interfere to rescue a prisoner from the 
sovereign immunity permits some remedies, but not the only meaningful one. 
179. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 97 
(1980). 
180. U.S. CONST. art. I, 8 9, cl. 2. 
181. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION F THE AMWCAN REPUBLIC, 1776-87, at 410 
(1998) (describing early American political theory). 
182. Id. at 410-1 1. 
183. Id. at 41 1. There may be normative arguments today to prefer other rights over 
property rights, but the Constitution's scarcity of remedial provisions would suggest that 
property and liberty are prioritized in our constitutional system. Though problematic in ways, 
this result at least avoids the danger of letting constitutional rights hinge on judges' own values. 
See ELY, supra note 179, at 43 (discussing the perils of judges' prejudices influencing their 
constitutional jurisprudence). 
184. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). 
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hands of those holding him under the asserted authority of the government, 
what reason is there that the same courts shall not give remedy to the citizen 
whose property has been seized without due process of law and devoted to 
public use without just compensation?185 
To an extent, the analogy is inexact because habeas claims are directed to 
state officers186 and, therefore, do not implicate the core of state sovereign 
immunity.187 Nevertheless, they necessarily intrude upon the prerogative of the 
state, and no one would suggest that Congress must abrogate the state's 
sovereign immunity for those habeas statutes to be functional.188 As Justice 
Souter has pointed out, habeas statutes are directed against "the state."lS9 One 
provision of the habeas corpus statute, for instance, requires that "the State shall 
produce part of the record and the Federal court shall direct the State to do so 
by order directed to an appropriate State official."1g0 To be sure, the statute 
provides that the court shall direct the order to the "appropriate State official." 
But the language of the statute-and, indeed, the nature of the habeas 
remedy--comprehends that the remedy is one that intrudes upon the state's 
sovereignty. And yet, though Congress may impose various restrictions on 
habeas actions, it may not entirely bar them under the Constitution except "in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [when] the public Safety may require it."19' 
Habeas, then, is an example of an action that intrudes greatly on the state but 
cannot be blocked by sovereign immunity. 
Of course, another important distinction is that habeas claims, unlike 
temporary takings claims, do not seek a monetary remedy; in this way, they 
more closely resemble Exparte Young a~ t i0ns . I~~  But to the extent that Young 
185. Id. at 218. 
186. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 5 2243 (2004) ("The writ. . . shall be directed to the person 
having custody of the person detained."). 
187. Moreover, Lee was decided about a century before First English, so the damages 
remedy in temporary regulatory takings cases was not yet required. Rather, the condemning 
authority could choose instead to return the property. 
188. See Idaho v.  Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 312 n.10 (1997) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (noting that habeas statutes were not "intended to abrogate an immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment"). 
189. Seminole Tribe of Ha. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 181 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
190. 28 U.S.C. $2254(f) (2004) (emphasis added). 
191. U . S . C o ~ s ~ . a r t . 1 , § 9 , ~ 1 . 2 .  
192. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 312 & n.10 (1997) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (citing a habeas case while discussing the "intrusiveness" of Ex parte Young 
actions); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 178 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that "when a habeas corpus petitioner sues a state official alleging detention in 
violation of federal law and seeking the prospective remedy of release from custody, it is the 
doctrine identified in Exparte Young that allows the petitioner to evade the jurisdictional bar of 
COLLISION OF TAKINGS & STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 533 
itself is a recognition that courts must offer an appropriate remedy to protect 
constitutional rights, its doctrine also stands for the proposition that the 
Constitution can be used as a sword to vindicate remedies explicitly protected 
in the Constitution. If we accept this principle at such a general level of 
abstraction, it would seem to follow that using the Takings Clause as a sword 
would necessarily command the damages remedy implicit in "just 
compensation." 
Indeed, a damages remedy arising from the Constitution is itself not alien 
to our case law; Bivens already decided that the Constitution-in that case the 
Fourth Amendment--could give rise to a cause of action for damages against 
federal agents for unconstitutional conduct.193 It did so, in fact, with specific 
reference to liberty interests, arguing that "[h]istorically, damages have been 
regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in 
liberty."lg4 And the Court has more than once noted specifically that property 
and liberty are uniquely important interests. In addition to Lee, the Supreme 
Court in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of ~ h i c a ~ o ' ~ ~  
noted that: 
Due protection of the rights of property has been regarded as a vital 
principle of republican institutions. Next in degree to the right of personal 
liberty . . . is that of enjoying private property without undue interference or 
molestation. The requirement that the property shall not be taken for public 
use without just compensation is but an a f f i c e  of a great doctrine 
established by the common law for the protection of private property. It is 
founded in natural equity, and is laid down as a principle of universal law. 
Indeed, in a free government, almost all other rights would become 
worthless if the government possessed an uncontrollable power over the 
private fortune of every citzen [sic].'% 
The notion that Fifth Amendment just compensation is different from 
other constitutional remedies has surfaced in other Supreme Court decisions as 
well. In Jacobs v. United states,19' for instance, the Court argues with regards 
to a federal partial regulatory takings claim that: 
The suits were based on the right to recover just compensation for property 
taken by the United States for public use in the exercise of its power of 
the Eleventh Amendment (or, more properly, the Hans doctrine)"). 
193. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
389 (1971). 
194. Id. at 395. 
195. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
196. Id. at 235-36 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
197. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933). 
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eminent domain. That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact 
that condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the right was 
asserted in suits by the owners did not change the essential nature of the 
claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the 
Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary. Such a 
promise was implied because of the duty to pay imposed by the 
Amendment. The suits were thus founded upon the Constitution of the 
United ~ t a t e s . ' ~ *  
Significantly, even the Court's most recent sovereign immunity decisions 
agree that sovereign immunity does not attach as vigorously to claims arising 
from the Constitution itself. In Alden, the Court admits that Reich v. Collins 
arose in the context of tax-refund litigation, where a State may deprive a 
taxpayer of all other means of challenging the validity of its tax laws by 
holding out what appears to be a "clear and certain" postdeprivation 
remedy. In this context, due process requires the State to provide the 
remedy it has promised.  he- obligation arises from the constitution 
itself. . . . 1 99 
This language is admittedly somewhat cryptic, but the idea that certain 
rights emanating from the Constitution enjoy special protections is not wholly 
anomalous. Over a century earlier, the Court in Lee opined that the principle of 
immunity was "as applicable to each of the states as it is to the United States, 
except in those cases where by the constitution a state of the Union may be 
sued in this 
These statements are potentially of great significance, but it is important to 
admit that their exact meanings are unclear. In Reich, Georgia had legislatively 
altered the remedy against officers, substituting traditional trespass or assumpsit 
- -- 
198. Id. at 16. In addition to Jacobs, the Court has several times explained that the 
Constitution requires the compensation remedy for takings. See First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (finding a 
constitutional requirement that condemnations be compensated); United States v. Clarke, 445 
U.S. 253,257 (1980) (noting that the Constitution provides a landowner with a self-executing 
claim to compensation after condemnation); see also Eric Grant, A Revolutionary View of the 
Seventh Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause, 91 Nw. U .  L. REV. 144,200 (1996) 
(claiming that courts regularly abrogate sovereign immunity when requiring compensation for 
takings). But see Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 64647 (1962) (finding that sovereign 
immunity barred an action to eject a federal forest service officer from land to which both 
plaintiffs and the federal government claimed title). Note, however, that because the actions in 
Jacobs were brought under the Tucker Act, there was no sovereign immunity to hurdle. 
199. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999) (emphasis added); see also Reich v. 
Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 108 (1994) (noting the long line of cases establishing the constitutional 
requirement of remedies for unconstitutional taxes); supra Part III.A.2 (discussing due process 
tax refund cases). 
200. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,20647 (1882). 
COLLISION OF TAKINGS & STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 535 
actions with a direct action against the state. The state supreme court, however, 
found the refund remedy unavailable when the taxcollection statute was 
declared unc~nstitutional.~~' In citing Reich, Alden may simply be asserting 
that a state cannot withdraw its promise for a remedy for unlawful taxes. From 
this perspective, Reich might be a narrow due process case rather than a novel 
application of constitutional remediese202 Indeed, keeping in mind that Alden 
argues that sovereign immunity barred a suit arising under the Constitution in 
~ a n s , ~ ' ~  it becomes clear that its treatment of Reich does not endorse a theory 
of automatic abrogation for suits to enforce constitutional rights. To the 
contrary, it explicitly rejects "any contention that substantive federal law by its 
own force necessarily overrides the sovereign immunity of the states. "204 And 
yet, the inclusion of the word "necessarily" seems to give the Court some 
wiggle room: federal law may not, as a general rule, ovemde Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, but in some instances it may. Given Alden's 
subsequent suggestion that obligations arising from the Constitution itself 
might deserve special treatment-and given that the Fifth Amendment's 
remedial promise grants takings a special place even among constitutional 
rights-this "necessarily" might hint that takings would trump the Eleventh 
Amendment. In other words, if some federal actions can ovemde the sovereign 
immunity of the states, then surely suits sounding in inverse condemnation 
should be such an action. Indeed, even if Reich is a narrow due process case 
that depends on the state's denial of the remedy it has promised, it still might 
apply to takings cases because just compensation clauses-either in the federal 
or state constitution--can be read as making such a remedial promise. 
Reich thus suggests that sovereign immunity concerns might be 
diminished in certain cases alleging unconstitutional state action. And Alden's 
treatment of Reich helps highlight, albeit obscurely, ways in which takings of 
property might be treated differently in our jurisprudence. Moreover, given 
that Alden addresses Congress's power to abrogate state sovereign immunity 
(as opposed to automatic abrogation), the Court's discussion of Hans is 
inapposite to the present problem.205 
- - - 
201. Reich, 513 U.S. at 110. 
202. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing further Alden's treatment of Reich); see also DM, 
Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 51 1,527-28 (6th Cir. 2004) (interpreting Reich as a reaftinnation 
that a remedy for unconstitutional taxes does not trump the sovereign immunity that states enjoy 
in federal court). 
203. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 732 (viewing the Hans Court's decision as a bar to federal 
question suits against states absent a waiver). 
204. Id. (emphasis added). 
205. The dispute in Alden focused on "new property," namely Maine's refusal to pay 
petitioners overtime payments required under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). (Maine 
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Other cases rejecting constitutionally implied remedies are also not wholly 
analogous. Ln Parratt v. ~ a ~ l o r , ~ ' ~  for instance, the Court provided no due 
process remedy for a prisoner plaintiff seeking to recover for the loss of his 
hobby kit by prison officials.207 This rule was extended to intentional losses of 
property in Hudson v. ~alrner.~~"oth these cases, however, hinged on the 
state's provision of a post-deprivation remedy, namely the state's tort system.209 
A pre-deprivation remedy in those cases was "simply 'impracticable,'"210 but 
the state could satisfy its constitutional obligations by providing adequate post- 
deprivation remedies through the tort system. 
Parratt and Hudson suggest, once again, that rights do not require the full 
spectrum of remedies, but these cases are significantly different from a takings 
case. First, by characterizing these as procedural due process cases, the Court 
permits the state to cure the injury by providing an adequate hearing. In a 
straightforward takings case, the government's constitutional obligations to the 
plaintiff exist regardless of post-deprivation procedures; whereas the tax cases 
hinge on the availability of an adequate procedure, the Takings Clause itself 
had paid straight overtime as back pay; the dispute arose over the FLSA's enhanced overtime 
protections.) See generally Mills v. Maine, 853 F. Supp. 551 (D. Me. 1994) (calculating past 
overtime and damages owed), dismissed No. 92-410-P-H, 1996 WL 400510 (D. Me. July 3, 
1996), affd  118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1997). In Reich, however, the state wrongfully required the 
payment of taxes, so that the property involved was actual cash money. Reich, 513 at 108. 
Alden and Reich can thus be distinguished in a number of ways. First, as the Court suggests, the 
right in Alden was statutory whereas the right in Reich is constitutional. Alden, 527 U.S. at 740. 
Second, to the extent that both involved "property," Alden only addressed "new property," 
which would seem entitled to fewer constitutional protections. Third, as a practical matter, 
providing the plaintiff with relief would have burdened the state far more in Alden than in 
Reich. In Alden, Maine still paid its labor under state law; it only failed to pay the additional 
money under the FLSA. Had the Court required payment under the FLSA, Maine would have 
needed to pay plaintiffs a fair sum of money, thus resembling the retrospective relief against 
which the states are protected under Edelman's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. In 
Reich, by way of contrast, the state had already illegally collected money from the plaintiff. 
This remedy seems more in line with straight due process-providing the post-deprivation 
remedy promised by the state-and hints of an injunction merely forcing the state to keep its 
promise. It is therefore more realistic to expect it to be able to repay that money than to comply 
with the FLSA's accrued statutory obligation in Alden. 
206. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
207. See id. at 545 (finding that the state had not denied respondent due process because it 
made available a state remedy for the prisoner's claim). 
208. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 5 17,536 (1984) (finding no due process violation for 
an intentional "shakedown search" where the state law provided an adequate remedy). 
209. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44 (finding that the state tort system provided the 
appropriate means of redress); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (same). 
210. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. 
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requires actual compensation, not mere procedural safeguards.2" Moreover, 
the Court in Parratt and Hudson did not invoke sovereign immunity principles. 
Plaintiffs were denied their remedy not because the Eleventh Amendment 
barred suit, but rather because 5 1983 is not so broad a cause of action as to 
encompass a tort against a state Accordingly, even though Parratt 
and Hudson resemble takings cases, the Court treats them like tort cases so that 
the post-deprivation remedy available is not a $ 1983 claim, but rather a state 
tort law claim. By way of contrast, the state's talung of real property must 
trigger the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause so that the claim is clearly 
constitutional and the state's tort system clearly irrelevant. Thus, the calculus is 
different when the injury arises from a constitutional violation for which there 
is no realistic remedy other than judicial vindication of the constitutional right. 
Our legal system might not promise the full spectrum of remedies for every 
injury, but straight constitutional violations deserve some degree of special 
treatment. 
It makes sense that the relevant case law does not foreclose the possibility 
of a self-executing and automatically abrogating constitutional property right. 
Immediately prior to the Constitutional Convention, people began to realize that 
the judiciary needed to play a bigger role in government. Before the 1780s, 
judicial review was hardly taken for granted; legislative supremacy was the 
But the legislatures' increased interference in judicial and other 
matters during the 1780s convinced many that a stronger judiciary was essential 
to healthy democracy.214 Many state courts, for instance, gingerly began to 
impose previously unthinkable restraints on the legislatures.215 Thus were 
21 1. But see Seamon, supra note 8, at 11 16 (arguing that due process creates an obligation 
on a state to make reasonable procedures for addressing taking in state, not federal, court). 
Professor Seamon argues that due process obligates states to meet their remedial obligations in 
state courts, but that courts of another sovereign cannot meet this obligation. Id. Such 
significant differences between state and federal court remedies seem odd in light of Alden. 
212. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (finding that, in cases of intentional deprivations of 
property, there is no due process violation if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation 
remedy); Parrart, 451 U.S. at 537 (finding that plaintiffs claim hinged on "whether the tort 
remedies which the State of Nebraska provides as a means of redress for property deprivations 
satisfy the requirements of procedural due process"). 
2 13. See WOOD, supra note 18 1, at 453-63 (describing the period of legislative ascendancy 
over the judiciary). 
214. See id. at 454 ("[Olnce legislative interference in judicial matters had intensified as 
never before in the eighteenth century, a new appreciation of the role of the judiciary in 
American politics could begin to emerge."). 
2 15. See id. at 454-55 (refemng to the New Jersey, Virginia, New York, Rhode Island, and 
North Carolina judiciaries). Professor Wood also cites to Rurgers v. Waddington (N.Y. 1784) 
for a more detailed example of the challenge to the theory of legislative sovereignty. Id. at 457- 
59. 
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Americans becoming more concerned with using the judiciary as a check on the 
other branches; for the first time, declaring unconstitutional laws void was seen 
not as usurping the legislature's power but rather as vindicating "fundamental 
law."216 
Consistent with this history, early defenses of the Constitution also 
recognized that the judiciary existed to safeguard individual rights against the 
~tates.''~ Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 80: 
The States, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited from doing a 
variety of things . . . . No man of sense will believe, that such prohibitions 
would be scrupulously regarded, without some effectual power in the 
government to restrain or correct the infractions of them. This power must 
either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an authority in the federal 
courts to overrule such as might be in manifest contravention of the 
articles of the Union. There is no third course that I can imagine. The 
latter appears to have been thought by the convention preferable to the 
former, and, Ipresume, will be most agreeable to the ~ t a t e s . ~ ' ~  
Elsewhere in The Federalist, Hamilton also argues that "the courts of 
justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against 
legislative  encroachment^."^'^ Madison too saw courts playing this protective 
role, noting in a speech proposing the Bill of Rights that "[ilndependent 
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians 
of those rights."220 Those tribunals were especially suited for such a function, 
partially because judges with life tenure are less subject to the political 
temptations. Only courts could operate as a sufficient 
check upon the legislative body . . . who, perceiving that obstacles to the 
success of iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the 
courts, are . . . compelled . . . to qualify their attempts. This is circumstance 
216. Id. at 461. 
217. As Professor Wood notes, the American Founders, in enhancing the power of the 
judiciary, "rejected the conventional British theory of the necessity of the legislature being 
absolute in all cases." WOOD, supra note 181, at 462 (internal quotations omitted). 
21 8. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 508 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) 
(emphasis added). 
219. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 218, at 500; see also James 
E.  Pfander, Sovereign Zmntunity and the Right ro Petition: Towarda First Amendment Right to 
Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U .  L. REV. 899,946 (1997) (arguing 
that the framers expected courts to have a special role in enforcing constitutional limits on 
government action). 
220. JAMES MADISON, SPEECH PROPOSING THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1 789), reprinted in 12 
JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197,207 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979). 
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calculated to have more influence upon the character of our governments, 
than but few many imagine.221 
With this backdrop, it becomes clear that the "state sovereign immunity" 
the Framers discuss might have been more limited than the current Court reads 
it. In Federalist No. 81, Hamilton actually addresses the sovereign immunity 
issue directly, admitting that "[ilt is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to 
be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent."222 However, 
Hamilton raises these concerns to assuage fears that "an assignment of the 
public securities of one State to the citizens of another would enable them to 
prosecute that State in the federal courts for the amount of those securities."223 
This focus on diversity suits between citizens of one state and the government 
of another is a narrower view of sovereign immunity than that embraced since 
Hans, more akin to the immunity ultimately codified in the Eleventh 
Amendment, Extending that immunity to protect states from suits by their own 
citizens for the vindication of constitutional rights would eliminate the very 
judicial check on the states that Hamilton considers central to the protection of 
federal individual rights. 
Of course, given our expansive federal government today, Congress can 
also check the states' power by, among other things, preempting state law with 
federal law. But national legislation does not always sufficiently protect 
individual rights because (among many other reasons) rights can slip beneath 
Congress's radar screen. Infractions of such rights are especially likely to go 
unnoticed if they occur in small numbers in a few states. Property owners as a 
class may have more political clout than many groups, but because takings 
generally affect a small portion of that class, it is rare that they would act 
together as a coherent political unit.224 If the federal judiciary were intended, as 
221. Id.at501. 
222. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 21 8, at 521 (emphasis in 
original). 
223. Id. 
224. There are, of course, exceptions to this general proposition. For instance, 60 Minutes 
recently featured a story about attorneys at the Institute for Justice, a libertarian group, who 
were filing suit against cities seeking to take private homes through eminent domain. See 60 
Minutes: Eminent Domain: Being Abused? (CBS television broadcast Sept. 28, 2003), 
available a t  hrp:llwww.cbsnews.com/storieSn003/09126160minutes/main575343.~html. These 
cases were noteworthy in that the cities were trying to use eminent domain to force people off 
their land so that private developers could build more expensive homes and offices, thus 
increasing the cities' tax bases. Such a case eventually made its way up to the Supreme Court, 
which recently held that the particular development plan at issue did not offend the Takings 
Clause's "public use" requirement. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655,2668 
(2005) (holding that use of property in the city's development plan, which a private entity 
developed and was to carry out, constituted a public use). (In cases where that requirement was 
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Hamilton argues, to check not only the federal government but also the states, it 
would be deeply contradictory to then let those same states circumvent federal 
judicial review through sovereign immunity, essentially leaving the legislature 
to decide whether or not to protect the right. To be sure, Hamilton's views are 
not the only ones from the founding period, but to the extent that The 
Federalist is seminal in our constitutional jurisprudence, his theory of the 
judiciary cuts against the Supreme Court's current interpretation that a 
sovereign immunity extending to federal question jurisdiction was hardwired 
into the Constitution in 1787.~~~ 
Another counter-argument to Marshall and Hamilton's theory of federal 
courts is that the Eleventh Amendment was added after the passage of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, which included the Takings Clause. Even 
if one were to accept Hamilton's original vision of the federal judiciary as a 
check upon the states, the Eleventh Amendment, as a rejection of Chisholm, 
changed that. But note that this is not the current Court's sovereign immunity 
argument. Indeed, for that argument, one must confine oneself to the narrower 
text of the Eleventh Amendment, which relates only to certain diversity cases 
and would not include a property owner suing her own state to recover just 
compensation for a taking. Even if today's vigorous sovereign immunity had 
been part of the common law at the time of the founding, as the Alden majority 
asserts (so that the Eleventh Amendment is merely a placeholder for the 
concept), then one can read the Fifth Amendment's requirement of a monetary 
remedy to overrule that immunity with regards to takings claims, just as a 
statute can overrule common law. (Common law, of course, can be changed by 
statute,226 so surely it can be changed by the Constitution.) Alternatively, one 
offended, the takings plaintiffs would arguably have an even stronger claim for a temporary 
takings damages action against the state, as the state action at issue would appear to be even 
more illegitimate than in a garden-variety temporary takings scenario.) The lawyers' 
involvement, the national publicity, and the grant of certiorari all suggest that property owners, 
more so than other groups at least, can protect themselves in the judicial and political systems. 
225. General federal question jurisdiction did not exist until 1875, see Act of Mar. 3,1875, 
ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, but it is convenient to separate out what has become federal question and 
diversity jurisdiction because state sovereign immunity does not necessarily apply to both. 
Moreover, because Article 111 of the Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States 
to "all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, 
and Treaties made," U.S. CONST. art. III, the concept of federal question jurisdiction would have 
been understood during the ratifying debates and the first years of the early republic. 
226. And if Eleventh Amendment immunity is in fact common law, then we might think of 
Fitpatrick's authorization of Section 5 abrogation as an example of a statute changing common 
law. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Tern: Foreword: Constitutional 
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1975) (putting forward theory of constitutional 
common law which, unlike "pure" constitutional law, Congress can overturn). 
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can read it to consent to suits for just compensation.227 If, on the other hand, 
sovereign immunity were actually part of the Constitution, as the Alden 
majority seems to argue, then that constitutional immunity for takings claims 
might have been amended out of the Constitution when the Court incorporated 
the Fifth Amendment against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Under 
any of these theories, it seems strange that a pre-constitutional doctrine of 
sovereign immunity barring money damages would have survived the Just 
Compensation Clause's promise of such damages. And, assuming it does not, 
nothing in the Eleventh Amendment would resurrect such a bar. 
None of this should be surprising, because sovereign immunity is 
notoriously difficult to square with other features of our constitutional 
democracy. As Professor Hart argued: 
[N]o democratic government can be immune to the claims of justice and 
legal right. The force of those claims of course varies in different 
situations. If private property is taken, for example, the claim for just 
compensation has the moral sanction of an express constitutional 
guarantee . . . . And where constitutional rights are at stake the courts are 
properly astute, in construing statutes, to avoid the conclusion that 
Congress intended to use the privile e of immunity, or of withdrawing 
jurisdiction, in order to defeat them. 22f 
The Court at times, even in the Hans era, has also articulated an ill regard 
for immunity, especially in constitutional property cases, all but admitting that 
the very notion of immunity rests upon a fiction. For example, in an action to 
recover one office desk seized following plaintiffs failure to pay taxes to the 
State of ~ i r ~ i n i a , ~ ~ ~  the Court recognized the "distinction between the 
government of a State and the State itself," finding that "whatever wrong is 
attempted in [the State's] name is imputable to its government, and not to the 
11230 State . . . . The fiction seems almost identical to the officer-suit fiction that 
227. Another theory, put forward by Justice Stevens, is that Article 111's general grant of 
jurisdiction to federal courts can be treated as adequate indication of the sovereign's consent to 
suits against itself. See John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U .  L. REV. 1121,1126 
(1993) (discrediting the argument that immunity springs from "nothing more mysterious than 
the sovereign's right to determine what suits may be brought in the sovereign's own court"). 
See also infra Part V.C (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Takings 
Clause against the states, which bolsters the argument for automatic abrogation); inji-a note 320 
and accompanying text (listing state coun cases in which the court read the state's just 
compensation clause as state consent to suits). 
228. Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1371 (1953). 
229. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270,273-74 (1885) (describing the underlying 
facts). 
230. Id. at 290. 
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is so central to current sovereign immunity law, and yet it suggests a broader 
incursion into the immunities the state enjoys because "both government and 
State are subject to the supremacy of the Constitution of the United States, and 
of the laws made in pursuance thereof."23' This would suggest that the fiction 
has its limits, and that the state-whatever one chooses to call it-is subject to 
certain kinds of suits, particularly those arising out of the Constitution. 
Even more remarkable is the discussion of sovereign immunity in Lee, an 
ejectment action to recover possession of an estate owned once by the family of 
General Robert E. Lee that the government had taken and turned into a military 
fort and later Arlington National The Court explained that when 
the rights of the citizen collide with acts of the government, "there is no safety 
for the citizen, except in the protection of the judicial tribunals, for rights which 
have been invaded by the officers of the government, professing to act in its 
name."233 The Court denounced, at times emphatically, immunity bars to suits 
against the government, particularly suits regarding the liberty and property 
interests most firmly secured in the Indeed, both the executive 
and legislative branches are "absolutely prohibited" from depriving anyone of 
"life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or [taking] private 
property without just compensation."235 Central to this proposition was the 
understanding that "[clourts of justice are established . . . to decide upon . . . 
rights in controversy between [citizens] and the The contrary 
notion-"that courts cannot give remedy when the citizen has been deprived of 
his property by force, his estate seized and converted to the use of the 
government without any lawful authority, without any process of law, and 
11237- without any compensation was not only wrong, but deeply opposed to our 
system's most cherished values: 
If such be the law of this country, it sanctions a tyranny which has no 
existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which 
has a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal 
rights. 
231. Id. 
232. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,197-200.219 (1882) (describing the facts of 
the case and discussing the Court's jurisdiction to hear the case). 
233. Id. at 218-19. 
234. See id. at 219-23 (arguing that government officers should not be placed above the 
law). 
235. Id. at 220. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 221. 
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It cannot be, then, that . . . . though the nature of the controversy is one 
peculiarly appropriate to the judicial function . . . though one of the three 
great branches of the government to which by the Constitution this duty has 
been assigned has declared its judgment after a fair trial, the [government] 
can interpose an absolute veto upon that judgment . . . . 238 
And to the extent that sovereign immunity had roots in English common 
law, Lee explained that the English legal system made available "the petition of 
right" to "subjects" involved in property disputes against the crown;239 in such 
disputes "the petition of right presented a judicial remedy,-a remedy which 
this court. . . held to be practical and Thus, even the English 
system-from which our immunity sprang-provided means for plaintiffs to 
protect their property rights against an encroaching state. Coming from the 
Court just a few years before Hans, this proclamation is all the more striking. 
Lee is not anomalous. Drawing heavily on it, the Court in Tinhl v. 
~ e s l e ~ ~ ~ '  explained that "the Eleventh Amendment gives no immunity to 
officers or agents of a State in withholding the property of a citizen without 
authority of law. "242 To be fair, some of this conclusion rested on the 
proposition that suits protecting a plaintiffs property from state-inflicted injury 
were deemed suits against the officer seeking to enforce an unconstitutional 
statute; they did not proceed against the state itself.243 But the Tindal Court 
also noted that the opposing view would leave the plaintiff "remediless so long 
as the State, by its agent, chooses to hold his property."244 Ruling in an era long 
before temporary takings became part of our legal landscape, the Tindal Court 
appears to have guarded against precisely that mischief. To be sure, Tindal 
offers no direct doctrinal support for an action for damages against the state 
itself, but its conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the action in 
that case emphasized that if the state had improperly taken private property, the 
government actor should not be able to shield itself from suit."" 
238. Id. Of course, Lee is a federal takings case, but the concerns regarding sovereign 
immunity closely mirror those in state takings cases. See Searnon, supra note 8, at 109&94 
(arguing that there is symmetry between federal and state sovereign immunity). 
239. Id. at 208. 
240. Id.; see also infra note 440 and accompanying text (quoting United States v. Lee on 
the petition of right). 
241. Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897). 
242. Id. at 222. 
243. Id. at 220-2 1 .  
244. Id. 
245. See id. at 222 (finding that the Eleventh Amendment does not impart to officers 
immunity from suit for actions taken under unconstitutional laws); see also Ha. Dep't of State v. 
Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670,686-87 (1982) (discussing this aspect of Tindal). 
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The counters to these views-defenses of sovereign immunity-are not 
wholly persuasive. Of course, scholars have long criticized state sovereign 
immunity and, for the most part, these attacks have not carried the day in the 
Supreme Court. This Article, therefore, will offer only a summary of the main 
arguments. It is worth noting, though, that these familiar arguments have their 
greatest traction here in the takings context. In other words, one might view 
statutory claims against the state, non-Fourteenth Amendment constitutional 
claims, Fourteenth Amendment claims, and Takings claims as concentric 
circles in which arguments against immunity grow increasingly strong. That 
the attacks on the Eleventh Amendment have failed-in say, the statutory 
context t hen4oes  not necessarily mean that those same arguments should not 
prevail in the takings context. 
Moreover, although attacks on sovereign immunity have obvious doctrinal 
limitations in that they do not confront Eleventh Amendment doctrine on its 
own terms, they also suggest that, unlike takings, state sovereign immunity rests 
on somewhat shaky footing. Though this analytic approach is unusual in 
American law, it bears asking in the case of a direct constitutional collision: 
which doctrine is more certainly right?246 From this perspective, too, the 
familiar attacks on state sovereign immunity doctrine are very relevant to the 
instant collision. 
Sovereign immunity originally derived from the English law assumption 
that "the King can do no one could not sue the Crown of England 
without its consent.248 This reasoning had a logical place in the monarchical 
system, but to rely on it still today is not only anachronistic but clearly contrary 
to our own history and democratic principles.249 As the Court argued in Lee, 
unlike the English monarchy, "[ulnder our system the people, who are there 
called subjects, are the sovereign."250 The United States, in fact, became a 
country largely through its rejection of the English monarchy.25' The Alden 
Court is certainly correct that the Founders absorbed some English common 
246. See infra notes 520-23 and accompanying text (discussing this approach to resolving 
doctrinal conflicts). 
247. Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 
(2001). 
248. Id. 
249. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205-06 (1882) (arguing that reasons 
protecting king from suit in his own court do not exist in our government). 
250. Id. at 208. 
251. See Chemerinsky, supra note 247, at 1202 ("The United States was founded on a 
rejection of a monarchy and of royal prerogatives."). 
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law into our own fledgling legal system,252 but surely royal prerogatives are a 
common law remnant incompatible with our nation's revolutionary heritage.253 
Another defense of sovereign immunity more closely tethered to the 
American experience is that it protects states' dignity.254 In FMC, for instance, 
Justice Thomas noted that the doctrine's "central purpose is to accord the States 
the respect owed them as joint sovereigns. "255 In our federal structure, the issue 
of what powers to reserve to the states is a crucial one, and the Court's recent 
decisions instruct us that one should not disregard these principles lightly. 
However, it is not clear exactly how protecting a state from suit preserves its 
dignity. One might disagree with the Court's decisions in cases like New York 
v. United and Printz v. United but at least there is some logic 
to holding that the federal government cannot order state officials to carry out a 
federal But why should those same principles necessarily shield a state 
from suits by private parties? Lf dignity were in fact such a real concern, then 
the Exparte Young suit against state officers would also seem untenable, but no 
one would suggest eviscerating that line of precedent.259 Indeed, if one believes 
the reasoning of recent commandeering cases, one might think that injunctive 
relief ordering the state to act or not act is more intrusive than merely requiring 
- -- 
252. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715-16 (1999) (noting that, despite the fact the 
United States had abandoned some English practices, it absorbed the idea that a sovereign could 
not be sued unless it consented). 
253. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1992) (arguing that the American Revolution was a fundamentally radical social event that 
rejected social and political values of English monarchy to establish, first, a republic and, 
ultimately, a democracy). See also Chemerinsky, supra note 247, at 1202-03 (arguing that 
sovereign immunity "is inconsistent with a central maxim of American government: no one, not 
even the government, is above the law"). 
254. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 749 (linking state sovereign immunity with concerns 
about the dignity of the state); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,268 (1997) 
(citing states' dignity as a reason for state sovereign immunity). 
255. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,765 (2002) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
256. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
257. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
258. See id. at 925 ("[Llater opinions of ours have made clear that theFederal Government 
may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory 
programs."); New York, 505 U.S. at 188 ("[Tlhe Federal Government may not compel the States 
to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."). 
2.59. See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Sew. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635,645-48 (2002) (finding 
that the core of Young doctrine is alive even in federal statutory rights cases). Verizon 
Maryland reaffirmed Exparte Young notwithstanding the exception for submerged tribal lands 
articulated in Coeur d'Alene. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(concurring that Court should not apply the Ex parte Young doctrine to the case because its 
application would effectively grant the Tribe title to the land at issue). 
546 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493 (2006) 
it to pay money to compensate for damages it has i n f l i ~ t e d . ~ ~  Additionally, a 
state that avoids suits against it seems far less "dignified" than one that meets 
its challengers directly; legitimate government, one would hope, would be 
accountable government.261 Moreover, because states appear in both state and 
federal courts frequently as plaintiffs or prosecutors, one cannot say that 
allowing a court to determine its rights in suits against citizens is degrading2" 
Professor Lee offers a more historically grounded presentation of this 
sovereign dignity argument. According to Lee, Justice Iredell and other early 
supporters of state sovereign immunity understood state dignity to entitle states 
to similar treatment due foreign nations in the Supreme Under this 
theory, "[dleference was due . . . because sovereignty itself was the most 
fundamental law [so that] . . . . [t]o acknowledge that [one] who had no claim to 
that sovereignty could seek relief in the general courts . . . would contradict that 
most fundamental law and cast the fate of the system into jeopardy."2a Thus, 
260. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendnlent, Irreparable 
Injury, and Section 1983.53 STAN. L. REV. 13 1 I ,  13 1 1 (200 1) (arguing that expanded scope of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity will encourage more suits for injunctive relief, which may be 
more intrusive because they may involve "more invasive judicial supervision of state entities 
and because some of the defenses that would be available in after-the-fact litigation, [such as] 
qualified immunity, are unavailable in cases seeking prospective relief'). Injunctive relief, in 
fact, is typically available only if another adequate remedy at law is not. See 13 JAMES W M .  
MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERALPRACTICE 5 65.06[1] (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2005) 
(noting that an injunction remedy is usually one of last resort). ?he Eleventh Amendment, then, 
is one of the rare areas where injunctive relief is the baseline, rather than the exception. 
261. Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. 
CT. REV. 1,54 (remarking that trust in our system derives from government accountability); see 
also Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of 
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 192 1,1927-28 (2003) ("[Blecause of 
revised understandings of the import of human dignity, law ought not to rely on institutional 
roledignity to permit an entity to avoid accounting for its behavior towards individuals."); 
Katherine H. Ku, Comment, Reimagining the Eleventh Amendment, 50 UCLA L. REV. 103 1, 
1063 (2003) (noting that the dignity rationale does not adequately justify current Eleventh 
Amendment doctrine). For a thorough and fascinating discussion of dignity's role in 
conceptions of sovereignty, see generally Resnik & Suk, supra. 
262. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882) ("Nor can it be said that the 
. government is degraded by appearing as a defendant in the courts of its own creation, because it 
is constantly appearing as a party in such courts, and submitting its rights as against the citizen 
to their judgment."); see also Evan H .  Carninker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANN. 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 81, 83-91 (2001) (concluding that dignity rationale is "flimsy 
foundation" for state sovereign immunity doctrine). 
263. See Thomas H .  Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law 
and State Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1027, 1095 (2002) (noting that the Constitution 
sometimes speaks of the States as nations and explaining how this parallel to foreign nations 
related to Justice Iredell's and others' understanding of the Constitution). 
264. Id. 
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sovereign immunity derives exclusively from the state's inherent sovereignty so 
that "[slovereign liability is a matter of sovereign grace, not of republican right, 
and therefore indistinguishable in scope as between, say, an absolute monarchy 
and a 
While these ideas surely animate theories of state sovereign immunity, 
they carry more force in the abstract than the concrete. In particular, this 
approach ignores the courts' role as a check upon the other branches. If the 
Constitution did in fact grow partially out of a desire for an enhanced judiciary 
capable of suppressing legislatures' supremacy,2e then an unconquerable 
immunity would have defeated that purpose. Moreover, Justice Iredell and 
others necessarily rooted notions of sovereignty in the experiences of nations 
long observed, namely monarchies. Though they might not have seen a 
difference in this regard between an absolute monarchy and a republic, this 
does not mean that no difference existed. To the contrary, in the American 
republic, sovereignty resides with the so it will not do to assert 
merely that the government's sovereign grace protects it from suit by all entities 
except other sovereigns. That one as erudite as Justice Iredell might not have 
fully comprehended this does not suggest that he willfully imposed an 
anachronistic view, but rather that it took a long time for many to grasp the full 
import and radicalism of the American  evolution.^^^ From this perspective, 
the Coua should determine the scope of sovereign immunity by reference to the 
values of our own constitutional system, rather than by an abstract hierarchy of 
foreign and domestic 
A more persuasive argument in favor of sovereign immunity is that state 
treasuries need to be protected. Unlike the "king can't be sued" and the 
"sovereign dignity" arguments, this one addresses current and practical 
concerns. The Court invoked this rationale in Alden, arguing: 
265. Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International 
Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court's Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits 
by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1836 (2004); see also Peter J .  
Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA.  L. REV. 1,5 1 (2003) 
(arguing that Court's use of dignity argument draws on concept of foreign state dignity). 
266. See supra text accompanying notes 213-16 (describing the judiciary's growth as a 
check upon the legislative branch). 
267. See infra text accompanying notes 278-82 (noting that individual sovereignty should 
take precedence over that of the government). 
268. See generally WOOD, supra note 253. 
269. See Lee, supra note 265, at 1837-38 (using a mathematical approach in which &he 
foreign sovereign "quantum of sovereignty" exceeds the sovereignty of semi-sovereign 
American state, which exceeds the sovereignty of non-sovereign mere citizen). 
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Not only must a State defend or default but also it must face the prospect of 
being thrust, by federal fiat and against its will, into the disfavored status of 
a debtor, subject to the power of private citizens to levy on its treasury or 
perhaps even government buildings or property which the State administers 
on the public's behalf.'" 
This is a legitimate argument, and it helps explain why the full spectrum of 
judicial remedies are not and should not always be available. 
Indeed, unlike the other justifications, this one genuinely appreciates 
separation-of-powers principles for it hesitates to give courts control over the 
legislatures' and executives' budgets. But it seems to overstate the danger, at 
least with regard to takings cases, because opening the judiciary to one kind of 
cause of action and thus authorizing one particular remedy would not 
significantly increase the courts' control over the legislatures' purse strings. 
Moreover, this argument does not account for the multiple ways in which the 
judiciary does influence spending  decision^.^^' The desegregation of our 
sch0ols,2'~ the indigent defendant's right to counsel273 and on appeal a free trial 
and the requirement that detainees in the war on terror receive 
some amount of judicial process275 are all rights recognized in Supreme Court 
decisions that cost significant government resources, even though the stated 
remedy was not money damages. From this perspective, relief other than 
damages can affect the budget as significantly as a monetary remedy. 
The "purse strings" argument also cannot explain why state budgets are 
necessarily more important than those of state subdivisions. To be sure, state 
governments have a special place in our federalist system, but if the protection 
of the legislature's budget was such an overriding concern, then the absence of 
county and city immunity would have proven disastrous. But it has not done 
so. Finally, the budget argument does not account for the fact that states 
270. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,749 (1999). 
27 1. See William P. Marshall & Jason S. Cowart, State Immunity, Political Accountability, 
and Alden v. Maine, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069,1082 (2000) ("There are simply too many 
ways remaining after Alden through which the state fisc may be invaded to suggest that 
budgetary accountability is the governing rationale."). 
272. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954) ("We conclude that in the field 
of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."). 
273. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (finding "counsel must be 
provided for defendant unable to employ counsel"). 
274. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956) (denouncing policies that give the 
well-to-do a larger chance at justice than poor defendants). 
275. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,538 (2004) (noting that Hamdi "is entitled [to 
process] under the Due Process Clause"); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,466 (2004) ("United 
States courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign 
nationals capture abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay."). 
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themselves should be able to limit how frequently they are sued by not 
encroaching on their citizens' rights. Indeed, the concern for state resources 
might cut against sovereign immunity, because that immunity fails to provide 
incentives for the state not to violate citizens' rights.276 Current law thus 
prioritizes the state treasury over governmental a c c ~ u n t a b i l i t ~ ~ ' ~  an outcome 
that seems both normatively suspect and contrary to our constitutional goals for 
a healthy democracy. 
More generally, sovereign immunity prioritizes the states over the people 
for no discernible reason. As Professor Monaghan asks, "Should not 
accountability to the people-both to the majority at the polls and to wronged 
11278 individuals in the courts-be 'inherent in the nature of sovereignty? The 
Court, in other words, has it backwards, prioritizing the state governments' 
sovereignty rather than the people.279 
Whatever the benefits of "sovereignty" might be, they should be enjoyed 
by the people, not the governments. State power and sovereignty should be 
subject to federal constitutional limits on state violations of individual rights.280 
Indeed, the states owe their very existence and their plenary power to the 
Founders' desire to create a political system that would protect individuals from 
too powerful a government.281 The Court, itself a champion of states' rights, 
has articulated this view in one of its recent well-known federalism decisions: 
[Tlhe Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of the States for the 
benefit of the States or  state governments as abstract political entities, o r  
even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the 
contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state 
governments for the protection of  individual^.^'^ 
276. See Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a Way to Enforce 
Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 631, 688 (2000) (arguing that "states might abuse freedom the 
Court has preserved for them" and that they might take advantage of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity by depriving citizens of their legal rights, for example "by not paying workers 
overtime to which federal law entitles them, flouting valid patents and trademarks, [and] 
polluting the environment"). 
277. Chemerinksy, supra note 247, at 1217. 
278. Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign lmmunity "Exception," 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 102, 123 (1996) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,69 (1996) 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))). 
279. See generally Arnar, supra note 7 1 .  
280. See THEFEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). supra note 218, at 294 ("[Als far as the 
sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every 
good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter."). 
281. See Amar, supra note 71, at 1426 (noting that the Founders created a limited 
government). 
282. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992). 
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Current sovereign immunity doctrine is very hard to square with a 
federalism premised on "the protection of individuals."283 Marbury's 
principle-that for every right there is a remedy-is certainly descriptively, and 
arguably normatively, over-simplistic. Clearly there are other values at play in 
our legal system. But if the Court's vigorous defense of states' rights in fact 
rests on a theory of individual rights, then there should be no place in that 
jurisprudence for a sovereign immunity doctrine so robust that it protects the 
states from suits, even in cases where the Constitution prescribes a specific 
remedy. 
2. Alden and the Symmetry of State Sovereign Immunity 
Even if we agree that sovereign immunity is incompatible with our 
Constitution's defense of certain individual rights, we must briefly address the 
argument that state sovereign immunity applies differently in federal court than 
it does in state court. In other words, even if state sovereign immunity cannot 
bar all takings suits, might it nevertheless bar federal court suits but permit state 
court actions? The Eleventh Amendment's language, after all, seems to apply 
only to the "Judicial power of the United ~ t a t e s " ~ ~ ~  and not to state courts. 
Though this interpretation of the amendment was long assumed-and is still 
accepted by ~ome~'~-it seenis to be no longer correct after Alden v. ~ a i n e . * ' ~  
Unlike prior precedents, Alden explicitly discusses the symmetry of state 
sovereign immunity, linking the state's immunity in federal court to its 
immunity in state Thus, the same preconstitutional common law 
283. Id. 
284. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
285. See, e.g., DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 51 1,527 (6th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that 
state sovereign immunity does not apply symmetrically in state and federal court); Seamon, 
supra note 8, at 1 1 16 (same). 
286. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that "the States retain 
immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to 
abrogate by Article I legislation"). 
287. See id. at 713-54 (discussing the history of states' sovereign immunity); see also 
Seamon, supra note 8, at 1096-97 (examining the Alden Court's approach to sovereign 
immunity). The Alden Court also linked the immunity of the state to the immunity of the United 
States. It asserted: 
It is unquestioned that the Federal Government retains its own immunity from suit 
not only in state tribunals but also in its own courts. In light of our constitutional 
system recognizing the essential sovereignty of the States, we are reluctant to 
conclude that the States are not entitled to a reciprocal privilege. 
Alden, 527 U.S. at 749-50; see also Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204,213 (1897) ("[at cannot be 
doubted that the question whether a particular suit is one against the State, within the meaning 
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underlying the state's sovereign immunity in federal courts applied with equal 
strength in state courts, and the Court found there was no "compelling 
evidence" that states ratifying the Constitution understood themselves to be 
empowering Congress to subject states to suits in their own courts.288 As the 
Court argued, the fact that some state statutory and constitutional provisions 
specifically authorized suits against the states in their own courts suggests "the 
prevalence of the traditional understanding that a State could not be sued [in 
state court] in the absence of an express waiver."2Bg To the extent that the 
Eleventh Amendment, according to the Alden Court, sought only to restore the 
pre-Chisholm state of the law?* the amendment's failure to mention state 
courts is inapposite. Because sovereign immunity applied in state courts under 
our original constitutional understanding-and because the immunity question 
in Chisholm did not arise out of state court pr~eedings291-there was no reason 
to believe that the states' immunity in state courts had ever been disrupted. 
Indeed, the state's immunity from suit in its own court was a compelling reason 
for the Exparte Young decision; were states not to retain immunity from suit in 
their own courts, the need for Young would have been less pressing.292 Thus, 
as the Alden Court summarized, the rationale behind not subjecting states to 
suit in federal court "applies with even greater force in the context of a suit 
prosecuted against a sovereign in its own courts, for in this setting, more than 
any other, sovereign immunity was long established and unquestioned."293 
There is a logic to the Alden decision, but the "shock of surprise" it 
provoked may well have been comparable to that caused two centuries earlier 
by Chisholm. Prior to Alden, a state's sovereign immunity applied only in 
of the Constitution, must depend upon the same principles that determine whether a particular 
suit is one against the United States."); Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. 670, 
687 n.21 (1982) (quoting Tindal); Searnon, supra note 8, at 1097-98 (drawing connections 
between sovereign immunity in state court and state sovereign immunity in federal court). 
288. Alden, 527 U.S. at 730-3 1. 
289. Id. at 724. 
290. See id. (noting that the swift passage of the Eleventh Amendment indicated that the 
Chisholm Court might have misinterpreted the Constitution). 
29 1. The question posed in Chisholm was: 
Can the State of Georgia, being one of the United States of America, be made a 
party-defendant in any case, in the Supreme Court of the United States, at the suit 
of a private citizen, even although he himself is, and his testator was, a citizen of 
the State of South Carolina? 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419.420 (1793). 
292. Aldenv.Maine.527U.S.706,748(1999). 
293. Id. at 742; see also Seamon, supra note 8, at 1097 (discussing the "preservation" 
rationale). 
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federal court, so that the Eleventh Amendment functioned mostly as a forum 
selection clause.294 Thus, before Alden, a takings plaintiff could have brought 
her claim in state court. As Alden's holding addresses only Congress's 
authority to use its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity in 
state courts, it is not necessarily broad enough to change the rules of the game 
entirely in state court. But given Justice Kennedy's rhetoric of symmetry, 
sovereign immunity might apply with equal force in state and federal courts. 
interestingly, not all commentators and courts agree that Alden necessarily 
requires identical sovereign immunity rules in state and federal court for certain 
kinds of claims. As this Article has already noted, Professor Searnon argues 
that, while sovereign immunity would bar an inverse condemnation claim 
against the state in federal court, due process requires that the state provide 
some kind of procedural remedy, including, potentially, state court But 
Professor Seamon's argument relies on the strength of the Due Process Clause 
and does not address whether the Just Compensation Clause might, by its own 
force, also require a particular remedy beyond mere procedural safeguards. 
The Sixth Circuit in DLX, Inc. v.  ent tuck^^^^ recently followed reasoning 
similar to Professor Searnon's. There the court held that state sovereign 
immunity barred a federal takings claim in federal court but continued to 
explain that no such bar existed in state court, notwithstanding ~ l d e n . ~ ~ ~  
Relying on Reich, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that, because the Constitution 
requires effective remedies for takings and the coercive collection of taxes, it 
must also require state courts to provide such remedies notwithstanding 
traditional immunity bars.298 But the Sixth Circuit, reasoning that both Reich 
and the First English footnote applies only to state court s ~ i t s , ~ "  found that no 
such requirement exists in federal 
294. Monaghan, supra note 278, at 125. 
295. Searnon, supra note 8, at 11 16; see also supra note 8 (summarizing Professor 
Searnon's argument). 
296. DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 38 1 F.3d 5 11 (6th Cir. 2004). 
297. Id. at 527-28. 
298. Id. at 527; see also Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110 (1994) (noting that the 
requirement of a remedy for unconstitutional taxes does not trump the state's sovereign 
immunity in federal court); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Oregon, 991 P.2d 563,568 (Or. Ct. App. 
1999) (holding that states can be sued in state court for takings claims); SDDS, Inc. v. South 
Dakota, 650 N.W.2d 1 ,9  (S.D. 2002) (following Boise Cascade). 
299. First English began as a state court suit in the California court system. First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles. 482 U.S. 304, 306-09 
(1987). 
300. DLX, 381 F.3d at 527. 
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Turning to Alden, the Sixth Circuit continued that, although it "might 
seem to foreclose the requirement that states be susceptible to suit in their own 
courts . . . , a close reading of Alden reveals that it would present no bar to such 
a claim."301 Alden, argued the Sixth Circuit, "specifically preserved Reich's 
promise of a state-court remedy, noting, 'The obligation arises from the 
Constitution itself; Reich does not speak to the power of Congress to subject 
States to suits in their own courts.' "302 DLX concluded by asserting that where 
the Constitution requires a particular remedy, such as through the Takings 
Clause or the Due Process Clause, "the state is required to provide that remedy 
in its own courts, notwithstanding sovereign immunity."303 
The Sixth Circuit, like Professor Seamon, makes its point well, but it is not 
clear that Alden ought to be construed this way. Alden and Reich could be read, 
as apparently DLX reads them, as granting a broad right to seek constitutional 
remedies against the state in state courts; under this theory, state sovereign 
immunity could never bar a state court action seeking a remedy required by the 
Constitution. Given Alden's aforementioned attention to the symmetry of state 
and federal court sovereign immunity, however, this conclusion seems odd, 
particularly in light of the current Court's willingness to expand the scope of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity and its insistence that that immunity was part 
of our original constitutional fabric. Another reading of Alden's treatment of 
Reich, more in keeping with the remainder of the Alden opinion, is that when 
the state promises a particular remedy, as it did in Reich, due process prevents it 
from welching on that promise. Under this reading, state and federal court 
immunity rules in a takings case would not necessarily be different, because the 
cause of action would be rooted in the Just Compensation Clause, rather than 
the Due Process 
Along these lines, it is important to remember that Reich itself makes clear 
that Georgia's chief failing was to "hold out what plainly appeared to be a 
'clear and certain' postdeprivation remedy and then declare, only after the 
disputed taxes have been paid, that no such remedy exists."305 Reich' s 
holding-and Alden's preservation of Reich-then are not directly on point for 
the takings claimant who objects not to state procedural inadequacies but to the 
lack of compensation; a landowner could have a takings claim against the state 
without being able to point to the kind of egregious procedural deprivation 
301. Id. at 528. 
302. Id. at 528 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,740 (1999)). 
303. Id. 
304. Of course, a due process action might also be possible, particularly if the state, like 
Georgia in Reich, offered and then removed a postdeprivation remedy. 
305. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 108 (1994). 
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committed by Georgia in ~ e i c h . ~ ' ~  Alden's own language seems to bolster 
this interpretation. The Court emphasized that in Reich, "due process 
requires the State to provide the remedy it has Contrary to 
DLXs reasoning, then, Alden and Alden's treatment of Reich do not compel 
the conclusion that state sovereign immunity cannot bar takings claims in 
state court. Nor do they support an asymmetrical immunity for takings 
claims. Instead, those cases dealt with a related but different problem, 
sounding in due process, not takings. And because Alden and Reich are not 
exactly on point, the Court's most direct statement on the matter remains the 
First English footnote, which finds that takings trumps sovereign immunity, 
without regard to whether the action is brought in state or federal court. First 
English began as a state court action,308 to be sure, but nothing in its language 
suggests that the immunity rules for takings claims would differ between state 
and federal court. In suggesting otherwise, the Sixth Circuit is relying on 
distinctions the Supreme Court itself has not recognized. 
It is interesting that the Sixth Circuit uses the ostensible availability of a 
state court action to help justify its dismissal of the federal court suit. After 
determining that the Eleventh Amendment required dismissal of the case 
before it, the DLX court need not have reached the question of whether the 
same action could have overcome an immunity claim in state court. And yet, 
the Sixth Circuit apparently felt that an appropriate remedy had to lie 
somewhere in the judicial system; given the Constitution's promise of a just 
compensation remedy, sovereign immunity could not absolutely bar such a 
case. Therefore, in a curious and indirect way, it assumed what this Article 
argues explicitly: given the remedial nature of the Fifth Amendment Just 
Compensation Clause, plaintiffs must be able to bring their takings actions 
somewhere in the judicial system. Ironically, to the extent Alden suggests 
that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies symmetrically in state and 
federal court, it can also be used to argue in favor of a Takings Clause that 
automatically abrogates state sovereign immunity in both state and federal 
court. Any other result would leave the takings plaintiff unable to protect her 
property rights in any judicial forum, an outcome virtually impossible to 
square with our constitutional structure. 
306. Alden can also be read more narrowly to address only Congress's power to abrogate 
state immunity in state courts, though as mentioned above, its reasoning has far wider 
implications in state sovereign immunity law. 
307. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,740 (1999). 
308. Supra note 299. 
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3. The Availability of Alternative Remedies 
Though the theoretical arguments are strongly in favor of a self-executing 
Takings Clause that automatically abrogates state sovereign immunity in both 
state and federal court, it is less clear that this outcome is a practical necessity. 
Even if the Takings Clause did not provide a damages remedy that 
automatically abrogates state sovereign immunity, many takings litigants would 
still have judicial recourse. In Marbury terms, while the system does not 
provide the full spectrum of remedies, it does provide a good amount, even 
accounting for sovereign immunity. First, property owners can protect their 
rights to a significant extent through traditional suits against the offending state 
official in both his official and personal capacities. Second, many states have 
consented to suits sounding in inverse condemnation, either by statute or 
judicial decision. Though these existing legal structures might not offer the 
perfect remedy in every case, they often do a decent enough job. 
The officer suit, long a part of our legal tradition though not formally 
canonized until Ex parte Young, frequently provides adequate remedies for 
those seeking to sue a state. Because its legal fiction permits suits in equity 
against state officials, the Young line provides judicial relief for ongoing 
constitutional violations. What it does not offer is money damages for past 
violations, such as interim takings. It can, though, get the government off a 
person's land, not only returning the property to its owner but also, at least 
theoretically, shortening the duration of the interim taking. 
The plaintiff who successfully wins back her land in this way is not wholly 
without further remediation: She can sue the officer in his personal capacity for 
damages to recover for the duration of the taking. Two obstacles remain. First, 
most state officials enjoy qualified To win damages, the plaintiff 
would need to demonstrate that such immunity should not apply. Second, the 
officer is unlikely to have deep pockets, so even if the plaintiff does win a 
judgment at law, she may not be fully 
309. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 529 (4th ed. 2003) (stating that 
executive branch officials are normally entitled to qualified immunity from suit). 
3 10. Some states, in certain situations, do indemnify their employees to a certain extent, but 
that indemnification is neither widespread nor complete enough to consistently make the takings 
plaintiff whole. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Bley, Use of the Civil Rights Acts to Recover Damages in 
Land Use Cases, SD14 ALI-ABA 213,434 (1998) (noting that "because indemnification is 
frequently available to government employees, a judgment against an employee in his or her 
personal capacity may be paid sometimes by the government"); James D. Cole, Defense and 
Indemnification of Local Oflcials: Constitutional and Other Concerns. 58 ALB. L. REV. 789. 
789-90 (1995) (noting that New York common law does not relieve public employees, 
including officers, of responsibility for torts committed during their public employment); 
George C .  Hanks, Jr., Contribution and Indemnity After HB4,67 TEX. B.J. 288, 298 (2004) 
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To surmount the qualified immunity hurdle, the landowner injured by an 
interim takings violation would have to establish that the offending officer 
knew or should have known that the taking-without just compensation- 
clearly violated established federal takings d~ctrine.~" Though this immunity 
certainly protects the officer to some degree, it is hardly as bulletproof as 
absolute immunity and, realistically, might deter some state officers from taking 
property that they know will lead to interim takings violations. Of course, this 
incentive is not as strong as the direct suit against the state, because an officer 
can hide behind a claim that the "taking" was not intentional and that the return 
of the property demonstrated the officer's good faith. He similarly can claim 
that he thought a particular regulatory scheme authorized the 
Nevertheless, coupled with the potential of injunctive relief, this remedy offers 
property owners considerable protection. 
It is also notable that many state laws offer protections that duplicate or 
exceed those under the federal Constitution. The constitutions of most states 
(noting Texas statutory provisions creating a right to indemnification, including the state's 
statutory duty to indemnify its employees for actual damages, court costs, and attorney's fees 
when they have been sued in their official capacity); Jack M. Sabatino, Privitization and 
Punitives: Should Government Contractors Share the Sovereign's Immunities from Exemplary 
Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 23Ck31 (1997) (noting that some states forbid and others 
permit indemnification of public employees for punitive damages); Martin A. Schwartz, Should 
Juries Be Informed That Municipality Will Indemnify Oficer's 5 1983 Liability for 
Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 121 1 (2001) (noting that municipalities 
and states "frequently indemnify their employees to protect them from liability for unlawful 
conduct within the scope of their employment"); Sherman P. Willis, Note, Iowa School 
Counselors Had Better Get It Right, 89 IOWAL. REV. 1093.11 19 n.189 (2004) (noting that the 
Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act "requires school districts and boards to 'defend, indemnify, 
and hold harmless' any employee who is named in a civil suit for an act or omission arising out 
of the employee's job"); see also Carlos Manual VQuez ,  Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, 
and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927, 1950 (2000) (noting that officer liability often 
translates into de facto state liability and contending that "it may simply be easier for all 
concerned for the state to establish an adequate remedy against itself'). See generally Cornelia 
T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public OfJicials' Individual 
Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 76-79 (1999) (discussing indemnification and the 
result of the Bivens system of liability for government officials). 
31 1. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that "[glovernment 
officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known"); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 
183, 194 n.12 (1984) (finding that relevant inquiry under Harlow is whether officer violated 
clearly established federal law rights). 
3 12. See, e.g., Sonoda v. Cabrera, 255 F.3d 1035,1043 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting defendants' 
argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they merely followed an executive 
order which the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands senate had approved). 
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have versions of the Fifth Amendment's Takings and many states 
also have statutes for inverse condemnation actions.314 Many takings actions 
could thus proceed without the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Indeed, in 
many instances, the state constitution or statute provides more than the federal 
Constitution does. For instance, some state statutes specifically provide not 
only for just compensation suits but also for attorneys' fees for victorious 
plaintiffs.315 Some also offer a separate administrative remedy for recovering 
from the state.316 California even statutorily provides market-rate postjudgment 
interest for condemnation awards.317 
Even more important, many states have consented to suits sounding in 
inverse condemnation, expressly authorizing suits for money damages. Some 
have done so through express legislation.318 Others have done so through their 
courts, so that even though sovereign immunity is theoretically sufficient to 
defeat an action against a state's taking,319 the state's constitutional just 
compensation clause constitutes consent to suit, thus waiving that immunity.320 
313. 1 JULIUS SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 5 1.3 (rev. 3d ed. 1998) 
[hereinafter NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN]. North Carolina is the only state that lacks such a 
provision. Id. at 1-95. 
314. See, e.g., A m .  REV. STAT. ANN. 5 11-972(B) (West 2001) (providing for inverse 
condemnation action); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE $$ 1250.1 10, 1268.31 1 (West 2000) (same); 
COLO. REV. STAT. 9 24-56-1 16 (2002) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. $48-17b (West 2000) 
(same); HAW. REV. STAT. 9 113-4 (1999) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 40A-Sl(1999) (same); OR. 
REV. STAT. 5 20.085 (2003) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, 5 512 (1999) (same); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. 1-26-516 (2005) (same); see also Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign 
Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485,578 (2001) (noting that many states have enacted statutes for 
inverse condemnation actions) Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign 
Immunity from Infn'ngement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1399, 1414 & 11.60 (2000) (same). 
315. See A m .  REV. STAT. ANN. 5 11-972(B) (providing reasonable attorney's fees in an 
inverse condemnation suit); COLO. REV. STAT. 5 24-56-1 16 (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
$ 48-17b (same); HAW. REV. STAT. 5 1 13-4 (same); OR. REV. STAT. 5 20.085 (same). 
316. See Menell, supra note 314, at 1414 & n.60 (providing a sample of state laws 
authorizing a separate administrative remedy). 
3 17. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE $ 1268.3 1 1 (West 2000). 
3 18. See, e.g., N.Y. Cr. CL. ACT 5 9(2) (McKinney 2001) (stating that a court of claims can 
hear monetary actions "against the state for the appropriation of any real or personal property or 
interest therein"); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 63-30-10.5(1) (1997) (repealed 2004) (providing that 
"immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensation 
from the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private 
property for public uses without just compensation"); see also Seamon, supra note 8, at 1 118 
11.249 (noting that New York and Utah expressly waive immunity from just compensation suits). 
319. See 6A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 313, 5 30.01[2] (stating that a 
state's sovereign immunity from suit is sufficient to defeat an eminent domain action). 
320. See, e.g., Rose v. California, 123 P.2d 505, 510 (Cal. 1942) (finding that the 
California takings clause is self-executing and therefore an action for damages is permissible); 
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In short, "[tlhe rigors of sovereign immunity are thus 'mitigated by a sense of 
justice which has continually expanded by consent the suability of the 
sovereign. 9 11321 
However, though many states offer protections more robust than that 
under the federal Constitution, not all do. Some state courts have yet to 
overrule cases refusing to find the state liable for exercising its eminent domain 
powers.322 Some states have also limited takings suits to either direct physical 
invasion or damage to specific rights.323 And in some states, it is unclear 
State ex rel. Smith v. 0.24148, 0.23831 & 0.12277 Acres of Land, 171 A.2d 228, 231 (Del. 
1961) (finding that the Delaware constitutional provision stipulating that no person's property 
shall be taken for public use without his consent and without compensation is a self-executing 
waiver of sovereign immunity); Angelle v. State, 34 So. 2d 32 1,323 (La. 1948) (finding that the 
Louisiana constitutional provision that private property shall not be taken or damaged except for 
public purposes and after just and adequate compensation is paid is "self-executing" and, hence, 
where private property has been appropriated by state for public purposes, the right of the owner 
to recover adequate compensation will be entertained by courts as an exception to the general 
principle that a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent); Schmune v. State. 22 N.W.2d 
691,694 (Neb. 1946) (finding that the Nebraska constitutional provision that property shall not 
be taken for public use without just compensation protects property rights from invasion by the 
state and is self-executing, so no further legislative consent is necessary); Cereghino v. State ex 
rel. State Highway Comm'n, 370 P.2d 694, 696 (Or. 1962) (finding that where the state 
exercises power of eminent domain without bringing a condemnation action, the owner may sue 
to recover the value of the property and damages under the Oregon and United States 
Constitutions); Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 157 S.E. 842,850 (S.C. 1931) 
(finding no immunity from suit under the South Carolina Constitution where the act complained 
of constitutes a taking of private property without just compensation); Dillard v. Austin Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 806 S.W.2d 589,596 (Tex. App. 1991) (finding that the eminent domain provision 
of the Texas Constitution constitutes a waiver of governmental immunity for the taking or 
damage of property for public use). Of course, along similar lines, one could read the states' 
ratification of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment as together consenting to just 
compensation suits. Given that many states' own takings clauses are very similar to the clause 
in the Fifth Amendment-and given that many states have construed their own clauses to satisfy 
this consent requirement-this analysis seems correct, if roundabout. See infra Part V1.C 
(tracing the development of claims under the Takings Clause); see also 6A NICHOLS ON 
EMVIINENT DOMAIN, supra note 313, 5 30.01[2], at 30-10 & 11.12 (noting that states' 
compensation clauses constitute consent to suit). 
321. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,755 (1999) (quoting Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 
322 U.S. 47,53 (1944)). 
322. See, e.g., Zoll v. St. Louis County, 124 S.W.2d 1168, 1173 (Mo. 1938) (concluding 
that "[ilt is the prerogative of the state to determine when suit may be maintained against it"); 
Westmoreland Chem. &Color Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 144 A. 407,410 (Pa. 1928) (noting 
that, absent legislation to the contrary, there could be no liability); Starrett v. Inhabitants of 
Thomaston, 137 A. 67.69 (Me. 1927) (pointing to a provision in the relevant act disclaiming 
any state liability). 
323. See, e.g., Hamer v. State Highway Cornrn'n, 304 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Mo. 1957) 
(discussing the requirement that property be "directly affected"). See also Robert Keith 
Johnston, Federal Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence and Missouri Inverse Condemnation 
Proceedings, 58 UMKC L. REV. 421, 430 n.77 (1990) (noting that Missouri inverse 
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whether immunity has been waived324 or even if a cause of action for inverse 
condemnation Moreover, in those states in which the courts, rather 
than the legislature, have found sovereign immunity waived, the issue may not 
be permanently settled; given recent Supreme Court developments, there is 
reason to think some state courts might revisit their earlier decisions on the 
matter.326 Indeed, because many state courts that have construed their 
respective just compensation clauses to provide state consent to suit were 
considering the issue prior to Alden, some of those courts might want to revisit 
the issue in light of Alden's decision that state sovereign immunity in fact does 
apply in state courts. This is not to say that the "consent" theory necessarily 
rested on the absence of sovereign immunity in state courts; however, that 
absence certainly facilitated such a conclusion. Thus, even though sovereign 
immunity might not present an obstacle to such a suit under state law, the 
protection provided by state law suits is limited and uncertain.327 
~ndeed, some states that "consent" to suit do so not in traditional courts but 
in quasi-judicial courts of claims. Illinois, for instance, requires that cases filed 
against the state be filed in the Court of Claims, a fact-finding body that is not a 
court in the constitutional sense.328 Illinois courts, thus, usually refuse to 
condemnation law is far from clear). 
324. See, e.g., New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 985 F.2d 1488, 1493 n.12 (1 lth 
Cir. 1993) (indicating that Florida law is uncertain regarding whether courts recognize a cause 
of action for inverse condemnation temporary takings claims); Austin v. City of Honolulu, 840 
F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1988) (indicating that Hawaii case law is also unclear); see also 
Seamon, supra note 8, at 11 18-19 & 11.250 (indicating that there are states where the law is still 
unclear). 
325. See Austin, 840 F.2d at 681 (stating that Hawaii case law is unclear as to whether 
there exists an inverse condemnation cause of action); Johnston, supra note 323, at 430 (stating 
that Missouri law is unclear as to whether such a cause of action exists); see also DANIEL R. 
MANDELKER T AL., FEDERAL AND USE LAW 8 4A.02[51 [Dl (1998) (noting that the availability 
of compensation remedies in land use cases remains muddy in many states). 
326. As Professor Searnon argues, some of those state courts have blurred together takings 
clauses' creation of a monetary cause of action with the waiver or abrogation of sovereign 
immunity. Seamon, supra note 8, at 1120. In light of City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 
states might need to revisit that approach. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 
687, 714-15 (1998) (discussing the distinction between a cause of action and waiver of 
sovereign immunity). 
327. See Daniel J .  Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of 
Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1335-37 (2001) (discussing the remedial gap 
created by current Eleventh Amendment doctrine with particular attention to intellectual 
property suits). 
328. See Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Coun of Claims, 485 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ill. 1985) 
(noting that the Coun of Claims is not "a court within the meaning of the judicial article" of the 
Illinois Constitution); 3 RICHARD A. MICHAEL, ILLINOIS PRACTICE: CIVL PROCEDURE BEFORE 
TRIAL 8 2.3 (2004) ("Cases against the State of Illinois are also outside the jurisdiction of the 
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assume jurisdiction over suits against the state.329 But the Illinois Court of 
Claims lacks the procedural protections afforded in "constitutional" courts, and 
under Illinois law, the circuit courts can review only the administrative 
procedures used by the Court of Claims, not the substance of the case.')' Were 
the Takings Clause not to trump state sovereign immunity and permit an action 
against the state in state or federal court, Illinois would then offer only limited 
administrative review, not the full panoply of judicial protections for takings 
plaintiffs. 
Moreover, for those plaintiffs who seek to vindicate their rights in federal 
courts, the Williamson doctrine already poses sizeable barriers to takings 
litigants not faced by other constitutional rights plaintiffs.331 As one 
commentator argues, the lower federal courts have an "overwhelming 
predisposition to dismiss federal land use cases on jurisdictional grounds such 
as abstention and ripeness."332 The quintuple threat of sovereign immunity, 
qualified immunity, and, under the Williamson trap, ripeness, abstention, and 
preclusion then poses multiple pitfalls, some unique to the takings plaintiff.333 
Nevertheless, the general point is that state law in many instances fills 
some of the gaps that might exist were the Court to hold that the Eleventh 
Amendment does limit the remedies that plaintiffs can receive in takings suits 
against the state. Such a holding would lead more plaintiffs to file their takings 
suits in state court, but that often happens anyway because of Williamson's 
ripeness requirements and (arguably) faulty reasoning about the asymmetry of 
state sovereign immunity.334 Moreover, the combination of Ex parte Young 
actions and suits against officers in their personal capacities can help to further 
deter temporary regulatory takings. If the officer suit option and state laws 
subject matter of the circuit courts and must be filed in the Court of Claims."). 
329. See M~CHAEL, supra note 328, at § 2.3 (listing arguments, rejected by the Illinois 
courts, asserted by litigants in attempts to join the state as a party to litigation). 
330. See id. (describing the circuit courts' subject matter jurisdiction). 
33 1. John J. Delaney et al., Who Will Clean Up the "Ripeness" Mess?: A Call for Refonn 
so Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31 URB. LAW. 195, 201 (1999) 
(describing the Takings Clause as being marginalized in comparison with the other Bill of 
Rights protections). These barriers seem particularly unfair (or, at the least, asymmetrical) given 
that federal official defendants can easily remove federal takings actions to federal court while 
plaintiffs in such cases usually are forced to go to state court first under Williamson. 
332. Id. at 196. 
333. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Fransisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2509 (2005) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that the Williamson trap creates burdens unique to takings 
plaintiffs). 
334. See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing the symmetry of state sovereign immunity in state 
and federal courts and citing some arguments against such symmetry for certain kinds of 
claims). 
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collectively provide adequate protection to property rights in many instances, is 
this all much ado about nothing? 
- 
The answer from the property owner for whom an adequate remedy is not 
otherwise available is, of course, certainly not. The foregoing discussion 
demonstrates there will be gaps in the coverage, and to the extent that the 
Constitution ought to protect everyone to the same degree, those gaps are 
disquieting. After all, "[c]onstitutional provisions are based on the possibility 
of extremes,"335 so the fact that the unprotected right is the exception rather 
than the norm should count for little as a constitutional argument. This is even 
more the case considering that the small property owner of modest means will 
- - 
tend to have less political clout and be more vulnerable to the system's gaps. 
On the federal law front, official immunity can be difficult to overcome, and an 
injunction offers nothing to the victim of a temporary taking. Similarly, the suit 
against the officer in his personal capacity might help deter uncompensated 
takings on the margins, but it will offer little in the way of satisfying 
compensation. Indeed, before we celebrate the existing safeguards, we should 
keep in mind that the system currently functions mostly without state sovereign 
i~nmuni t?~~ and poses litigation bamers serious enough to merit congressional 
attention. The problem, in fact, has been perceived as so serious that a bill 
addressing these concerns made it all the way through the House before falling 
short in the 
The state law front might be rosier on the whole, but as noted above, some 
states do better than others. If a state were intent on denying reasonable 
procedures, it is plausible that that same state would neither waive its immunity 
nor offer much in the way of state law remedies. The direct collision between 
takings and state sovereign immunity, in fact, presupposes a state that is 
unwilling to compensate an alleged taking, because a suit that has progressed to 
that point must involve a state unwilling to provide certain compensation. State 
335. Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 21 1,226-27 (1908). 
336. Because the Court suggested in First English that takings trumps the Eleventh 
Amendment, and because it has not held to the contrary, takings cases in many instances can 
proceed unmolested by sovereign immunity. Such was the case in Palauolo, when the Court 
ignored a potential sovereign immunity problem. See supra note 6 and accompanying text 
(noting that the Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the problem but declined to do 
so). See also Boise Cascade Corp. v. Oregon, 991 P.2d 563, 568 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) 
(concluding that "at least some constitutional claims are actionable against a state, even without 
a waiver or congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity"); SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 650 
N.W. 1 ,9  (S.D. 2002) (finding that a sovereign immunity claim can not overcome the Takings 
Clause's just compensation requirement). But see supra note 4 (citing federal appellate cases 
finding that the Eleventh Amendment barred takings suit against the state). 
337. See Delaney et al., supra note 331, at 195-98 (discussing the Private Property Rights 
Implementation Act). 
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court protections in fact are frequently limited, as evidenced by the fact that 
many takings plaintiffs try to get into federal court notwithstanding the 
procedural complications.338 Thus, even though the law would offer some 
protections were the Supreme Court to hold that state sovereign immunity 
precluded just compensation suits, those remedies would not always protect 
property owners as well as an automatically abrogating Takings Clause would. 
Such a holding, then, would not be a policy disaster, but that does not mean it is 
preferable. Given that some already see procedural hurdles as having rendered 
the Takings Clause a "poor relation" compared to the other Bill of Rights 
protections,339 a clearly articulated state sovereign immunity hurdle would make 
it that much more difficult for plaintiffs to protect their property rights. 
C. The Fourteenth Amendment, Incorpora tion, and Automatic Abrogation 
Another structural argument in favor of automatic abrogation relies on the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause's incorporation of the Takings 
Clause against the states. This reading reasons that, in its radical realignment 
of the relationship between the federal and state governments, the Fourteenth 
Amendment also reconfigured Eleventh Amendment immunity. To the extent 
that the Eleventh Amendment was passed after the Bill of Rights, there are 
problems in arguing that those rights automatically abrogate state sovereign 
immunity-although not insurmountable ones, because current jurisprudence 
treats the Eleventh Amendment as a placeholder for sovereign immunity, not as 
an affirmative creator of the doctrine. However, because the Fourteenth 
Amendment was passed after the Eleventh-and because those rights did not 
previously apply against the states anyway-there is reason to think the 
Fourteenth Amendment disrupted pre-Civil War immunity principles. 
The current Court acknowledges that the Fourteenth Amendment 
"fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the 
~onstitution."'~~ In theory, this fundamental alteration could automatically 
abrogate state sovereign immunity for all rights incorporated through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Interestingly, the Court has never rejected this 
principle, even suggesting that automatic abrogation might apply in some 
instances. Even the Alden Court noted that, in adopting the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the people required states to surrender a portion of sovereignty 
338. See id. at 200 (discussing ripeness and preclusion doctrine as complicating factors in 
federal litigation). 
339. Id. at 201. 
340. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,59 (1996). 
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preserved to them in the original ~onst i tut ion.~~'  This is a view not terribly 
different from that of many state courts, which read the states' ratification of 
the Fifth Amendment and, later, the Fourteenth Amendment as collectively 
consenting to takings 
Still, doctrinally it seems extreme to assert that incorporation did not 
merely apply the Bill of Rights against the states but also abrogated state 
immunity for those rights. Nevertheless, this theory does illustrate important 
ways of thinking about the Fourteenth Amendment's impact on sovereign 
immunity. As the Bill of Rights did not initially apply against the states, the 
original discussions of state sovereign immunity-whether in the ratification 
debates for the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the Eleventh 
Amendment--often did not focus on the issue of constitutional righkM3 
Indeed, those debates had in mind particular phenomena, such as war debts and 
the connected debates on fiscal Though this historical backdropM5 
certainly does not foreclose the possibility that Eleventh Amendment or, 
alternatively, common law state sovereign immunity applied to constitutional 
suits, it also does not prove that a state's immunity was so powerful as to block 
constitutional suits. 
The Court's recent decisions permit Congress to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity under its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 powers, while limiting its 
ability to abrogate pursuant to other powers.346 This focus suggests that the 
Court might not see the Fourteenth Amendment as automatically abrogating 
anything. And yet, though automatic abrogation has not been embraced by the 
current Court, the Court's own precedent suggests at least some incorporated 
rights should not be subject to Eleventh Amendment bars. Interestingly, 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, which establishes that Congress can abrogate Eleventh 
341. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,756 (1999). Alden's discussion focuses on Congress's 
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5, but its analysis does not foreclose 
the possibility of some instances of automatic abrogation. Id. 
342. See supra Part V.B.3 (discussing state consent and waiver case law). 
343. But see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 421-25 (1793) (discussing 
enforcement of the Constitution against the states in federal court). 
344. See ORTH, supra note 74, at 18 (noting the pre-Chisholm "national debate on fiscal 
policy"); James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the 
Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL . REV. 1269, 128 1-1 3 13 (1998) (exploring the historical 
backdrop behind state government amenability to suit). 
345. See infra Part VI for historical arguments. For ease of presentation, I treat structural 
arguments here and historical ones in Part VI, though, of course, there is substantial overlap 
between the two. 
346. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 (discussing congressional intervention pursuant to Section 
5); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (upholding Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)). 
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Amendment immunity pursuant to its Section 5 powers,347 notes that the 
Fourteenth Amendment's substance is not limited to Congress's action. It 
explains that "the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . 
themselves embody significant limitations of state The fact of 
congressional abrogation might militate against automatic abrogation, but the 
Court does not address automatic abrogation because that question is not raised. 
Fitzpatrick, then, unanimously addresses only the easier question of Section 5 
abrogation,349 not the harder "automatic abrogation" question. To the extent it 
acknowledges that the substantive provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment themselves constrain state authority, Fitzpatrick might be a 
relatively contemporary admission that some constitutional rights might be self- 
executing in this sense. 
Justice Brennan's concurrence embraces these principles more explicitly 
than do his fellow Justices. Not only does Brennan read the Eleventh 
Amendment only to mean what it says-that "only federal-court suits against 
States by citizens of other States" are b~irred~~'-but he also suggests that the 
states waived their sovereign immunity for constitutional claims when they 
granted Congress specifically enumerated powers.351 Similarly, in his own 
concurrence, Justice Stevens notes, "I am not sure that the 1972 Amendments 
[to Title VII abrogating state sovereign immunity] were 'needed to secure the 
11352 guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment' . . . . Thus, when the right in 
question emerges from the Constitution itself, the state's immunity, under this 
theory, may be automatically surrendered.353 
Curiously, the current Court might support this argument. In City of 
Boeme v. ~ l o r e s , ~ ~ ~  the Court, in limiting Congress's powers under Section 5, 
emphasized that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment has meaning 
independent of Congress's actions. Section 5 thus merely gives Congress 
"remedial powers."355 Boerne has often been seen as part of the Rehnquist 
- -- 
347. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976). 
348. Id. at 456. 
349. No one dissented in Fitzpatrick. Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens each filed a 
concumng opinion. 
350. Id. at 457 (Brennan, J., concumng). 
35 1. Id. at 457-58 (Breman, J., concurring). 
352. Id. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651 
(1966)). 
353. Id. at 458 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 
(1999) (distinguishing Reich v. Collins because in that case the state's obligation derived from 
the Constitution rather than congressional action). 
354. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
355. See id. at 53 1 (finding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) 
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Court's federalism movement, curtailing Congress's power to legislate. But in 
retaining the final say over the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, the Boeme 
Court explains that "[als enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment confers 
substantive rights against the States which, like the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, are s e l f - e ~ e c u t i n ~ . " ~ ~ ~  Of course, this does not necessarily mean that 
one can sue the state directly for damages; it might only mean that these rights 
can be raised without statutory authorization as a defense or as a cause of action 
in an officer suit for injunctive relief. But the suggestion is that these rights 
must have real bite without congressional action. 
As this Article acknowledged earlier, case law will not conclusively 
determine the outcome of this doctrinal collision. Case law created the 
collision, so to rely on it too heavily would be to beg the question. However, 
case law can help illuminate the judiciary's primary concerns. Indeed, as 
vigorous as the Court's defense of federalism has been over the past decade, the 
focus has been mostly on limiting Congress's intrusions on the states, not on 
shielding the states from its constitutional duties. The Court in recent years has 
reined in Congress's power to legislate in cases involving the Commerce 
 lau use,^'' Tenth ~ r n e n d r n e n t , ~ ~ ~  and Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
~ r n e n d r n e n t . ~ ~ ~  Indeed, the Court's deep concern over congressional 
overreaching has arisen in separation-of-powers cases as Collectively, 
these decisions suggest that the recent Court's federalism is bothered more by 
congressional aggrandizement-and more concerned with its own power vis-h- 
vis the other branches-than by constitutional requirements that might attach 
against the states. 
"contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal 
balance"). 
356. Id. at 536. 
357. See United States v. Monison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-19 (2000) (holding that the 
Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enact the civil remedy provision of the 
Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,552-68 (1995) (holding 
that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enact the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act). 
358. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,904-33 (1997) (rejecting congressional 
authority to compel state law enforcement officers to enforce federal law); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992) (noting that congressional authority does not extend to 
forcing state governments to implement federal legislation). 
359. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,529-36 (1999) (holding that Section 5 
does not empower Congress to enact RFRA). 
360. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (noting that congressional 
participation must end once legislation is enacted); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,958 (1982) 
(explaining that further legislation is the proper means for Congress to affect the execution of 
laws already in effect); see also Choper & Yoo, supra note 8, at 213 (suggesting that the Court's 
real "lodestar" is separation of powers, not federalism). 
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This is, of course, an oversimplification of the Rehnquist Court's 
federalism decisions. However, it is notable that the trend has been to limit 
Congress, not to aggrandize the states in other ways. Indeed, though liberal 
critics have been quick to disparage the contemporary Court, one could argue 
that it has proven to be a willing defender of some constitutional rights. As this 
Article has already noted, certainly its takings and due process cases defend an 
individual against the state. In fact, the Court has recently vindicated a host of 
constitutional individual rights, sometimes even at the expense of state 
government. To mention just a few, it has held that the Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial prohibits trial judges from imposing "exceptional" sentences 
based on judicially determined facts;361 that due process requires that United 
States citizens being held as enemy combatants be given meaningful 
opportunity to contest the factual basis for detention;362 that foreign national 
detainees held in the Guantanarno Bay facility may file habeas petitions in 
United States courts;363 that the First Amendment likely protects adults' access 
to some material banned by Child Online Protection A C ~ ; ~ *  and that the Due 
Process Clause prohibits states from making homosexual sodomy criminal.365 
Of course, this is a very limited survey and does not help settle the doctrinal 
issue here. However, if one is to search for a unifying theme to the past fifteen 
years of constitutional jurisprudence, it would certainly be limitations on 
Congress's power, not on individual rights. Indeed, this brief list of cases 
suggests that the Court is deeply concerned with constitutionally protected 
rights, arguably sometimes at the expense of workable To this 
361. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004) (holding the judge's use, in 
sentencing, of a fact neither admitted nor found by the jury to be a Sixth Amendment violation); 
see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,288 (2005) (finding that the Sixth Amendment 
was incompatible with the mandatory Federal Sentencing Act). 
362. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that "due process 
demands . . . a meaningful opportunity to contest the basis for detention"). 
363. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,484 (2004) (allowing habeas corpus petitions by 
Guantanarno Bay detainees). 
364. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004) (finding COPA to be a likely 
violation of the First Amendment). 
365. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (finding consensual, adult 
homosexual activity to be a protected liberty under the Due Process Clause). 
366. See, e.g., Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306-08 (suggesting that the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines might be unconstitutional and thereby arguably creating serious practical problems 
for criminal attorneys and for courts all over the country); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144,171-75 (1992) (striking down three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985, which required states to provide for disposal of waste generated 
within their borders, even though the Act resulted from efforts of state leaders to achieve a state- 
based set of remedies for the waste problem). 
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extent, the automatic abrogation thesis, though perhaps still controversial, is not 
so out of line with the Court's current philosophy. 
Indeed, recent sovereign immunity jurisprudence is consistent with this 
view. Seminole Tribe and Alden, the two most important recent statements on 
the Eleventh Amendment, focus on Congress's power to abrogate 
Keeping that in mind, it becomes apparent that congressional abrogation and 
self-executing constitutional abrogation might be very different in this Court's 
mind. There is a tendency to assume that if the Court has limited Congress's 
power to abrogate, then the Constitution certainly would also limit any 
automatic abrogation, because the latter would infringe on states' dignity more 
than the former. But, given the aforementioned case law, this is not necessarily 
the case. 
This interpretation not only fits with recent case law's admittedly cryptic 
remarks but makes sense given the Founders' initial intentions. To alleviate 
fears that the federal government would swallow the smaller states, Alexander 
Hamilton argued that "the State governments would clearly retain all the rights 
of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, 
exclusively delegated to the United Such delegations included cases 
"where [the Constitution] granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and 
in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority."369 
Significantly, even Justice Iredell, the lone dissenter in Chisholm and, 
obviously, a supporter of state sovereign immunity, reasoned similarly, arguing 
that each state is sovereign as to the powers reserved to the state but not for 
those powers of which the Constitution deprives the state.370 Of course, the 
Fourteenth Amendment would not exist for another eighty years, but 
presumably the same founding principles would apply to constitutional 
Thus, once the Fourteenth Amendment limited state authority, 
367. Of course, Alden in particular might have significant implications outside the 
abrogation context. See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing whether Alden requires state sovereign 
immunity to apply symmetrically in state and federal court). 
368. THEFEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 218, at 192. 
369. Id. 
370. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) 
("Every State in the Union in every instance where its sovereignty has not been delegated to the 
United States, I consider to be as compleatly sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the 
powers surrendered."). 
371. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,148 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(interpreting Federalist No. 32 to include "subjects over which state authority is expressly 
negated"). Justice Souter's interpretation, which this Article accepts here, might not fit with the 
exact language of Hamilton's essay. However, it seems uncontroversial to assert that this 
interpretation is implicit and applies to the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the relevant clause 
grammatically separates authority "granted" to the union and authority "prohibited in the states, 
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the states' sovereignty in those areas must have disappeared. Although that 
"sovereignty" would not necessarily include sovereign immunity, it would be 
strange for it to not.372 In fact, because the Fourteenth Amendment contains 
judicially enforceable restraints on the states independent of Congress's 
Section 5 powers, it would be contradictory for sovereign immunity then to 
bar suits seeking to enforce those rights against the states. 
The predictable counter to all this is that we should let the political 
safeguards of federalism work out these details. Because protection of the 
states lies with Congress, Congress should decide if sovereign immunity is a 
defense states need. Permitting abrogation is thus a way to remain respectful 
of principles of federalism without insisting that the judiciary impose those 
principles on the other branches. 
While this theory makes sense for statutory rights, it seems less 
appropriate for constitutional rights. After all, one main reason for 
enshrining a right in the Constitution is to take the issue out of the political 
branches' hands. Permitting the government to decide whether it wants to 
subject itself to takings suits weakens the constitutional protection almost 
into a statute; if a plaintiff cannot sue in the absence of a waiver or 
abrogation of sovereign immunity, then the constitutional right has little bite. 
Indeed, the complicated politics of these issues could result in a political 
process failure that prevents or permits abrogation for the wrong reasons. 
One could argue, of course, that congressional failure to abrogate 
demonstrates insufficient support for abrogation, so the system works. 
Political realities obstruct much legislation, yet surely such hurdles do not 
justify judicial involvement. However, when the right is constitutional, we 
should be more hesitant to leave the issues to the political branches. Dozens 
of " ~ e t o - ~ a t e s , " ~ ~ ~  obstacles in the legislative process, might prevent 
thus suggesting two discrete categories. Second, even if this is not the best reading of the 
sentence, it would be odd to read the states' sovereignty as existing still in areas where the 
Constitution expressly negates state authority. Third, one can argue that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does grant power in one instance to Congress (in Section 5) and prohibits the states 
from exercising similar authority (in Section 1). 
372. As Professor Manning queries: 
How should one understand sovereign immunity in a dual republic in which the 
states seem to have ceded some measure of sovereignty to the federal government 
on matters within a limited sphere of federal power and, beyond that, seem to have 
agreed to certain express constitutional restrictions on their own sovereign powers? 
Manning, supra note 129, at 1676; see also Amar, supra note 71, at 1426 (describing 
"sovereign immunity" as an "oppressive" feature of state "sovereignty"). 
373. See, e.g., ESKRDGE ET AL., supra note 139 (refemng to hostile or indifferent 
committee leaders, filibusters, presidential vetoes and the host of other potential killers of 
legislation as "veto-gates"). 
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legislators from enacting a desirable law or even from passing a law that 
reflects the preferences of a majority.374 Congress is also less likely to act on 
a complicated issue underneath the media's radar, even if the majority of the 
public and of legislators themselves might view abrogation favorably. This 
baseline of inaction is, of course, typical of our legislative processes 375- 
arguably one of the great strengths of our democracy-but it seems 
particularly dangerous to entrust our constitutional rights to such arbitrary 
political winds. 
Federalism, then, has more resonance in the realm of congressional 
legislation, where structural obstacles help prevent our government from 
acting "tyrannically. "376 To the extent those same obstacles ensure state 
power, they will help achieve some other goals commonly associated with 
federalism: experimentation, individual choice, and It is 
entirely unclear how state sovereign immunity+specially as applied to 
constitutional rights-might further any justifications for our federalism; 
crucially, with or without immunity, the states "retain something to do."378 
State sovereign immunity not only prevents the vindication of individual 
rights, but also does little actually to further principles of federalism. State 
governments can in fact carry out their regulatory authority even if they are 
subject to lawsuits.379 Considering that the framers of the original 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment saw our federalist system as 
protecting individuals against the excesses of government, the Fourteenth 
Amendment should be viewed as doing more than merely placing the 
abrogation decision in Congress's hands for all constitutional rights. 
374. See S. 2271,105th Cong. (1998) (noting that Senate supporters of the property rights 
bill were unable to overcome filibuster); see also Delaney et al., supra note 331, at 59 
(describing how the property bill passed in the House but needed eight additional votes to defeat 
an anticipated filibuster). 
375. See generally JW MORONE, Tl-iE D ~ O C R A ~ C  WISH (1989) (arguing that Americans 
are profoundly wary of government power and that our constitutional structure reflects that 
wariness by making it difficult for government to act and change status quo). 
376. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 218, at 294, 298 
(arguing that state sovereignty exists to protect individual liberty); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From 
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 
341, 385-99 (discussing federalism as a method of preventing tyranny). 
377. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., C O N S ~ O N A L  LAW 15Cb54 (3d ed. 1996) 
(presenting most of the common explanations and defenses for a federalist system). 
378. Young, supra note 261, at 43. 
379. See id. at 52-53 (arguing that sovereign immunity does little to advance genuine 
federalism concerns). 
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VI. The Historical Arguments 
While it is frequently possible to garner significant historical evidence for 
opposing sides of a constitutional debate, the fact remains that originalist 
arguments are persuasive for the current Supreme Court. Some Justices might 
take history more seriously than others, but most, or even all, of the current 
Justices seem to consider history relevant to their task. This is particularly true 
in sovereign immunity cases; Seminole Tribe and Alden both contained 
scholarly, historically minded majority and dissenting opinions. The student of 
the constitutional collision must therefore address the historical roots of the 
competing doctrines. 
A. Originalist Views of the Takings Clause and the Evolution of 
"Just Compensation" 
At common law, property rights were seen as absolute.380 According to 
Blackstone, when the government took private property it was "considered as 
an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange."381 Though the 
sovereign's authority was usually unquestioned and unquestionable, when 
Parliament took private property, it did so "not by absolutely stripping the 
subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full 
indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained."382 To take 
property, the sovereign would thus have to enter the marketplace as an ordinary 
participant and pay the fair market value for the land in question.383 However, 
though English common law certainly formed an important backdrop to the 
nation's founding, theories of eminent domain were far from the framers' chief 
Evidence of the origins of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is scanty. 
The idea seems to have been Madison's, and it encountered little opposition, 
either in the Constitutional Convention or in the states.385 Given that the 
Clause was unremarkable and uncontroversial, it is probably safe to assume, as 
do Professors Dana and Merrill, that the Constitution merely codified existing 
380. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES * 134. 
38 1. Id. at 135; see also DANA & MERRILL, supra note 24, at 24 (describing Blackstone's 
view of property rights). 
382. BLACKSTONE, supra note 380, at *135. 
383. DANA & MEFCULL, supra note 24, at 24. 
384. See id, at 25 (discussing the drafting of the Takings Clause). 
385. Id. at 13-14. 
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practices of providing just compensation when government appropriated land 
for public This practice was to provide compensation when the 
government forced a private property owner to surrender title to it.387 Of 
course, the eighteenth century framer would have been concerned mostly with 
physical takings,388 but this establishes that regulatory takings were less likely 
to have been on his radar screen, not that he would have been categorically 
opposed to the extension of a takings clause to such cases in a future 
regulation-heavy era. Indeed, the fact that many nineteenth century state 
constitutional takings clauses included provisions requiring just compensation 
when property was "taken or suggests that regulatory-type takings 
were on people's minds by the time the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause was 
incorporated. Interestingly, even in Blackstone's era, road commissioners were 
liable in tort and, according to Blackstone, subject to punitive damages for road 
repairs that obstructed light or passage to nearby houses.390 The notion of 
compensating indirect damage to property owners, then, was not wholly foreign 
to Anglo-American jurisprudence in the era of the founding. 
From its conception, the Takings Clause was unique in its specific 
provision of a monetary remedy. Such a view is consistent with historical 
theories that the Constitution was written with an eye towards protecting the 
386. Id. at 15- 16; see also Farber. supra note 156, at 28 1 (noting that a takings clause was 
included in Northwest Ordinance of 1787 to protect nonresident investors and alleviate fears 
that state legislators would seize lands owned by outsiders); William Michael Treanor, The 
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
782, 785 n.12 & n.13 (1995) (citing Massachusetts Body of Liberties and 1669 Fundamental 
Constitutions of Carolina). 
387. DANA & MERRILL supra note 24, at 16. As one scholar notes: 
When substantial parcels of land were taken for public facilities-courthouses, 
prisons, churches, fortifications-statutes normally specified that the landowner 
would receive compensation equivalent in value to the land taken. Compensation 
was also generally provided when government took temporary possession of private 
property, as in the compulsory lodging of troops. 
John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modem Takings Doctrine, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1283 (1996). Interestingly. Professor Hart's findings suggest that the 
government provided just compensation not only for permanent takings, but for temporary 
takings as well. First English, then, seems consistent with original practices and understanding. 
388. See Treanor, supra note 386, at 798-801 (arguing that the originalist understanding of 
the Takings Clause was that compensation was only mandated when the government physically 
took property). 
389. See Brauneis, supra note 8, at 64 (describing the addition of "taking or damages" 
provisions in the nineteenth century). 
390. See Leader v. Moxton, (1773) 95 Eng. Rep. 1157,1160 (K.B.) (Blackstone, J.) (ruling 
that the road commissioners had acted "arbitrarily and tyrannically" and awarding damages); see 
also Brauneis, supra note 8, at 86 (discussing Leader v. Moxton). 
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wealth and property rights of the colonies' elite arist~crats.~~'  Of course, this 
broader Marxist reading of the constitutional convention need not dictate the 
content of the Takings Clause, but it would help affirm that the Clause 
provided a monetary remedy to property owners whose land was taken by the 
government. Indeed, this understanding was apparently also dominant a 
century later when judges understood that "[tlhe fact that the just compensation 
clause itself referred to payment for the appropriation of property made the 
clause a special case even within the tradition of recognizing implied damages 
action."392 This reading would suggest that the Clause could trump sovereign 
immunity (though admittedly not state sovereign immunity, because the 
Takings Clause did not yet apply to the states) and that the Tucker Act's waiver 
of immunity is redundant for takings actions. Given the eighteenth century 
principle that "the burdens of the State should be borne equally by all, or in just 
proportion"393 and that Blackstone viewed property as an "absolute right,"394 it 
seems that takings cases constituted that rare exception where the 
government--or, in England, the king--could be sued. In fact, because just 
compensation clauses and statutes, by definition, address only instances when 
the sovereign effects a taking, to then require a plaintiff to surmount an 
independent sovereign immunity hurdle would be paradoxical. 
This argument, originally applicable only to federal takings, should also 
extend to the states after 1 8 6 8 , ~ ~ ~  TO be sure, federal courts under the 1875 
general federal question jurisdiction statute would not have considered a claim 
that property had been taken as an issue of federal law. Rather, federal courts 
entertained such suits only in diversity, where in that era they would be 
circumscribed by the remedies available under state law.396 As Professor 
391. See generally CHAW A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES (1913) (reviewing the Founders' economic interests and 
concluding, in part, that the Constitution was drafted with an eye towards protecting private 
wealth). Interestingly, the American emphasis on constitutional property rights is not unique; in 
European constitutions, for instance, property is the most widely recognized right, appearing in 
every European constitution. Terence Daintith, The Constitutional Protection of Economic 
Rights, 2 INT'L J .  CONST. L. 56,75 (2004). 
392. Brauneis, supra note 8, at 113. 
393. 3 E. DE VATEL, LAW OF NATIONS OR THE ~ C C P L E S  OF NATURAL AW 96 
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758), quoted in DANA & 
supra note 24, at 22. 
394. BLACKSTONE, supra note 380, at *134. 
395. Whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to incorporate the Bill of 
Rights is a matter of historical debate, but it is doctrinally clear today that many such rights, 
including takings, do apply against the states. 
396. Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constiturionally Compelled 
Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 151-52 (1997); see also Henry M .  Hart, Jr., The Relations 
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Woolhandler puts it, "a federal due process claim was not ordinarily presented 
when the allegation was that the state had collected taxes (or taken property) in 
violation of its own But because the Takings Clause was not 
incorporated against the states until 1 897,398 it makes sense that federal courts 
would have thought of takings claims against a state or state official as a state 
law action prior to that date. The doctrine's limitations prior to incorporation 
then should have little import on the application of the Clause today against the 
states. 
Another more serious counter is that takings clauses in the nineteenth 
century did not promise damages to successful plaintiffs but rather invalidated 
legislation effecting unlawful takings. According to Professor Brauneis, most 
antebellum state courts did not initially award just compensation under their 
state constitutions when determining whether an act amounted to a taking.399 
Rather, they "asked whether the act purportedly authorized by the legislation 
amounted to a taking, and if so, whether the legislation itself provided for just 
compensation."400 If not, the legislation was void: The legislature had 
exceeded its competence, which the Constitution limited to the authorization of 
"takings-with-just-compensation."40' However, as Brauneis explains, as a 
practical matter, the difference between antebellum interpretations of the 
Takings Clause and contemporary ones is not quite so stark. Though just 
compensation provisions were originally intended to limit legislative 
competence, they nevertheless operated within a complicated common law 
context that included damage remedies. A just compensation provision' s 
limitation on legislative competence, then, also limited the legislature's ability 
to abolish damage remedies. A legislature could only bar damages if it offered 
an alternative, constitutionally adequate remedy; monetary compensation was 
thus always part of the takings equation.m 
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954) (discussing the 
intersection of federal and state law). 
397. Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 157. 
398. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,238-39 
(1 897) (discussing the incorporation of the Takings Clause). 
399. Brauneis, supra note 8, at 60. To the extent that Brauneis's argument informs our 
understanding of takings jurisprudence, it is important to remember that his focus is primarily 
on takings clauses in state constitutions, which were amended frequently and, of course, are not 
legally binding on federal courts construing the federal Constitution. Nevertheless, these 
clauses were similar enough in language and purpose to the federal Takings Clause that his 
analysis remains instructive for our purposes. 
400. Id. at 60. 
401. Id. at 60-61. 
402. Id. at 6 1-62. 
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In fact, not only were damages possible, but state courts sometimes held 
individual officers in just compensation suits liable in money damages, 
notwithstanding potential immunity bars.403 The special nature of just 
compensation clauses is then highlighted by the fact that official immunity did 
not always extend to actions for violations of property rights, either because 
courts chose to make an explicit exception or because they refused to raise 
immunity issues in opinions considering such  action^.^ And though plaintiffs 
formulated these suits against the offending officers, as opposed to directly 
against the states, the fact that courts carved an exception for official 
immunities at least suggests the possibility that the states' sovereign immunity 
could also be pierced by just compensation clauses.405 This possibility was not 
always realized at once; some courts adopting a constitutional tort model of 
takings actions did not immediately entertain suits that previously would have 
been obstructed by sovereign But by the 1920s and 1930s, many 
states did take that next step, finding that just compensation provisions in fact 
abrogated state sovereign immunity.407 And today, many state courts, as noted 
403. See McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336,350 (1868) (Dillon, J., concurring) (finding that 
the plaintiff must be given a remedy despite the highway supervisor's lack of malice); Cubit v. 
O'Dett, 5 1 Mich. 347,351 (1883) (holding the overseer of highways and his assistant liable for 
the flooding of a landowner's property); see also Brauneis, supra note 8, at 82-83 (noting that 
general doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity suggested property owner could recover from public 
officer for injury to his property and that, after the Civil War, courts specifically held that those 
officials could not use sovereign immunity to shield themselves from just compensation 
litigation). 
404. Brauneis, supra note 8, at 136. 
405. Of course, the parallel is inexact. Unlike state sovereign immunity, which is rooted (at 
least somewhat) in the Constitution, official immunities are determined with reference to the 
"immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law." Irnbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. 409, 421 (1976). Courts thus frequently look at the common law of immunities as it 
existed when 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 was adopted to determine issues of official immunity. 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 309, at 495. Accordingly, courts' willingness to narrow official 
immunity does not necessarily bear on the scope of the Constitution's protection of state 
sovereign immunity. But the willingness to narrow official immunity is not wholly irrelevant 
either, for it demonstrates courts' willingness to seek appropriate remedies, notwithstanding 
doctrinal limitations. Moreover, to the extent that state sovereign immunity is itself deeply 
rooted in our common law heritage, see supra Part V.B. 1 (discussing case law on constitutional 
remedies, the historical backdrop of the Eleventh Amendment, and the common law roots of 
sovereign immunity), and infia Part V1.B (discussing Supreme Court's conflicting accounts of 
the original understanding of state sovereign immunity), the judiciary's treatment of common 
law official immunities is indicative of the inherent flexibility of these common law hurdles. 
406. Brauneis, supra note 8, at 136. 
407. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Adler, 194 P. 621,622 (Colo. 1920) (finding that the 
state's just compensation clause was "a consent by the state to the bringing of suits against a 
county"); see also Brauneis, supra note 8, at 13840 (describing the abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity). 
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above, view just compensation clauses as either abrogating state sovereign 
immunity or consenting to 
Supreme Court precedent hints at the same evolution but is less overt 
about it. Some cases, such as Schillinger v. United ~ t a t e s ~ ' ~  and Lynch v. 
United ~tates ,4 '~  suggest that the United States was immune from just 
compensation suits except to the extent the Tucker Act waived that 
immunity!" Given that the Court often treated the United States's sovereign 
immunity as symmetrical to the states' sovereign these cases 
would suggest that the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause does not 
automatically abrogate any immunity, whether federal or state. But precisely 
because of the Tucker Act, this issue rarely arose in the federal context. 
Schillinger was decided before the Court had determined that the Takings 
Clause itself created a cause of action, so it would be dangerous to assume that 
its treatment of sovereign immunity still applies!13 And although a cause of 
action is certainly analytically distinct from sovereign immunity, the application 
of sovereign immunity to a constitutional claim in an era when the Constitution 
did not give rise to such a claim caries less weight in an era when the 
Constitution does give rise to such a claim. 
408. See supra notes 318 & 320 and accompanying text (discussing state consent to suit). 
409. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894). 
410. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). 
41 1. See id. at 581-82 (stating that "[tlhe sovereign's immunity from suit exists whatever 
the character of the proceedings" and that "[tlhe character of the cause of action . . . may be 
important in determining (as under the Tucker Act) whether consent to sue was given"); 
Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 169-72 (finding that a just compensation claim was one "sounding in 
tort" and that, as Congress had not consented to such suits in the Court of Claims, the court had 
no jurisdiction to hear the case). 
412. See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670,686 n.21 (1982) 
(noting cases treating state sovereign immunity similarly to federal sovereign immunity); Great 
N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944) ("The principle of immunity from litigation 
assures the states and the nation from unanticipated intervention in the processes of 
government."); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620 (1912) (noting that because 
state offtcers can be sued for injunctive relief so too can federal officers); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 
U.S. 204,213 (1897) (stating that, in the sovereign immunity context, "the question whether a 
particular suit is one against the State, within the meaning of the Constitution, must depend 
upon the same principles that determine whether a particular suit is one against the United 
States"); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883) ("It may be 
accepted as a point of departure unquestioned, that neither a State nor the United States can be 
sued as defendant in any court in this country without their consent."); see also Seamon, supra 
note 8, at 1090-91 n.115 (discussing symmetry and relevant cases). 
413. See Seamon, supra note 8, at 1092 (noting that "the predicate for the Court's 
sovereign-immunity ruling in Schillinger is no longer valid"). 
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Even the Court's 1962 decision in Glidden Co. v. ~ d a n o k , ~ ~ ~  which 
affirmed the validity of sovereign immunity, does not speak to the contrary.415 
In sustaining the Article Ill status of Courts of Claims, Glidden echoed past 
decisions finding that the United States could not be sued without its 
consent.416 But by 1962, the federal government had long ago waived 
immunity in most contract claims and common legal claims in the 1887 Tucker 
A C ~ . ~ ' ~  Contrary to Justice Scalia's view, the Tucker Act then can be read not 
as evidence that Congress is required to abrogate sovereign immunity for 
constitutional claims like takings,41s but rather as the reason why the Supreme 
Court never overruled sovereign immunity doctrine. If the Tucker Act and 
similar legislation waived most federal sovereign immunity-and if individuals 
prior to Alden could circumvent state immunity by suing states in state court- 
then the Supreme Court would have had little opportunity and no reason to 
disrupt sovereign immunity principles, even if such principles were incorrect. 
It is also possible that courts declined to address the issue because they agreed 
with scholarship of the era arguing that sovereign immunity was obsolete.419 
As Professor Shimomura argues, "Thus, the sovereign immunity doctrine 
remained the federal rule in theory largely because immunity had become the 
decided exception in practice."420 Indeed, a similar point can be made about 
whether the Takings Clause trumps the Eleventh Amendment: Because the 
officer suit provided the most consistently reliable remedy, plaintiffs would 
have been foolish to bring direct just compensation claims against the state.421 
414. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (plurality opinion). 
415. Id. at 584-85. 
416. See id. 564-65 (invoking past decisions to conclude that the United States could not 
be sued without its consent). 
417. Id. at 565. 
418. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,613 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "no 
one would suggest that, if Congress had not passed the Tucker Act, the courts would be able to 
order disbursements from the Treasury to pay for property taken under lawful authority (and 
subsequently destroyed) without just compensation"). But see United States v. Mitchell, 463 
U.S. 206,216-17 (1983) (suggesting that the sovereign must waive immunity before plaintiff 
can seek compensation mandated by Constitution). 
419. See Brauneis, supra note 8, at 139 & n.348 (citing, for instance, articles by Edwin 
Borchard). 
420. Shimomura, supra note 177, at 691. The Court itself has hinted that the Tucker Act 
might not be necessary to abrogate federal sovereign immunity against takings claims, stating 
that the Just Compensation Clause is "self-executing . . . with respect to compensation." United 
States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253,257 (1980) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 6P. NICHOLS, 
EMINENT DOMAIN 5 25.41 (3d. rev. ed. 1972)). 
421. See Seamon, supra note 8, at 1083 (noting that "the Court never had a case that 
required it squarely to decide whether the Just Compensation Clause overrode the state's 
sovereign immunity"). 
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The fact that the ostensible immunity bar persisted after the Takings Clause was 
applied to the states, then, does not suggest that the Court would have been 
unwilling to find sovereign immunity automatically abrogated but rather that 
litigants naturally were content to proceed under the existing framework, which 
often provided adequate remedy.422 
More important, to the extent that we must take seriously doctrinal 
complications, the evolution of takings clauses indicates that ow constitutional 
history has been in constant flux. Though we must recognize that just 
compensation clauses did not always give rise to damages actions by their own 
force (even if they did sometimes require such a remedy be made available in 
the common law), that nineteenth century understanding need not bind us 
today. If anything, courts' eventual decisions to view takings clauses as giving 
rise to a cause of action for damages and, later, as waiving or abrogating state 
sovereign immunity demonstrates that judges needed this added flexibility to 
protect such clauses' core principles. From this perspective, the Bivens-type 
action arising out of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause is not so much an 
abandonment of our constitutional heritage but an attempt to vindicate the 
Constitution's original purpose.423 And although this approach might seem to 
ring with the shrill call of judicial activism, the clause's evolution suggests that 
it is in fact what courts have been doing for over a century-and-a-half. 
B. Original Understandings of State Sovereign Immunity 
The original understanding of state sovereign immunity is decidedly more 
controversial than that of takings. A majority of the Rehnquist Supreme Court 
believed that sovereign immunity was hard-wired into the original Constitution, 
but, as Justice Souter's dissents demonstrate, it is debatable whether this is the 
case and, even if it is, what that sovereign immunity included. Indeed, 
notwithstanding the Court's recent case law, there is strong evidence to suggest 
that state sovereign immunity, if it existed at all, applied only to diversity cases 
in which a citizen of one state sued the government of another state. The stakes 
- - - -  - -  - 
422. Prior to First English, the availability of the temporary regulatory taking suit would 
have been open to doubt, so  there would have been far fewer instances when plaintiffs sought 
damages in takings cases. And as the Court in First English obviously did not feel constrained 
by the absence of temporary takings in the past, one might expect similar agnosticism on the 
question of direct just compensation suits against the states. 
423. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 'Rx. L. REV. 1165 (1993) 
(arguing that readings of the Constitution, whether changed or consistent, standing alone are not 
sufficient to establish fidelity or infidelity, rather the practice of interpretation, the translation of 
the Constitution, permits fidelity when context changes constitutional meaning). 
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in this debate are high. In arguing that "sovereign immunity derives not from 
the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution 
itself,"424 the Court is using historical arguments to extend state sovereign 
immunity beyond the limited text of the Eleventh Amendment. However, as 
Justice Souter counters, Justice Kennedy's arguments might well rest on faulty 
assumptions.425 
The Court's originalism argument contains two parts, what might be called 
a common law and a natural law argument.426 The first contention is that 
sovereign immunity was an integral part of the English common law inherited 
by the Constitution and that the founding generation intended to preserve that 
immunity.427 The Court argues that the Founders' silence on the issue 
"suggests the sovereign's right to assert immunity from suit in its own courts 
was a principle so well established that no one conceived it would be altered by 
the new ~ o n s t i t u t i o n . " ~ ~ ~  
The Court's common law argument is misleading in two fundamental 
ways. First, it fails to acknowledge the extent to which sovereign immunity 
was a controversial topic even in the 1780s. The Court might be right that a 
majority of the Constitution's framers and ratifiers believed that such immunity 
was, and should be, included in the new governmental structure, but it seems 
undoubtedly wrong that the principle was uncontroversial, at least as applied to 
federal question cases. The states themselves, at the time of the Constitutional 
Convention, had different sovereign immunity practices, but none included that 
immunity in their constitutional declarations of the inalienable and natural 
rights of statehood.429 Indeed, to the extent that sovereign immunity was an 
issue, some of the Founders seemed to assume it would apply only in diversity 
cases. In the Pennsylvania ratification debate, for instance, James Wilson 
424. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,728 (1999). 
425. Id. at 761 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's positions concerning the 
Tenth Amendment, historical inherent sovereign immunity, and American federalism prompt a 
suspicion of error). 
426. See id. at 765-66 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining how common law conception 
of sovereign immunity differed from natural law conception); Young, supra note 129, at 1667- 
70 (separating out common law and natural law arguments and arguing that majority jumbles 
the two together). 
427. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 741 (noting that the Constitution's silence on the issue 
evidences that no one, even those opposed to the Constitution, considered that the document 
would abolish such immunity); see also Hill, supra note 314, at 497 (arguing that when 
Constitution was adopted, "it was generally assumed that the states were protected by sovereign 
immunity if sued in their own courts" and that some Founders expected this immunity would 
extend to federal court). 
428. Alden, 527 U.S. at 741. 
429. Id. at 772 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing the Pennsylvania Constitution). 
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stated that federal judges could force states to pay back debt owed to English 
merchants, thus implying that the states' immunity would apply in only some 
cases.430 
The common law argument is also misleading because the supposedly 
sovereign states had in fact possessed their sovereignty for a very short time. 
As Justice Souter points out in his Alden dissent, "the American Colonies did 
not enjoy sovereign immunity, that being a privilege understood in English law 
to be reserved for the Crown alone."431 Thus, as Justice Story has argued, 
"antecedent to the Declaration of Independence, none of the colonies were, or 
pretended to be, sovereign states."432 Given that American states gained their 
sovereignty so shortly before the ratification of the Constitution, the majority's 
argument that the states' sovereignty was a "well-established" principle seems 
to assume that American law would blindly incorporate English law without 
adapting it to the new  circumstance^.^^^ 
This was not the case. The framers, in fact, were generally averse to the 
federal reception of common law and drew from a variety of "reception" 
doctrines to detennine exactly how the English common law should and should 
not be included in American The majority's finding of common law 
sovereign immunity principles, then, should only be the first step of the 
analysis. Even if the Court is right that those principles extended to federal 
question suits-itself a controversial proposition-it has been sloppy in not 
examining more closely just how the framers in the 1780s thought about 
receiving English common law. Evidence suggests, in fact, that the framers 
rejected the idea of incorporating the common law into the Constitution 
because that incorporation would render it immune from legislative 
alterati01-1.~~~ Moreover, anti-English hostility was such that many states 
adopted only so much common law as they thought necessary for their local 
430. Seminole Tribe of Ha. v. Florida, 5 17 U.S. 44, 105 n.4 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(quoting 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 490 (2d ed. 1836)); see also 
Jackson, supra note 8, at 55 (demonstrating that debates about sovereign immunity at time of 
founding revolved around diversity cases, not federal question cases). 
431. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,764 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
432. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE C O N S ~ O N  5 207, at 149 (5th ed. 1891), 
quoted in Alden, 527 U.S. at 764 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
433. See Young, supra note 129, at 1666 11.298 (arguing that the "short-lived nature of 
preconstitutional state sovereignty in America suggests caution in importing English sovereignty 
concepts to the American Constitution, as the ways in which those concepts would have to be 
adapted to the new American context had not had much time to settle out by 1789"). 
434. See id. at 1647 11.235 (noting the "reception" doctrines which questioned "how to treat 
common law doctrines imported from the mother country"). 
435. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 104-05 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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conditions.436 As for the federal Constitution, it explicitly referenced a few 
concepts from English common law, such as habeas and the distinction 
between law and equity, thus reflecting, in Justice Souter's words, "widespread 
agreement that ratification would not itself entail a general reception of the 
common law of ~ n ~ l a n d . " ~ ~ ~  Keeping this in mind, it would seem that the 
current Court has assumed a more whole-hearted embrace of the common law 
principle than in fact occurred. To the extent that the states did believe in 
sovereign immunity, it appears not to have been the "indefeasible" sort 
embraced by the Court today.438 And, even if the Court accurately 
characterized 1780s common law, Congress should be able to amend it by 
statute, unlike the common law that was explicitly included in the Constitution, 
such as the right to a jury trial. 
Interestingly, even in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the English justifications for sovereign immunity did not 
translate well into the American context. The Court in United States v. Lee 
noted that the king of England was not suable "in the courts of that country, 
except where his consent had been given," but continued that "it is a matter of 
great uncertainty whether prior to that time he was not suable in his own courts 
and in his kingly character as other persons were."439 The Court went on to 
explain that the petition of right was established "as the appropriate manner of 
seeking relief where the ascertainment of the parties' rights required a suit 
against the King" and "has been as efficient in securing the rights of suitors 
against the crown in all cases appropriate to judicial proceedings, as that which 
the law affords to the subjects of the King in legal controversies among 
themselves. "'" Though the petition of right might be construed as the 
monarch's consent to suit, Lee recognizes that even in the English judicial 
system, "the rights of suitors against the crown" were secured.#l 
436. Id. at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
437. Id. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Letter from John Marshall to St. George 
Tucker (Nov. 27,1800), reprinted in Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 
133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1326 app. A (1985) ("I do not believe one man can be found" who 
maintains "that the common law of England has . . . been adopted as the common law of 
America by the Constitution of the United States."), quoted in Seminole Tribe of Ha. v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 138 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
438. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,770 n.9 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that 
the spectrum of state thought and practice allows for sovereign immunity but not to the extent 
adopted by the Court). 
439. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196.205 (1882). 
440. Id. 
441. Id. 
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The other primary originalist argument in defense of sovereign immunity 
more resembles natural law. Under this reading, law exists by the 
sovereign's good graces, so it is paradoxical to let mere subjects use that law 
as a sword against the sovereign without its consent. However, as Justice 
Souter points out, that theory of sovereign immunity can only be asserted in 
cases where it was the sovereign's own law that was sued upon.&* In 
Professor Young's words, "there is no warrant in a system of dual 
sovereignty for state sovereign immunity v i s -h i s  a claim based on federal 
law. M443 
Souter's argument is a clever one-and it might well be right-but one 
important potential rejoinder is that the states ratified the Constitution, so 
federal law comes from the states in a sense. Federal law, then, is not wholly 
outside the states' purview, because it needed the states to approve it before 
that law took effect. This counter is not insignificant, but it ignores the very 
nature of our federal system. In ratifying the Constitution-and especially in 
ratifying the Fourteenth ~mendment~- the  states accepted a federal system 
in which their sovereignty was no longer absolute. 
A final hole in the Court's originalist argument lies in Chisholm v. 
~ e o r ~ i a ~ ~ ~  and the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment. To be sure, 
opponents of sovereign immunity today cannot rely much on Chisholm 
because it was rejected so quickly by constitutional amendment. But what is 
crucial-and what is extraordinary for the Court to ignore-is that the 
Eleventh Amendment reaction against Chisholm expressly limited state 
sovereign immunity to suits "against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another Far from supporting the Court's common law argument, 
the Eleventh Amendment's language instead strongly suggests the country 
decided to constitutionalize only a limited form of sovereign immunity. 
While legal language does not always mean what it says, it creates a 
presumption of meaning. The Court's originalist arguments do not overcome 
that presumption and thus rest on shaky footing for federal question cases 
and, even more so, takings cases. 
442. Alden, 527 U.S. at 76347 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
443. Young, supra note 129. at 167 1.  
444. See supra Part V.C (discussing a theory of automatic abrogation based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of the Takings Clause). 
445. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
446. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
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C. The Evolution of Actions Against the Government and the Rise 
of the Judiciary 
Because the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Takings Clause, we 
must also consider the background understanding of constitutional remedies at 
the time of its ratification. I have already argued that the Constitution's 
structure following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment supports my 
theory of automatic abrogation. That structural argument should, however, also 
be viewed in light of the history surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The ratification debates lend little insight into the framers' views on 
constitutional remedies.*' Not surprisingly, the technicalities of constitutional 
litigation were far from the center of the Reconstruction Congress's debates, 
which dwelt more on issues such as pardons,448 the fran~hise,"~ and 
frustration with President ~ohnson.~'' And although the structure of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was certainly central to these debates, the framers' 
focus was racial equality under the law in the wake of the abolition:52 not the 
particulars of incorporation. Indeed, though today accepted as a constitutional 
given, it is still a matter of debate whether incorporation was intended by the 
1866 
Given that there is no smoking gun in the legislative historgS4 we must 
try to deduce the framers' probable understanding. This understanding was 
likely based on some dominant features of mid-nineteenth century practices: 
447. See generally CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2433-2545 (1866) (House 
debates); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2763-3042 (1866) (Senate debates); CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3144-49 (1866) (House debates) [hereinafter CONG. GLOBE]; 
Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. 
REV. 1 (1955) (examining the legislative history of Fourteenth Amendment in light of Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
448. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2462-64 (House debates). 
449. See, e.g., id. at 2466-70 (House debates). 
450. See, e.g., id. at 2474-78 (House debates). 
451. See, e.g., id. at 2493 (Senate debates). 
452. See, e.g., id. at 3037 (Senate debates). 
453. See NATHAN NEWMAN & J.J. GASS, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE FORGOTIEN 
HISTORY OF THE THIRTEENTH, FOURTEENTH, AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS 10-12 (2004) 
(arguing that constitutional law treatises of the era read the amendment as not only applying but 
also enforcing the Bill of Rights against the states). 
454. See John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action 
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 
C O L ~ .  L. REV. 1413, 1458 (1975) ("There is no discussion in the debates of the ability of 
federal courts to entertain damage actions against state governments under the fourteenth 
amendment without congressional authorization."). 
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(1) officer suits based on claims of private right were the predominant form of 
relief against unconstitutional action; (2) the Constitution's principal effect was 
to nullify statutes, so that it was raised defensively as a shield, not offensively 
as a sword; and, accordingly, (3) most constitutional litigation involved the 
validity of statutes rather than the legitimacy of nonlegislative governmental 
 action^.^" Just as the Takings Clause, in particular, was seen as creating a 
legislative disability rather than a remedial duty, so too were courts reluctant to 
view constitutional rights as bestowing upon the litigant a broad range of 
potential remedies. 
The remedies available in most suits were therefore limited by preexisting 
forms of action at common law. The Supreme Court tended to feel bound by 
those common law limitations and therefore respected the state law out of 
which its cases emerged. Thus, where states provided no remedy against 
themselves, the Court typically did not compel an unwilling state court to 
provide remedies.456 Indeed, the officer suit was limited to actions for 
injunctive relief and damages out of the officer's own pocket; it was not a 
means of accessing the state treasury.457 In short, the Court would not permit 
the officer suit to "oust" the political power of its "jurisdiction" and set the 
judiciary "in its place."458 
With this backdrop, the drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment (or the 
informed member of the ratifying public) might well have found excessive any 
implied damages constitutional remedy, even in the Takings Clause. 
Constitutional rights might have been thought of as "self-executing," in the 
sense that they could be raised defensively against the state-for example, in a 
criminal prosecution or in an officer suit-but that did not mean that they 
455. Meltzer, supra note 168, at 2551; see also Pfander, supra note 219, at 966 (noting 
that Marshall Court, faced with limited jurisdiction over claims against government, relied 
extensively upon officer suits to secure government accountability). 
456. Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 151-52; see also Henry M .  Hart, The Relations 
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954) ("The general rule, 
bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that 
federal law takes the state court as it finds them."). As a result, state assertions of sovereign 
immunity in state court were historically respected. Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 152. 
Interestingly, this history, though inconsistent with the text of the Eleventh Amendment, 
supports the Supreme Court's decision in Alden. 
457. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (stating that "a suit by private 
parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment"); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 727-28 (1883) 
(holding that the Supreme Court is not "authorizing the courts, when a State cannot be sued, to 
set up its jurisdiction over the officers in charge of the public moneys, so as to control them as 
against the political power in their administration of the finances of the State"). 
458. Jumel, 107 U.S. at 727-28. 
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automatically abrogated any sovereign immunity or created a monetary remedy. 
Additional remedies, such as damages, would not have been forever barred but 
would have required additional legislation by Congress under Section 5.459 
A competing view contends that the debates make clear that both the 
drafters and opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment assumed that federal 
courts would have an inherent power to enjoin state activities failing to conform 
to the amendment.460 Of course, if this is the case, it would still not necessarily 
speak directly to sovereign immunity issues because injunctive relief is 
available anyway.46' However, the ratification debates certainly do not 
foreclose the federal courts' power to hear damage actions against the states;462 
to the contrary, they suggest a general willingness to allow federal courts to 
force compliance with the Constitution and, similarly, to ignore the Eleventh 
Amendment. Specifically, it was understood that Section 1 of the amendment 
empowered courts to enforce Article IV's Comity Clause against the states, 
notwithstanding any potential Eleventh Amendment barriers.463 Moreover, the 
Amendment's supporters several times decried federal courts' prior inability to 
protect individual rights against state incursions;464 only a self-executing 
Fourteenth Amendment that authorized damages actions could fully resolve 
that concern. Indeed, even the Fourteenth Amendment's opponents understood 
that if it were ratified it would subject state action to federal court review.465 
As Professor Meltzer argues, we must remember that the framers of the 
original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment were 
practical men seeking to create a workable government and to protect 
459. Of course, because these legal technicalities were far from the forefront of the framers' 
mind, these assumptions carry less weight than they might were they articulated clearly during 
the congressional debates. 
460. Nowak. supra note 454, at 1455. 
461. Though Exparfe Young was not decided until 1908, the officer suit was the dominant 
mode of adjudicating takings claims in the mid-nineteenth century. See generally Brauneis, 
supra note 8 (discussing the extension of the scope of just compensation protection). The 
ofticer suit, as an end run around sovereign immunity, was then nothing novel. Exparre Young 
was novel in the sense that it permitted the officer suit for a violation of federal, rather than 
state, law and for a constitutional, rather than a common law, violation. Meltzer, supra note 
168, at 2556. Given the deep roots of the officer suit, however, it is best seen as adapting the 
available remedies and cementing them in Supreme Court precedent. 
462. Nowak, supra note 454, at 1458. 
463. Id. at 1456 n.208. 
464. Id. at 1455. 
465. Id. at 1457; see also CONG. GLOBE. supra note 447. at 1064-65 (discussing the 
powers Congress and the Federal Courts may arrogate to themselves if the Fourteenth 
Amendment is ratified). 
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individual liberties.466 Given that the Constitution lays out a basic structure but 
leaves the particulars to be realized through experience?67 it is not surprising 
that the methods of constitutional enforcement were left unspecified in both 
1791 and 1 8 6 6 . ~ ~ ~  So, though the officer suit began as the predominant mode 
of constitutional enforcement, when this and other traditional remedies began to 
fall short, "federal courts strained, even in the years shortly after ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, to reformulate them to ensure that relief was not 
denied, even when doing so departed from pre-existing state or general law 
rules."469 In Belknap v.  child:^' for instance, the Court found that, though 
injunctive relief was inappropriate in a patent infringement suit, damages were 
still potentially available on remand. The Court found that "no ground for 
equitable relief, by injunction, by account of profits, or otherwise, [had been] 
shown, [so] the proper remedy of the plaintiff against the defendants for such 
damages is by action at law."471 
Indeed, consistent with this surprisingly flexible approach to remedies, the 
early Court was quite candid about the significance of the officer suit fiction; 
Chief Justice Marshall admitted in Osbom v. United States ~ a n k ~ ' ~  that the 
officer action runs "substantially, though not in form, against the 
Accordingly, the Court was willing to vindicate individual rights, even if doing 
so interfered with the workings of government. In the Virginia Coupon 
the Court reinstated the state legislature's repeal of mandamus and 
trespass actions against revenue officers after the legislature had effectively 
abrogated the mandamus remedy so that plaintiffs would only be entitled to the 
remedy of a refund.475 Specifically, the Court held in Poindexter v. 
466. Meltzer, supra note 168, at 2555. 
467. E.g., FEDERALIST NO. 37 (Madison), supra note 218, at 220-27. 
468. Meltzer, supra note 168, at 2555. 
469. Id.; see also Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 91-1 11 (discussing ways in which 
federal courts, in diversity actions raising constitutional claims, departed from state law so as to 
permit effective remediation). 
470. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896). 
47 1. Id. at 26. But see id. at 18 (stating that "no injunction can be issued against officers of 
a State, to restrain or control the use of property already in the possession of the State, or money 
in its treasury when the suit is commenced"). 
472. Osbornv.U.S.Bank,22U.S.(9Wheat.)738(1824). 
473. Id. at 846. 
474. The Virginia Coupon Cases, 1 14 U.S. 269 (1884). 
475. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 306 (1884) (holding that the federal 
legislation "in all its parts, as to creditors affected by it and not consenting to it, must be 
pronounced null and void"); see also Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 120, 125 (discussing the 
Supreme Court's decision to direct "the state court to make available to the taxpayer the trespass 
remedy against the officer"). 
586 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493 (2006) 
 ree en how^^^ that the state could not repeal the previously available tort action 
against the AS PrOfessor Woolhandler argues, the Court thus 
suggested that a common law remedy for trespass was constitutionally 
compelled.478 In this light, the Court's tax refund cases, beginning with Ward 
v. Love in 1920, might be understood as other examples of the Court 
reaching beyond traditionally available constitutional remedies to ensure that 
relief against an encroaching government would not be denied. So too might 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. 0  onn nor,^^^ in which the Court held 
that a tax payment had been under duress and that a refund action was therefore 
available.48' These departures still issued a remedy against the officer, as 
opposed to the government itself, but they suggest a greater judicial flexibility 
than one might initially assume. 
United States v. Lee articulates even more forcefully the notion that legal 
technicalities like sovereign immunity must not interfere with the protection of 
rights.482 There the Court argued, in a takings case, that judicial tribunals were 
the sole protectors for the safety of citizens whose rights had been invaded by 
the government.483 This was especially so in the property context: 
When [the citizen], in one of the courts of competent jurisdiction, has 
established his right to property, there is no reason why deference to any 
person, natural or artificial, not even the United States, should prevent him 
from using the means which the law gives him for the protection and 
enforcement of that right.4s4 
And in General Oil Co. v.  rain?*^ the Court suggested that if the Eleventh 
Amendment barred a suit in federal court, then relief must be available through 
the state courts because a contrary rule would impermissibly close both federal 
476. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884). 
477. Id. at 302-03. 
478. Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 121. For a very interesting discussion of the 
remedies available in state and federal courts for both diversity and federal question cases, see 
generally id. 
479. Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); see also supra Part III.A.2 (discussing due 
process tax refund cases). 
480. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912). 
48 1. Id. at 286-87; see also Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 133-38 (discussing remedies 
made available in various tax cases). 
482. See supra text accompanying notes 185, 200, 232-50, 43940 (discussing the 
implications of United States v. Lee). 
483. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,219-20 (1882); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 232-238 (discussing the sovereign immunity argument asserted in United States v. Lee). 
484. Lee, 106 U.S. at 20849. 
485. Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 2 1 1 (1908). 
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and state courts to a constitutional claim.4" More recently, it has asserted that 
"it is . . . well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal 
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may 
use any available remedy to make good the wrong done."487 
As this brief discussion illustrates, even though the historical practice of 
limited constitutional remedies is real, so too is there history, even in the 
nineteenth century, of a strong, if not unyielding, presumption that there should 
be individually effective remedies for constitutional violations.488 Moreover, 
there has been "a more general, but also more unyielding, structural principle 
that constitutional remedies must be adequate to keep government generally 
within the bounds of law."489 Of course, these presumptions can give way to 
practical imperatives, but the historical picture is incomplete without 
recognizing courts' general goals of protecting individual rights and limiting 
governmental overreaching. In this way, a Court that has approached immunity 
issues primarily with a formalist eye4w has sometimes permitted the twin 
pragmatic necessities-protecting individual rights and guarding against 
governmental overreaching-to override rigid doctrinal thinking. 
One must concede that the Court's willingness to craft new remedies had 
its limits and that, in many (though not all) instances, the officer suit was itself 
the newly created remedy. To this extent, it more frequently represented the 
ceiling rather than the floor of permissible remedies. However, even if the 
486. See id. at 226 (discussing the possibility that no court would be available to hear suits 
against state officers). The Crain Court noted that: 
If a suit against state officers is precluded in the national courts by the 1 lth 
Amendment to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a State to its courts, as it 
is contended in the case at bar that it may be, without power of review by this court, 
it must be evident that an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement of many 
provisions of the Constitution; and the Fourteenth Amendment, which is directed at 
state action, could be nullified as to much of its operation. 
Id. Curiously, Alden invokes Crain for the proposition that where Ex pane Young allows a 
federal court action against a state official to enjoin a constitutional violation, a state court must 
permit the same remedy. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 74748  (1999) ("[Slovereign 
immunity bars relief against States and their officers in both state and federal courts, and . . . 
certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers must therefore be permitted 
if the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land."); see also supra Part V.B.2 
(discussing whether state sovereign immunity applies symmetrically in state and federal court). 
487. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,684 (1946); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Officers, 403 U.S. 388,396 (1971) (quoting Bell). 
488. Meltzer. supra note 168. at 2559. 
489. Id. 
490. See Michael E. Solirnine, Formalism, Pragmatism, and the Conservative Critique of 
the Eleventh Amendment, 101 MICH.  L. REV. 1463, 1479 (2003) (describing Eleventh 
Amendment case law as highly formalist). 
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more persuasive historical argument is that officer suits were the predominant 
(and, arguably, lone) form of relief against unconstitutional action in the rnid- 
nineteenth c e n t ~ r ~ , 4 ~ '  the dominance of that practice should be less persuasive 
to a constitutional adjudicator today given the historical context. Significantly, 
our system of claims against the government shifted from a legislative to a 
judicial model in the eighty years following the Civil War. That shift radically 
altered the means by which individuals sought redress from a government that 
had violated their rights, and the tradition of the officer suit cannot be properly 
assimilated into our current constitutional understanding without accounting for 
the nature of that shift. 
Though the judiciary was not wholly absent from the Founders' minds and 
though some of our early writings recognized that the judiciary would play a 
crucial role in protecting people from government's the "legislative 
model" of claims determination was the dominant one at the founding.493 
Courts in fact recognized that claims against the government were the province 
of the legislature, not the judiciary. We are used to thinking of the Judiciary 
Act as Congress's first major action in determining how the young country 
would settle claims, but even earlier, the First Congress, in 1789, invested the 
Treasury Department with the authority to review claims against the 
government.494 Interestingly, even at the time, there were murmurs that this 
function perhaps belonged best in the judiciary; James Madison himself 
thought this function "part[ook] of a Judiciary quality,"495 and sought to pennit 
a right to review in the Supreme Court to insure impartiality.496 Congress 
rejected the idea, "preferring to maintain control over claims without judicial 
interferen~e."~~' This little episode and, indeed, the subsequent story of 
491. See, e.g., John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2513,2521 (1998) (noting that officer suits were the predominant form 
of relief for unconstitutional acts but, also, arguing that Section 1 of Fourteenth Amendment 
nullifies state law conflicting with constitutional provisions but does not give rise to affirmative 
remedy such as injunction or damages); see also Meltzer, supra note 168, at 2549-65 
(discussing Harrison's thesis). 
492. See supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text (discussing the framers' expectations 
for the judicial system). 
493. Shimomura, supra note 177, at 637; see also Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional 
Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 11 1 HARV. L. REV. 
1381, 1446 (1998) (arguing that in early eighteenth century, consensus was that the legislature 
was the appropriate authority to determine obligations of government). 
494. Shimomura, supra note 177, at 637. 
495. 1 ANNAIS OF CONG. 61 1-14 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
496. Shimomura, supra note 177, at 638. 
497. Id. 
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Chisholm and the adoption of the Eleventh ~rnendrnent~ '~ demonstrate that 
these tensions have been with us since the beginning. 
For decades, Congress's right to exercise this power was 
~ncontroversial.~~~ As Professor Shimomura argues, given the judiciary's 
silence, this legislative function seems better understood as an extension from 
colonial history than a deduction of logic from the ~ o n s t i t u t i o n . ~ ~ ~  Its historical 
roots, however, could not quell brewing dissatisfaction with the system. By the 
Civil War era, Congress had recognized that it simply could not keep up with 
the ever-increasing number of claims. The model that thus developed was a 
hybrid, in which Congress and the federal judiciary shared responsibility for 
hearing and determining claims against the federal government.50' This model 
lasted until about World War I, when it too began to break down.502 By World 
War 11, the hybrid model itself was all but dead, and Congress turned over to 
the Article ID judiciary responsibility over most legal claims against the United 
Thus, since the Supreme Court's decision in ~ l i d & n  Co. v. Zdanok, 
the Court of Claims's status as an Article El court has been unchallenged.504 
The triumph of the ')udicial model" of claims determination505 
demonstrates that our modern government structure recognizes courts' 
preeminent role in vindicating individuals' legal claims against the government. 
To be sure, there is no straight linear progression to be traced in which the 
Court consistently makes available more remedies each generation. But nor is 
the Brennan Court anomalous in creatively using its remedial powers to 
vindicate constitutional rights that might otherwise go unprotected. Of course, 
even Glidden itself recognized that the Court of Claims's jurisdiction could not 
waive sovereign immunity by its own f~ rce .~"  But the judiciary's place in 
-- 
498. C$ Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409.409-10 (1792) (discussing the fact that the 
Supreme Court did not need to rule on the Hayburn Case because the legislature provided 
another method of relief). 
499. See, e.g., Emerson v. Hall, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 409, 413-14 (1839) (holding that 
Congress has the power to enact a statute providing for payment of money directly to heirs of 
claimants). 
500. Shimomura, supra note 177, at 646. 
501. Id. at 670. 
502. Id. at 678. See, e.g. ,  Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 581 (1933) 
(determining that salaries of Court of Claims judges were permissible because the Court of 
Claims was an Article I court and therefore not protected by Article ID salary protection). 
503. Shimomura, supra note 177, at 682. 
504. See supra text accompanying notes 414-20 (discussing sovereign immunity and the 
Court of Claims). 
505. See Shimomura, supra note 177, at 687-90 (discussing "'A Judicial Model' of Article 
In"). 
506. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,564 (1962) (plurality opinion) (reiterating 
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settling claims against the government is now firmly established, and the 
Supreme Court has recognized Article III as a basis for all claims against the 
government.507 Moreover, the Court has now recognized, in limited 
circumstances, that sovereign immunity is not an impenetrable barrier to suits 
against the government for money.508 
The story of this evolution is even more significant for interpretive 
purposes than the original practice it superseded. In Federalist No. 37, 
Madison recognized that it would take time to elucidate the Constitution's 
meaning. As he explained, "[all1 new laws, though penned with the greatest 
technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are 
considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meanings can be 
liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and 
 adjudication^."'^ Jefferson voiced similar sentiments, writing to Madison that 
"the earth belongs in usufruct to the living; that the dead have neither powers 
nor rights over The Founders, then, seem not to have envisioned a 
Constitution etched in stone but rather expected constitutional meaning to adapt 
after more considered "discussions and  adjudication^."^" The triumph of the 
judicial model demonstrates the gradual recognition that courts are better suited 
than legislatures to adjudicate individual legal claims against the government. 
that a government may not be sued without its consent). 
507. See id. (noting that Article III's extension of authority over controversies to which the 
United States is a party does not depend on whether the United States is a plaintiff or 
defendant). 
508. See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1994) (noting that sovereign immunity 
does not completely bar state tax refund claims); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic 
Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18,27 (1990) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment does not 
bar federal jurisdiction "to review issues of federal law in suits brought against states in state 
court"); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987) (stating that the Fifth Amendment "dictates a remedy" for takings 
despite principles of sovereign immunity); see also Pfander, supra note 219, at 972 ("[Wlhere 
the Constitution requires the government. . . to make victims . . . of constitutional violations 
whole, remedial obligations apply whether or not the government has adopted an effective 
waiver of sovereign immunity."). Of course, it would be circular to cite the First English 
footnote for the proposition that it is correct. But to the extent historical practice commands 
attention, First English, among other cases, suggests a general willingness on the part of the 
Court to apply appropriate remedies, even in the face of a potential sovereign immunity hurdle. 
509. FEDERALIST NO. 37, (James Madison), supra note 218, at 226. 
510. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6,1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1 16 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1895) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted); 
see also ELY, supra note 179, at 11 (noting that Jefferson suggested the Constitution naturally 
expire every nineteen years). 
51 1. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885,948 (1985) (arguing that framers did not think originalism appropriate as an 
interpretive strategy for the Constitution). 
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Of course, none of this history definitively settles our larger question about 
the interaction of the Takings Clause and state sovereign immunity. But the 
triumph of the judicial model of claim adjudication coupled with Federalist No. 
37's evolutionary vision of constitutional interpretation undermines the vigor of 
originalist arguments insisting that the king cannot be sued. It similarly calls 
into question the applicability of the nineteenth century assumption that an 
individual could never sue the government for damages without its consent so 
that the officer suit was the only means of obtaining redress for constitutional 
violations. This assumption was, of course, dominant then, but the limits of 
that assumption were unlikely to be questioned given the legislature's role in 
claims adjudication. Though sovereign immunity was-and still is-part of 
our legal fabric, the historical argument in its favor is weakened by the fact that 
nineteenth century courts rarely heard legal claims against the government. 
Given that the whole model for adjudicating these claims has radically 
changed over the past two hundred years, the historical roots of sovereign 
immunity-themselves controversial, as Justice Souter and others have pointed 
out+arry less persuasive force.'12 As noted above, original understanding 
sometimes ought to be "translated" into a modem context.513 Such a translation 
here should recognize that the very notion of immunity-and the corresponding 
notion that the officer suit frequently constituted the lone means of appropriate 
relief-became dominant in an era when it was feasible for the legislature to 
consider all claims for damages in private bills. Because that is no longer 
feasible, Congress has delegated that responsibility to the courts. Of course, the 
history of permissible remedies should be part of our understanding, but in 
translating the history to the contemporary setting, we should not limit 
ourselves to a remedy that was predominant before our cause of action even 
existed. Put differently, if the entire method for seeking redress for a taking has 
changed-and if the historical trend has generally favored the Marbury 
principle-then surely sovereign immunity too plays a different role in the 
system. 
To this extent, a contemporary translation of historical practices is a way 
to reconcile competing stories, not a means of subverting consistent historical 
practice. The limited remedy of the officer suit on the one hand, and the 
argument that the judiciary has generally sought to impose remedies that will 
5 12. See Suzanna Sheny, The Eleventh Amendment Md Stare Decisis: Overruling Hans v. 
Louisiana. 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1260, 1262 (1990) (arguing that legal circumstances have 
changed so much since 1890 that adherence to Hans' strict mle of sovereign immunity under 
the Eleventh Amendment is not justified). 
5 13. See Lessig, supra note 423, at 1263-68 (arguing that "translationu--as Lessig uses the 
term-"accommodate[s] changes in context so as to preserve meaning across contexts"). 
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vindicate important rights on the other, represent competing notions of courts' 
role in our constitutional system. History, from this perspective, cannot 
vindicate one theory over the other; rather it reflects different ages' efforts to 
reconcile these competing tensions. Notwithstanding the originalists' 
insistence, history does not settle this score decisively in favor of the Eleventh 
Amendment. If anything, its complexities and ambiguities demonstrate not 
only the loose historical foundation upon which the Court's Eleventh 
Amendment theory rests, but also the danger of applying that theory to the 
instant problem. 
VII. Conclusion 
It is time to tally score. On textualism, takings is a clear winner over state 
sovereign immunity. While I must concede that the Takings Clause does not 
specifically mention temporary takings, First English and its progeny are 
earnest interpretations of the Just Compensation Clause. Without protection for 
temporary takings, it would be too easy for government to "borrow" property 
and return it eventually without offering any compensation. Temporary takings 
doctrine, therefore, closes a loophole and helps the Takings Clause operate. By 
way of contrast, state sovereign immunity doctrine is decidedly-and 
unabashedly-unmoored from the text of the Eleventh Amendment. Takings 
might not rout state sovereign immunity on textualism, but the victory is sound. 
Structural arguments are more complicated, and more normatively based, 
but again the Takings Clause emerges victorious. A "just compensation 
exception" to Eleventh Amendment doctrine would carve but a small piece out 
of current state sovereign immunity law, leaving the remainder, including the 
Seminole Tribe line of abrogation cases, unimpeded. The contrary holding 
would leave the property owner mostly unprotected against temporary takings 
by the state. And though we must be careful not to delegate too much power to 
the courts, the promise that rights be protected by remedies coupled with the 
Fourteenth Amendment suggests that we should not take lightly explicit 
constitutional protections and remedies. 
Policy and historical considerations are closer calls. As noted above, an 
Eleventh Amendment bar to takings suits against the states would not be a 
policy disaster, though it poses yet another hurdle for the takings plaintiff.514 
But automatic abrogation also would not be a disaster. The policy arguments, 
then, seem mostly equivocal, and as we shall see in a moment, given the 
5 14. See supra Part V.B.3 (discussing alternative remedies). 
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abstractness and subjectivity of the inquiry, they ought not play too important a 
role.'15 
As for history, given the sparse material on the origins of the Takings 
Clause and the controversy over the scope of the Eleventh Amendment in 
relation to Chisholm, it is hard to rely with confidence on original intent. 
Nineteenth century practices, to be fair, tended to favor sovereign immunity, 
but history is never static, so these understandings changed. Takings clauses 
started to be used as causes of action; courts, rather than legislatures, began to 
hear claims against the government and became more concerned with 
protecting the individual from government encroachment. Though novel, in 
ways these developments seem more faithful to original understanding. Given 
these complications, it is easy to see why scholars and judges cannot agree 
either on the content of these histories or on their relevance. 
The question posed to the historical inquiries might well be asked of all 
the methodologies: Exactly how are we to reconcile a great deal of complicated 
and conflicting information? If text, structure, and "evolutionist" history weigh 
in favor of takings and originalist history weighs (albeit slightly) in favor of 
sovereign immunity, what is the constitutional jurist to do? 
In American jurisprudence over the past few decades, it has been common 
to sidestep doctrinal conflicts and make potentially competing doctrines fit with 
one another. These cases have tended to focus on one doctrine or to find that a 
potentially conflicting doctrine has in fact not been This 
approach, of course, has the aura of objectivity and avoids damage to already 
existing lines of law. Indeed, as we have seen, the instant problem offers a 
515. See infra notes 523-27 and accompanying text (discussing the "funnel of 
abstraction"). Courts' core institutional competence is also not policy decisions. 
516. See, e.g., Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 450-51 (2004) 
(holding that Eleventh Amendment was not implicated because undue hardship determination in 
Bankruptcy Court did not constitute a suit against the state for purposes of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,923-25 (1997) (finding that the 
Tenth Amendment prohibits "commandeering" of state officials under the Commerce Clause, 
and therefore the Necessary and Proper and Supremacy Clauses are not applicable); New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-80 (1992) (giving scant consideration to arguably 
competing constitutional provisions, such as the Necessary and Proper Clause, in relying on the 
Tenth Amendment to hold that Congress cannot force state legislatures to enact federal 
regulatory plans under the Commerce Clause); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,380-81 
(1992) (relying on First Amendment exclusively when case arguably also implicated 
Reconstruction Amendments); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-71 (1974) (drawing 
prospective-retrospective line for Young actions without balancing surrounding legal 
arguments); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City 
of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 151-60 (1992) (arguing that Supreme Court decision in 
R.A. V, should have considered the Reconstruction Amendments in addition to First Amendment 
doctrine). 
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supposed solution of this kind: the Fourteenth Amendment makes temporary 
takings doctrine applicable to the states, and though constitutional provisions 
are generally not self-executing, the unique nature of the Takings Clause, when 
applied against the states, trumps whatever immunity might usually bar such an 
action. The Fourteenth Amendment naturally supersedes the Eleventh 
Amendment, and so the immunity bar is hurdled.'17 
Though this interpretation is probably correct, it is not the entire story. 
Instead, it is a post-hoc rationalization of a more complicated inquiry that 
should consider the text, structure, and history behind the competing doctrines. 
It is understandable why judges and, for that matter, scholars sometimes shy 
away from the more explicit balancing that this Article presents. First, the 
inquiry is hard to focus; the questions are so numerous and intricate that it is 
not always easy to know when to stop digging and start assessing. Second, 
judicial weighing necessarily involves subjectivity out of vogue in American 
jurisprudence. Third, even if we can come up with a reasonable ledger of pros 
and cons, that ledger will not help us determine if there is a hierarchy among 
the various inquiries. Fourth, the common law roots of our legal system 
pressure judges to decide all cases by finding the relevant precedent.518 Fifth, a 
careful inquiry takes time and many pages. But, notwithstanding these 
concerns, courts, usually silently, do perform this kind of balancing in certain 
cases. Instead of pretending to reconcile the irreconcilable, courts should be 
more straightforward about the real factors shaping their decisions. 
There are two primary ways of balancing the principles here. The first is 
to ask which principle-temporary takings or state sovereign immunity-is 
more important in context. When plaintiffs sue state governments to recover 
for past talungs, should sovereign immunity be able to bar the action? The 
answer here seems easy. To sum up, temporary takings are no "different in 
5 17. Note that Professor Seamon offers a different way of reconciling the two doctrines. 
He takes state sovereign immunity as a bedrock principle and finds no chinks in its armor that 
will necessarily fail against a takings claim. See Seamon, supra note 8, at 1080-1 101 (arguing 
that unconsenting states are generally immune from takings suits in both federal and state 
courts). Relying on century-old case law, he then argues that due process sometimes requires 
state courts to provide rights of action for takings claimants against the states. See id. at 1 101- 
17 (arguing that due process trumps state sovereign immunity when a state does not provide a 
"reasonable, certain and adequate provision" for just compensation). Thus, sovereign immunity 
doctrine is not damaged but rather made to fit with turn-of-the-century due process cases. 
5 18. See Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United Stares: 
Paradoxes and Contrasts, 2 INT'L J .  CONST. L. 633, 636-37 (2004) (noting that, in 
constitutional adjudication, common law judges, in contrast to civil law judges, are constrained 
much more by precedent in their interpretive choices). This reliance on stare decisis is usually 
straight forward and appropriate-except in a case such as this one. 
COLLISION OF TAKINGS & STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 595 
kind from permanent takings."519 Because sovereign immunity does not bar 
regular takings suits-and because there is no argument that it should-it 
seems strange to extend that immunity to temporary takings. Accordingly, state 
sovereign immunity should not bar the vindication of this important right. 
A related, but different, means of balancing is to ask which principle we 
are more confident is correct.520 American law commonly treats propositions of 
law as either correct or incorrect; as Professor Lawson eloquently explains, "the 
law does not even consider applying to legal propositions any of the varied 
principles that govern the proof of factual propositions."52' But, as we have 
seen, propositions of law can be called into question, and not just because a 
change in the make-up of the Supreme Court could alter a doctrine. A doctrine 
like state sovereign immunity does have some significant historical roots and a 
practical justification. But it also seems contrary to many of our fundamental 
legal principles, and the history, at best, is controversial. Temporary takings 
doctrine, by way of contrast, though less rooted in historical practice, is 
generally accepted as uncontroversial (though the boundaries of what 
constitutes a taking are, of course, debatable). Presenting the problem this way, 
we pit a strong doctrine against a weak doctrine. American courts do not 
resolve problems this way, frequently for good reason. If law exists, it should 
not generally be treated as less definite because it is controversial. But in a case 
like this, where doctrines conflict and one must yield, it seems not only 
acceptable but desirable that we should account for the fact that one doctrine is 
more likely correct than the other. As Professor Lawson asks rhetorically: 
"Why is it important that courts always be able to give definitive interpretations 
of the law? The law certainly does not require that decisionmakers always be 
able to reach definitive conclusions about facts . . . and the system nonetheless 
works quite 
To carry out this second type of balancing-to weigh our confidence in 
competing laws--one might use what Professor Eskridge and others have 
called "the funnel of abstraction," an approach common in statutory 
interpretation but less often employed explicitly in constitutional 
5 19. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304,318 (1987). 
520. Obviously, these two methods can blend into each other and frequently will, as here, 
point in the same direction. 
521. Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859,895 (1992). 
522. Id. at 896. 
523. ESKRIDGEET AL., supra note 139, at 804-05 (describing "funnel of abstraction"). The 
funnel is presented as a descriptive theory of statutory interpretation that explains how judges go 
about deciding statutory cases, id. at 805, but because it gives more weight to the concrete 
inquiries that limit the range of arguments, it could also be said to be a normative presentation 
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Recognizing that different inquiries in statutory interpretation can point to 
different results, scholars have arranged the inquiries from most concrete to 
most abstract.524 Though each inquiry figures into the equation, the more 
concrete ones deserve more weight in the determination of the final answer.525 
Thus, statutory text, the most concrete inquiry, receives the greatest weight, 
followed by specific and general legislative history, legislative purpose, 
statutory evolution, and current A similar approach to constitutional 
interpretation would consider constitutional text; specific and general 
constitutional history (in this case, both the specific original intent behind the 
Takings Clause, Eleventh Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment and the 
more general assumptions underlying our constitutional framework); the 
purpose behind the relevant provisions and the Constitution generally; the 
evolution of our constitutional understanding; and current policy concerns.527 
This funnel does not find a precise niche for structural arguments, but they can 
be thought of as both textual, because a structuralist approach might be 
mandated by the Constitution itself,528 and purposive, because our 
constitutional values were arranged into a lean document from which we must 
discern meaning.529 
of how judges should cabin themselves in deciding statutory questions. 
524. Id. 
525. Id. 
526. Id. 
527. Professor Fallon offers a similar hierarchy of modes of constitutional interpretation, 
prioritizing text and then, in order, original intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and values. 
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constmctivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194-1209 (1987) (developing a "typology of constitutional 
argument"). Some have attempted to argue that, so long as one legitimate "modality" of 
argument is employed, the constitutional jurist need not select between approaches. See PHILIP 
BOBBETT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11-30 (1991) (discussing the "modalities" of 
constitutional argument and asserting that the modalities should not be used to justify particular 
ideologies of constitutional interpretation). While the challenge of selecting among "modalities" 
is very real, to deny the existence of interpretative hierarchy seems to ignore the fact that some 
inquiries are more subjective than others (though, admittedly, no inquiry is wholly objective) 
and that judges, recognizing this, frequently debate the relative legitimacy of different 
interpretative approaches. See Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Nonnative and Descriptive 
Constitutional Theory: 7?ze Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1787-90 (1997) 
("Supreme Court opinions abound with self conscious justifications of the modalities . . . . To 
describe constitutional law accurately thus requires an account of justification."). See generally 
, Tribe, supra note 8, at 85-89 (discussing approaches to constitutional analyses when competing 
modes of interpretation collide and summarizing Fallon, Bobbitt, and Dorf). 
528. See, e.g., Young, supra note 129, at 1625-30 & 1675 n.333 (arguing that the 
Guarantee Clause, "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the use of the word "state" 
throughout the Constitution are textual mandates for structural arguments). 
529. More so than in statutory interpretation, the different inquiries bleed into each other, 
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Indeed, the nature of structural constitutional arguments and the leanness 
of the Constitution itself suggest that the constitutional adjudicator need not 
follow the funnel as closely as the interpreter of statutes. Because our 
Constitution is so short, much of its meaning is not contained in the literal text; 
many of our most important constitutional principles are the product of judicial 
interpretation. We must therefore acknowledge that, at least in some instances, 
the Constitution's text, unlike a statutory text, is often not decisives3' and, 
accordingly, that the funnel exists more as a guide than a directive. In fact, in 
different constitutional cases, different factors turn out to be decisive. From 
this perspective, if there is any "hierarchy," as Professor Fallon insists:31 it is a 
loose one. 
Though the funnel's hierarchy is only marginally helpful to the 
constitutional adjudicator, the process of forcing the adjudicator to think 
through the different modes of argumentation is crucial. It is this kind of 
inquiry that will help identify which doctrine is more fundamental, both 
generally and in the context of the given doctrinal conflict. This balancing is 
far more common in foreign courts than in In most cases, our 
as our understanding of constitutional structure and purpose, for instance, is necessarily colored 
by our reading of the text, history, and evolution. In this way, no interpreter will be wholly 
neutral, as each will be influenced by his or her own hermeneutical biases. As Professor Ely 
pointed out, it is no earth-shattering insight that judges, whether consciously or unconsciously, 
"slip their personal values into their Ljudicial] reasonings." ELY, supra note 179, at 44. The 
inherent fallibility of judges might be reason to let the legislature decide whether or not to 
abrogate immunity. But that is a cop out. If it is emphatically the province of the judiciary to 
say what the law is, then the judiciary must decide whether congressional abrogation is required. 
530. There are exceptions of course. The Constitution's requirement that the President of 
the United States be at least thirty-five years of age, for instance, is a strict textual requirement 
that invites no judicial gloss. See U.S. CONST. art. II, $ 1, cl. 5 ("[Nleither shall any Person be 
eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the Age of Thirty-five Years . . . ."). 
53 1. See Fallon, supra note 527, at 1243-48 (arguing for hierarchy of "modalities"). 
532. The South African Constitution, for instance, contains one clause seeking the 
promotion of human dignity and another recognizing the constraints of economic realities. See 
S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 39 (requiring courts interpreting South African constitution to "promote 
the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom"); id. $ 36 (permitting courts interpreting South African Bill of Rights to take into 
account "all relevant factors" when considering limitations of rights). It thus balances 
competing constitutional principles against each other. See  THEW CHASKALSON AL., 
CONST~V~ONAL L WOF SOUTH AFRICA §$ 12-13(c) (5th ed. 1999) (noting balancing in this 
area of South African constitutional law). A comprehensive comparative study exceeds the 
scope of this Article, but it is uncontroversial that many other court systems also employ open 
balancing, particularly when examining the scope of constitutional rights. See Donald L. 
Beschle, Clearly Canadian? Hill v. Colorado and Free Speech Balancing in the UnitedStates 
and Canada, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187, 188-89 (2001) (noting that whereas Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms instructs Canadian courts to balance competing interests, 
United States Constitution encourages adherence to absolute principles and eschews such 
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precedent-driven common law system works well. But as many other legal 
systems around the world have acknowledged, some sort of balancing is 
necessary when two doctrines do not mesh. A funnel-like approach is a good 
way to line up the factors, even if we choose not to be constrained by a rigid 
hierarchy of "modalities." Indeed, though out of fashion in American 
jurisprudence, this kind of balancing offers a rigorous methodology for 
arbitrating irreconcilable collisions of this sort. As one commentator has 
explained: 
Open balancing compels a judge to take full responsibility for his decisions, 
and promises a particularized, rational concept of how he arrives at them- 
more particularized and more rational at least than the familiar parade of 
hallowed abstractions, elastic absolutes, and selective history. Moreover, 
this approach should make it more difficult for judges to rest on their 
predispositions without ever subjecting them to the test of reason. It should 
also make their accounts more rationally a~di table . '~~ 
There is, of court, as Ely warned, the danger that the balancing test will 
"become intertwined with ideological predispositions of those doing the 
balancing."534 But where doctrine cannot solve the problem, it is inevitable that 
balancing); Michael D. Bimhack & Jacob H. Rowbottom, Shielding Children: The European 
Way, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 175, 192 (2004) (noting that emerging constitutional and human 
rights jurisprudence, embedded in Article 10 of European Convention of Human Rights, does 
not shy away from explicit balancing); Victor Ferreres Comella, The Consequences of 
Centralizing Constitutional Review in a Special Court: Some Tlzoughts on Judicial Activism, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 1705,1712-13 (2004) (noting activist trend in European constitutional courts 
that embraces open ended inquiries like balancing); William E. Forbath & Lawrence Sager, 
Comparative Avenues in Constitutional Law: An Introduction, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1653, 1654 
(2004) (noting that European constitutional courts tend to address problems more directly--and 
be more "activeM-than United States courts, in part, because as constitutional courts, they have 
nothing else to do); Kevin W. Goering et al., Why U.S. Law Should Have Been Considered in 
the Rwanda Media Convictions, COMM. LAW., Spring 2004, at 10, 11 (2004) ("Whereas 
European courts (and others) balance constitutional. . . freedoms against one another, the 
United States begins with enumerated and absolute prohibitions and then proceeds by allowing 
exceptions in certain discrete situations."); Lorenzo Zucca, Book Review, 53 INT'L & COMP. 
L.Q. 247,247 (2004) (reviewing ROBERT A m y ,  A THEORY O F C O N S T ~ O N A L  RIGHTS (Julian 
Rivers trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002 (1986)) (noting that balancing constitutional rights is 
method used in European courts). 
533. Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the 
Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821,825-26 (1962). 
534. John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of 
Categoriziztion and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1501 
(1975); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Supreme Court Term 1991: Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22. 97 (1992) (explaining that historical swings 
demonstrate that "substantive theories of rules as conservative and standards as liberal---or vice 
versa-are wrong"). 
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judges' predispositions will at least color-if not entirely shape-their 
decisions. If anything, balancing in a scenario such as this helps judges avoid 
deciding a case without at least testing their convictions. It also forces judges 
to try to place the doctrines at issue in the broader legal landscape, so as not to 
lose the forest for the trees. 
After completing this balancing and lining up all the factors, the instant 
case, though doctrinally intricate, is in the end less controversial than it initially 
appeared.s35 Though many of the inquiries are complicated, most suggest that 
takings should trump state sovereign immunity. And while the origindist 
might disagree, even that is not certain. It then seems that the dicta in the First 
English footnote had it right. 
It should not be too surprising that the various inquiries here point towards 
the same answer, because there is substantial overlap among them.536 As the 
foregoing analysis has sought to demonstrate, text, structure, history, policy, 
and norms are not purely discrete categories but artificial organizing principles. 
To this extent, most arguments from a given approach will borrow at least 
somewhat from another methodology. And one's interpretive biases in one 
area will likely affect one's interpretations in another.537 There is a disquieting 
subjectivity to this admission, but that does not mean that the judicial enterprise 
cannot be taken seriously. Indeed, although judges' interpretations of a given 
problem will necessarily be colored by their interpretive biases, most can and 
will take the interpretive process seriously, seeking the right answer in each of 
the various modes of inquiry. Thus, while the inquiries are likely to bleed into 
each other, the mere effort to keep them discrete will help judges treat each one 
seriously. Quite often, this will be enough, for the answer will become 
obvious. 
535. This is perhaps unsurprising. As Professor Fallon posits in his "constructivist 
coherence theory," various categories of constitutional argument, though distinct, are 
sufficiently interconnected so that it usually is possible for a constitutional interpreter to reach 
"constructivist coherence" in which the various factors are not inconsistent with a single result. 
Fallon, supra note 527, at 1191-94. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that just 
because the various factors point in the same direction does not mean that the question was an 
easy one on first impression. 
536. See supra note 16 (noting that the categories of textual, structural, and historical 
arguments are not rigid). 
537. Professor Eskridge and others have referred to this phenomenon as the hermeneutical 
circle. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLIJM. L. REV. 609, 
650 (1990) (discussing Gadamer's Truth and Method and Gadarner's use of "hermeneutical 
circle"); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321,35 1-52 (1990) (explaining the hermeneutical circle idea that 
no interpretive thread can be viewed in isolation so that each interpretive thread will be 
evaluated in relation to other threads). 
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The instant conflict is such a case; unlike some constitutional dilemmas, 
resolving this one does not greatly risk the imposition of judges' values on an 
unwilling democracy.538 Rather, with a doctrinal collision, one must admit that 
both lines of precedent exist for a reason and try to pick the solution that 
honestly recognizes the problem while doing the least collective damage. Of 
course, it would be nalve to assume that judges' initial weighing within each 
category will not be suspect to personal values, but as Ely, Bickel, and others 
have long recognized, this is inevitable. 
This case has no easy doctrinal solution; in fact, it has no doctrinal 
"solution" at all because the governing case law is irreconcilable. Many 
important and fascinating legal questions are about thinking small-about 
wrestling with the finer points of statutes and case law and coming up with the 
answer that the sources command. In this case, however, thinking small does 
not resolve the problem. It is important to see how we got where we are, and it 
can be useful to ask if precedent leans one way or the other. But to resolve a 
case like this, courts must think about their very role in our democracy. 
The danger, of course, is that this is countermajoritarian and places more 
power in the hands of judges. A case like this is different, however, because it 
not only involves the Constitution but competing constitutional provisions. If 
constitutional rights are to be truly constitutional-and are to demand 
protection regardless of majority whim-then the judiciary must play some role 
in arbitrating these conflicts.539 Notwithstanding perfectly legitimate concerns 
about the countermajoritarian problem, it is inevitable that these questions will 
come before courts, and it is essential that courts themselves decide them. The 
Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, exist partially to protect 
individuals from the excesses of government, and when those protected rights 
are challenged, it would be contrary to the Constitution's text, structure, and 
purpose to throw them right back to the legislature. But that is what the Court 
would do were it to require congressional abrogation of takings claims against 
the states. 
538. See ELY, supra note 179, at 71 (noting that Professor Bickel recognized that "[ilt 
wouldn't do . . . for the justices simply to impose their own values"). 
539. As Madison explained: 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal controls on govemment would be necessary. In 
framing a govemment which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; 
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 218, at 33 1. 
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The states as sovereign entities are surely central in our constitutional plan, 
but to hold their sovereignty as more essential than the individual rights they 
were created to safeguard is to prioritize the means before the ends. This is not 
to say that these questions are easy, and surely there is value in retaining-r, 
as it were, reviving-a healthy federalism. There is a real danger of subjecting 
state treasuries to the avarice of pecuniary minded citizens, and it would be 
simplistic not to admit that protecting these state treasuries is, in a way, also 
protecting citizens' individual rights. But when we step back and ask how 
better to protect individual rights-permitting a suit claiming a constitutional 
violation or barring such a suit to preserve a state's dignity-the former is 
clearly more convincing. This answer, of course, assumes that individual rights 
are our core constitutional value, but given the Founders' own appeal to this 
value in defense of the new government's federalist structure, this assumption 
seems consistent with our Constitution's history and structure. That our 
government leaves much to process is incontrovertible, but the ultimate 
decision to enshrine some individual rights in the text itself takes certain issues 
out of that process. This is to put the discussion at a high level of abstraction, 
to be sure, but the question must be asked: What is a constitutional right if its 
protection must be ensured first by the legislature? 
For most rights, the answer to that question is complicated because our 
judiciary does not have the power to award any remedy it wishes. The tension 
between individual rights and the protection of the legislature's budget runs 
deep. But the Takings Clause is different because, unlike most other 
provisions, it promises a specific remedy.5* Nothing in the Eleventh 
Amendment purports to trump this.541 Indeed, text, structure, and, I would 
540. What might be troubling for liberals in this analysis is that it prioritizes property over 
other rights that might seem more fundamental. Why should individuals with takings claims be 
entitled to remedies not available to those who suffer physical abuse at the hands of the 
government? The easy answer here is that the Constitution, by confemng upon property rights 
an anomalous constitutionally compelled remedy, makes this decision for us. Judges wary of 
constraining regulation too much might scale back what constitutes a taking, but once triggered, 
the clause demands a particular remedy. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1825-26 
("[Tlhe just compensation clause mandat[es] government compensation for takings of 
property. "). 
541. A more controversial argument would be that all individual constitutional rights 
should trump state sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity would still apply for statutory 
rights and state law but would avoid potential constitutional conflict by steering clear of those 
particular rights. Indeed, to the extent that current immunity doctrine rests on highly contested 
accounts of a preconstitutional common law, it seems wrong that it can block suits against states 
involving constitutional rights. The Court's recognition that Mr. Bivens deserved a damages 
remedy, then, is a normatively powerful argument in favor of automatic abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity of other constitutional rights. As a legal matter, this is an even harder issue 
than my narrower takings hypothetical, but it is not hopeless. After all, the Court in Alden did 
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argue, history all suggest that the Takings Clause should trump state sovereign 
immunity. But, admitting that these inquiries, individually and collectively, are 
difficult, there comes a point when the jurist must step back from a thorny issue 
and ask which answer is more closely tethered to our deepest constitutional 
values. From that perspective, placing aside all the complexities, this is an easy 
case. 
note that there was something different when an "obligation arises from the Constitution itself." 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,740 (1999) 
